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PROACTIVE POLICING AGAINST STREET-LEVEL DRUG TRAFFICKING

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INTRODUCTION

Studies of the police have failed to identify any strategies guaranteed effective in reducing crime, and a number of scholars now agree that the mere expansion of traditional policing techniques will have little or no impact on crime rates; they argue that if police departments are to respond more effectively to both crime and citizen fear of crime, they must develop new strategies of policing, Jerome Skolnick and David Bayley (1986), for example, have suggested that urban police departments free more personnel from the reactive mode of operation — where officers respond to criminal "events" as they occur — and deploy them proactively in response to chronic criminal "situations" that exist in specific neighborhoods. Skolnick and Bayley examined a number of innovative strategies being used around the country and concluded that, in spite of shortcomings, they offer a useful and exciting addition to traditional methods of policing.

The New York City Police Department has recently developed a number of special proactive operations, designed to supplement its predominantly reactive system. This paper will describe and evaluate Operation Pressure Point (OPP), a project created to disrupt the drug traffic which had, for several years, been expanding on the streets of Manhattan's Lower East Side. Data for this analysis were obtained through examination of police reports and documents, as

an observer on patrol with OPP forces during the summer of 1985, and in extensive, open-ended interviews with community members, drug users, drug treatment personnel, police administrators, and rank-and-file police officers from the Lower East Side.

OPERATION PRESSURE POINT AS AN INNOVATIVE POLICE STRATEGY

The multifaceted role of the police prevents any complete classification of policing strategies, but two dichotomous schemes of police work are useful for comparing more traditional policing strategies with recent innovations. James Q. Wilson (1968) has categorized police work as oriented toward either "order maintenance" or "crime control;" Albert Reiss (1971) has classified police interventions as either "proactive" or "reactive." Every police department utilizes both proactive and reactive interventions, oriented toward both order maintenance and crime control, but over the last several decades, most urban police departments have emphasized reactive crime-control strategies, hoping they would help in the fight against serious crime. Today, more proactive order-maintenance tactics such as those outlined by Skolnick and Bayley (1986) are being tried as police departments around the country renew their effort to fight some of the criminal "situations" which have proven resistant to strictly crime-control methods.

Fighting serious crime and catching criminals have always been crucial aspects of policing, but before the mid-1960s or so, order-maintenance was an important function as well. Police officers often worked particular neighborhoods for an extended period and helped to enforce community standards of conduct through both moral authority and the arrest of persons engaging in "disreputable" behavior. According to James Q. Wilson and George Kelling (1982: 34), "the objective was order, an inherently ambiguous term but a condition that people in a given neighborhood recognized when they saw it."

Maintaining orderly neighborhoods involved proactive, more than reactive, intervention strategies. Rather than waiting for specific complaints from citizens about undesirable or criminal conduct, police officers patrolled the streets and monitored the behavior of persons assumed most likely to violate community standards — strangers, youth, drunks and the like. The police might have re-

quested that such persons alter their behavior or leave the neighborhood, requests that the police could back up with an arrest on charges of vagrancy, drunkenness or disorderly conduct.

There are a number of reasons why the order-maintenance function lost ground to a crime-control orientation in the mid-1960s. For one, the rate of serious crime in the country began to rise, a trend that would continue into the 1980s. Several presidential commissions appointed to study the crime problem consistently pointed to police reform as an important component of any crime-reduction package.¹ Police scholars called for increased professionalism (Saunders, 1970; President's Commission, 1967b), greater utilization of scientific and technological advances (Clark, 1970; President's Commission, 1967c), and improvements in police response time (President's Commission, 1967), all suggestions oriented toward catching criminals for specific crimes rather than maintaining orderly neighborhoods. Several researchers even suggested that the service and order-maintenance functions of the police be turned over to less highly trained personnel, freeing police resources for the fight against serious crime (Cumming et al., 1965, Garmire, 1972; Palmer, 1973; President's Commission, 1967b). This official separation of function did not occur but most police departments did begin to more systematically dispatch patrol cars on the basis of the seriousness of a call, a process facilitated by adoption of centralized reporting (often through a 911 system). The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973) urged that special attention be paid to the society's five most serious crimes: homicide, rape, assault, robbery and burglary. The kind of disreputable behavior handled (often informally) within the order-maintenance role was automatically given a low priority in this fight against serious crime, especially as police resources were stretched thin during the urban fiscal crisis of the 1970s.

Order maintenance also suffered with the more general demise of the neighborhood cop during this period. The focus on crime fighting and rapid response time required a mobile police force, unattached to specific communities, allowing officers to respond to reports of serious crime over a wide geographical area. The removal of police officers from regular neighborhood beats was also encouraged by efforts to solve the problem of police corruption (McNamara, 1976; Walker, 1977; Gardiner, 1970) By breaking the close bond between officers and those they policed, law enforcement

officials hoped to prevent the charges of corruption that had scandalized several large departments during the 1970s (Goldstein, 1975; Sherman, 1974; Knapp Commission, 1972). Removed from daily contact with specific neighborhoods, patrol officers thus lost both the opportunity and motivation to enforce the standards of conduct critical to order maintenance.

The order-maintenance role of the police also became highly politicized during this period. By its very nature, the enforcement of "community standards" requires the police to accept the legitimacy of some citizens' standards over others, and especially in communities divided on the basis of class, race or ethnicity, this can exacerbate, rather than soothe, neighborhood tensions and open the door to charges of discrimination against the police. In some communities, proactive, order-maintenance policing defined the police as an "occupying army" (Wilson, 1972; Silberman, 1978; Rubinstein, 1973), one that may have contributed to the eruption of ghetto riots in the late 1960s (Jacob, 1980; National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1967). This was simply not a good time for the police to perform a function that required consensus over standards of conduct. Not surprisingly, during this period of turmoil the police willingly withdrew from the communities they served and relinquished order maintenance in favor of a more legalistic, crime-fighting orientation.

The ascendancy of the crime-fighting model — responding to serious crime as it is reported ~ led automatically to a decrease in proactive policing. Proactive strategies continued to be used, especially in the battle against vice crime (gambling, prostitution, drug trafficking), but such enforcement was largely taken away from regular patrol forces and placed within separate units that, freed from the reactive system, could investigate them more efficiently and could, themselves, be monitored more closely for signs of corruption (Jacob, 1984). The duties of the patrol force, the largest proportion of officers in all departments, became more and more devoted to roving patrol, with cars dispatched to the scene of a crime in response to an incoming call.

It is this general model of policing — professional, highly bureaucratized, technological, legalistic, and impersonal - that was urged by numerous police researchers, reformers, and government commissions over the last few decades. It is also a model that many now realize has failed to reduce crime or the fear of crime substan-

tially (Silberman, 1978; Skolnick & Bayley, 1986; MacGillis, 1983; Wilson, 1985). James Q. Wilson and George Kelling (1982) have urged a return to the order-maintenance function, not only because citizens want more orderly neighborhoods, but because disorder itself, beginning with the "broken window" left unattended, creates an environment in which serious crime can occur more easily. Others have suggested that more police resources be devoted to proactive policing strategies which attack specific crime problems rather than crime in general; Herman Goldstein (1979) calls for "problem-oriented" policing, James Q. Wilson (1985) for "crime-specific" policing, and Ronald Clarke (1983) and Engstad and Evans (1980) for "situational" policing. David Farmer (1984) advocates allocation of police resources by neighborhood, or even by street, in response to the crime problems that plague certain areas.

In the 1980s, the crime problem that plagues many inner-city neighborhoods is street-level drug trafficking. As traditional efforts to reduce both the supply of drugs and the demand for drugs have failed, public officials have increasingly advocated that more law enforcement dollars be deployed proactively, to "take back the streets" from drug buyers and sellers. Operation Pressure Point (OPP) is an early example of this type of innovative, community-oriented intervention against drug trafficking: an aggressive, proactive strategy with both crime-fighting and order-maintenance goals. By disrupting the sale of drugs on the streets of the lower East Side (a crime itself), the police were also hoping that OPP would decrease drug-related crime, particularly the robberies, burglaries, and violence associated with the drug trade.² At the same time, OPP was an order-maintenance strategy, oriented toward improving the quality of life in the community as a whole and enforcing the standards of conduct of the increasingly affluent population that had gradually begun to move into the area. After more than three years of Pressure Point, drug trafficking became much less visible (and almost disappeared in some sections); the official crime rate declined; and people in the community began to feel more comfortable using many of the parks and public areas that were once "owned" by drug sellers, buyers, and other "undesirables." The Lower East Side was far from transformed into an orderly, crime-free community, and the changes which occurred may not be permanent, but the changes were substantial and speak well for the potential of proactive, crime-specific policing to relieve particular communities of particular forms of

crime. This does not mean that similar operations would necessarily work as well in the other communities. The following sections will describe OPP in more detail, focusing on its accomplishments, its limitations, and the dilemmas it created for the police.

CREATION OF OPERATION PRESSURE POINT

By the early 1980s open drug dealing on city streets had become a fact of urban life (Beschner & Brower, 1985; Hanson, 1985). On New York's Lower East Side the commerce had become so conspicuous that the area gained a local reputation as "a drug supermarket" and a national reputation as "the most open heroin market in the nation."³ Police videotapes taken before OPP show long lines of double-parked cars, hundreds of people milling around waiting to purchase heroin and cocaine, sellers shouting out the "brand names"⁴ and prices of their drugs, and others openly advertising "works" — hypodermic needles — guaranteed clean for two or three dollars. Enterprising young men and women sometimes searched the crowd, looking for novice customers who might be willing to pay to have someone else "score" for them. When long lines formed behind dealers, waiting buyers at the end of the line were sometimes offered "express service," for a fee. On some blocks, vendors set up their carts, selling hot dogs and sodas to the crowd; portable radios competed with the shouting. The unaware might have thought, for a moment, that they had stumbled upon a block party or street festival.⁵

The Lower East Side of Manhattan has a long history as a "port of entry" neighborhood, having housed the steady stream of immigrants coming into the country during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was once the location of a variety of poor, but fairly stable ethnic communities. By the 1980s, however, the area had been undergoing several decades of decay and decline, as the housing stock deteriorated and many second- and third-generation Americans moved into more middle-class communities. As the local population declined, businesses left the area and entire blocks of old tenements were destroyed, burned out, or simply abandoned, providing an ideal location for expansion of a drug trade that had been there for a long time. Empty buildings were turned into drug warehouses, storefront selling operations, and shooting galleries. Empty

streets meant an absence of people to complain about the expanding trafficking in drugs.

At the same time, the drug traffic was expanding on the Lower East Side, police attention to street drug trading was declining, in part because of budget cutbacks and decrease in police personnel (Smith, 1984). Between 1976 and 1984 there was a 29 percent decrease in uniformed officers in New York City as a whole, from approximately 24,000 to about 17,000. The Lower East Side precincts⁶ fared even worse, going from 733 officers to 492 — a decrease of 33 percent.⁷ During this same period, the overall crime rate rose substantially,⁸ and in an effort to deploy personnel in response to serious crimes, the police gave citizen complaints of drug dealing on the streets a low priority, not only on the Lower East Side, but elsewhere in the city as well.⁹ The Narcotics Division, devoted to drug enforcement, also lost personnel during this period and, after 1970, began to focus most of its resources on long-term investigations of the high-level distribution system rather than street-level sales (Belenko, 1981). After 1970, a year in which the New York City police made over 50,000 drug-related arrests, the number of drug arrests declined sharply, and for the years 1973 to 1980 averaged between 17,000 and 18,000 (Belenko, 1981). With the waning risk of arrest and prosecution, street-level dealers were able to expand their operations, and as the volume of drug dealing increased, police effectiveness decreased even further. Patrol forces made occasional one-day "sweeps" through the area, making large numbers of arrests, but any individual's chance of arrest remained small. Drug traffic was hardly interrupted, returning to "normal" the following day.

The inability of the police to enforce the law made the Lower East Side particularly attractive to drug buyers. There was already a substantial population of drug users living in the neighborhood where, as in other poor urban areas, heroin use had become more prevalent after World War II (Chein et al., 1964; Waldorf, 1975; Johnson & Lipton 1984). In the 1970s, as the area lost population and began to deteriorate, drug users from elsewhere may have migrated to the Lower East Side, attracted by low rents or the opportunity to live rent-free in one of the growing number of abandoned buildings. This resident-user population provided a ready market for drug sellers and provided the supply of street-level workers necessary for expansion of the drug trade.

The Lower East Side also became an increasingly attractive market for drug consumers who lived outside the area. The area had a reputation for particularly high quality drugs, with higher potency than those available elsewhere in the city (Goldstein et al. 1984). Small-time dealers could reportedly buy drugs on the Lower East Side and, by cutting and reselling them, quickly turn a profit in another district.¹⁰ Individual drug users from other parts of the city and from neighboring states also came to the Lower East Side because it was easily accessible and anonymous. Numerous bridges and tunnels connect lower Manhattan with Brooklyn, Long Island, Staten Island, and New Jersey, making it easy to enter and exit. And because of its ethnic mix, the Lower East Side may have been particularly attractive to out-of-town white buyers who were reluctant to frequent open drug markets in predominantly black areas like Harlem.

For a variety of reasons, then, the Lower East Side was ripe for expansion of the drug trade. Dealers became increasingly blatant, gradually spreading into occupied as well as abandoned blocks, and the area's reputation as a buyer's paradise, offering little threat of arrest and no need for an established connection, rapidly grew. The situation was clearly beyond the capacity of the regular precinct forces to solve, and even the permanent assignment of several Special Narcotic Enforcement Units (SNEUs) to the Lower East Side precincts in 1982 was a matter of "too little, too late." Many officers no doubt felt the frustration and resignation voiced by an officer who had spent nearly thirty years policing the Lower East Side:

There was nothing we could do. There were some blocks in the precinct that I avoided as much as possible because it was embarrassing to see them; it was embarrassing to be a police officer and see the law broken in front of your eyes and know there was nothing you could do.

The people involved in the drug scene appreciated the impotence of the police. A drug user who occasionally worked on the streets reported:

There was nothing the police could do. There were more of us than there were of them and for every seller they arrested, there were ten people waiting to take his place on the street. The police were more of a nuisance than any-

thing. I'd think "like, why do they bother coming out here at all?"

Many people in the community had also given up hope that their streets could be recaptured. One long-time resident said:

I had totally stopped complaining to the police. Every time I called, they said they'd send a car, but I'd seldom see one. Many of my neighbors had moved out, but I had no place to go. There was no choice but to just live with it, day after day and stay indoors as much as possible.

Not everyone accepted the situation as hopeless, however, and in the early 1980s a number of citizen groups formed on the Lower East Side to confront the problem. In 1983, one such group began to hold monthly candlelight vigils on some of the most drug-infested street corners.¹¹ They also organized several protest marches, including one that ended at the mayor's residence. Eventually, the media were aroused, and New York newspapers and local television stations ran a series of exposés. The *New York Daily News*, for example, ran a cover story entitled "Is This Any Place for Children?" with a picture of day-care workers and children walking past junkies.¹² Several local politicians, who had for years been fielding the complaints of Lower East Side residents, also voiced outrage. Some residents cynically attributed the politicians' response to pressure generated by real estate interests as certain Lower East Side blocks, after decades of decline, were beginning to show the early signs of gentrification.¹³

Early in 1984, the New York Police Department responded to these various community and political pressures by launching Operation Pressure Point (OPP), a massive police initiative involving the deployment of over 240 additional officers into the high-drug areas of the Lower East Side. Operation Pressure Point was the brainchild of New York's new police commissioner, Benjamin Ward, a man who came into office especially concerned about the problem of drugs and committed to implementing a more community-oriented approach to policing.¹⁴ Operation Pressure Point fit well into Ward's agenda and gave him a highly visible and newsworthy project with which to begin his administration.

THE OPERATION

Operation Pressure Point forces moved into the Lower East Side with strength and confidence, quickly establishing an imposing police presence in the community. The team was made up primarily of uniformed patrol officers, many just out of the police academy, who swept through the streets, mostly on foot, dispersing the crowds, giving out parking tickets, conducting searches, and making arrests. Extra officers assigned from the Housing Police and the Transit Police used similar tactics on the grounds of the public housing projects and in subway stations within the Pressure Point area. In the first few weeks, mounted police rode through and cleared the parks, and the canine unit was used to empty out the abandoned buildings which had been turned into drug warehouses and shooting galleries. The Organized Crime Control Bureau (OCCB) conducted hidden surveillance operations and engaged in "buy and bust" arrests. Police helicopters sometimes hovered overhead, watching the rooftops for possible counterattacks against the police.

Operation Pressure Point substantially increased the risk of arrest for the drug buyers and sellers who previously had been almost immune. In the first month, the police made over 2,000 drug-related arrests, an average of about 67 per day. After five months, the arrest total was close to 7,000 and after seventeen months, almost 14,000. Not only did OPP increase the risk of arrest, but its leaders also sought severe sentences for those apprehended. The U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York agreed to process all arrests made one day each week through the federal court system, where penalties for drug offenses are more severe than those of New York State and where judges have a "street reputation" as being tougher than state court judges. The federal courts did, in fact, hand out substantially harsher penalties,¹⁵ and although it is difficult to quantify their impact, the police believe that rumors of "federal day" produced a notable decrease in the volume of drug traffic.

The police department also raised the cost of Pressure Point arrests by eliminating the Desk Appearance Ticket (DAT) system that ordinarily allows many persons charged with misdemeanors to be released from custody with notice of a court appearance date.¹⁶ A DAT arrest imposes no immediate cost on the offender and may result in no punishment at all if the courts fail to locate defaulted

DATs.¹⁷ The elimination of DATs meant that all Pressure Point arrestees were immediately subjected to the full arrest, booking, and arraignment process and, especially in the first few months of mass arrests and backed-up courts, they often had to spend several days in jail before gaining release. Every Pressure Point arrest thus represented not only a first stage in the criminal process, but also an "immediate intervention" (Goldstein, 1977); every arrestee, even those against whom charges were later dropped or who were acquitted, was subjected to some sanction.

Even when unable to make arrests, OPP forces tried to discourage involvement in the drug trade by acting as what Sagarin and McNamara (1972) call a "judicial punitive body." This is a euphemism for harassing suspicious people in a "known drug area" by stopping them, questioning them, searching them, and telling them to "move on."¹⁸ The police find this type of intervention useful because it does not take officers off the street to do the paperwork that accompanies an arrest. The cost to the alleged offender is substantially less when the police harass rather than arrest, but a greater number of interventions per officer can occur.¹⁹

This harassment strategy became especially useful to the OPP patrol force as the months wore on, not only because manpower was reduced,²⁰ but also because street selling became less blatant and less frequent in response to the earlier efforts. In the early days of Pressure Point, arrests were guaranteed, but both buyers and sellers quickly altered their behavior in response to the police threat, making early police tactics gradually less effective. Buyers, for example, began to spend less time on the street, trying to decrease the possibility of arrest:

Buying drugs used to be an all-day affair. You'd hang around, shooting the breeze, maybe picking up a little work [in one of the street operations]. Now, I get my drugs and get out of the area as quickly as possible. Nobody 'shoots up' on the block anymore; it's just too dangerous.

Drug sellers also adapted to the police presence by varying the location and time of sales,²¹ selling in larger quantities,²² and employing more helpers. "Steerers" began to walk the streets, notifying buyers of the time and location of the next sale; more "lookouts" appeared, sending warning signals when the police drew near. Sellers

stayed on the street for only short periods of time, distributing drugs to buyers who had already paid their money to another worker. As the whole drug operation adjusted itself to decrease the risk of detection and arrest, Pressure Point patrol officers turned more and more to monitoring the street population, harassing anyone who appeared to be involved in the drug trade, and encouraging the very changes in drug trafficking that made it more difficult for them to make arrests.

The demise of the blatant "drug supermarket" increased the usefulness of undercover surveillance operations aimed at drug sellers who, because they make only brief appearances on the street, are often able to avoid both arrest and harassment by the patrol force. On a surveillance operation, one officer concealed in an observation post uses binoculars to watch drug transactions taking place and then radios a description of buyers to officers waiting in cars outside the observation area. Several buyers will be arrested as they leave the purchase area before the police move in to arrest the seller. This type of operation can be very effective, but is difficult to organize because it requires considerable manpower, knowledge of possible sale locations, the cooperation of someone in the community to provide the lookout post, and adequate advanced planning — especially coordination with the patrol force to make sure it does not disrupt the sale before it takes place. Even then, surveillance operations are not foolproof, and may fail to catch the sophisticated dealer who can decrease the chance of detection by employing lookouts to patrol surrounding blocks, look for police cars, and report back by walkie-talkie.

Recognizing the limitations of a pure law enforcement strategy for fighting a problem as entrenched as the Lower East Side's drug trade, the police department supplemented it with community-based programs designed to strengthen the neighborhood and increase resident support of the police effort. As part of the Neighborhood Involvement Program (NIP), OPP officials met with church and community groups to develop programs that would encourage residents to report drug sales on their blocks. This eventually led to establishment of a special hotline, allowing callers to bypass the centralized reporting system and telephone anonymous tips directly to the Pressure Point office. The program not only sought to improve enforcement (by providing the police with information), but also to

involve Lower East Side citizens more directly in the fight against drugs.

The Police Department's Community Affairs Division also became more active on the Lower East Side, adding extra officers to each of the Pressure Point precincts. This allowed them to expand their work with local community groups and help residents form block associations to plan outdoor activities designed to "recapture" the public spaces "liberated" by the police. In two of the three Lower East Side precincts, Community Patrol Officer Programs were created, and specially selected officers began to work with residents, business people, and community groups to solve the problems of individual blocks and neighborhoods, whether directly related to drugs or not. Police officials also sought the cooperation of other city agencies, encouraging them to demolish city-owned abandoned buildings being used in the drug trade, improve garbage pickup, sweep the streets, and tow away abandoned cars. By promoting general improvements on the Lower East Side, the police hoped to make the streets more attractive to residents who would then use them more, thus making them less available to drug traffickers.

IMPACT OF OPP ON THE DRUG TRADE AND DRUG-RELATED CRIME

The package of law enforcement and community-oriented strategies making up Operation Pressure Point led not only to changes in how drugs were marketed on the Lower East Side, but also to what all observers agree was a noticeable decrease in the volume of the drug traffic itself.²³ There are a number of possible explanations for this decrease. It may be that OPP forced a reduction in the demand for drugs, and that simply because of the police presence, some drug users stopped buying drugs altogether or decreased their consumption. There is no evidence of Pressure Point putting additional strain on New York City's drug treatment facilities,²⁴ but both James Q. Wilson (1985) and Mark Moore (1977) suggest that it may be relatively new (and still unaddicted) drug users who can best be deterred by raising the costs of "copping." Bruce Johnson's (1984) research suggests that even chronic heroin users vary their daily intake considerably and occasionally experience days of total abstinence. So, at least some portion of the reduced volume might have

been due to a reduction in the number of people seeking drugs on any given day.

A second explanation for the reduced volume of drug buyers on the Lower East Side after OPP is that some portion of the drug traffic moved to other locations. Within a few months of implementation, OPP was expanded to include some neighboring blocks which had not previously been high-drug areas and the police department created two additional, although smaller, operations (Pressure Point II and Pressure Point III) to attack drug traffic in other parts of the city. Some drug operations reportedly moved out of Manhattan altogether, relocating to other New York City boroughs, New Jersey, and Long Island. Established drug markets in Harlem may also have expanded their operations, taking on some of the business deflected from the Lower East Side.²⁵

The police take the view that they were especially successful in ridding the Lower East Side of "out-of-town" buyers. Persons residing outside of New York City never constituted a large proportion of arrestees ~ only 14.2 percent in the first five months of Pressure Point, and 11.6 in the following year. However, a visual survey of the drug traffic two years after implementation, compared with police videotapes of pre-OPP, does reveal a difference in clientele. Pre-OPP, many of the buyers were white, and many appeared to be middle class — men with briefcases, wearing business suits, and women with babies in back-pack carriers. By 1985, white faces were scarce; in fact, police on patrol in high-drug areas of the Lower East Side automatically viewed any white person with suspicion. Cars with New Jersey license plates, which OPP officers report were once double parked along some blocks, had virtually disappeared.

If OPP forced some drug operations to move to new locations, this was probably more a result of police pressure on buyers than on sellers. Drug sellers are accustomed to the possibility of arrest, accepting it as a built-in cost of doing business (Luksetich & White 1982), and even the threat of extraordinarily severe punishments may not deter them. When New York State increased penalties under the "Rockefeller Drug Laws," it did not reduce the number of drug dealers or the supply of drugs available in the state (Japha et al. 1977; U.S. Department of Justice, 1978); and according to data gathered by the New York City Criminal Justice Agency (CJA), the sentences imposed on drug sellers arrested during the first month of OPP and subsequently convicted were not terribly severe.

Of 716 felony sale arrests analyzed by CJA, the large majority were settled in Criminal Court with guilty pleas to misdemeanors; only 131 defendants (less than one-fifth) were convicted on felony charges and only 87 persons were Jailed, with almost half of them (40 people) serving one year or less.²⁶ Some longer sentences were given out,²⁷ but these data suggest that the cost of selling drugs (at least in the first month of OPP) may not have been high enough to turn a substantial number of people away from the business. In addition, those who were deterred by the threat of imprisonment (or incapacitated by actual imprisonment) were, in all likelihood, easily replaced. Street-level dealers are a fluid group, made up primarily of drug users who sell to support their own use and local adolescents, anxious to earn easy money. Many work the streets only sporadically and are, as one local user/part-time dealer put it, "a dime a dozen." The arrest of even a large number of street dealers might not force a drug operation to move its location. In fact, perhaps the only thing that could force a drug operation to move is a reduction in buyers. If OPP made buyers afraid to buy drugs on the Lower East Side, then at least some number of dealers might have been motivated to relocate to areas where buyers felt safer.

The increased threat of arrest under OPP might be expected to have more impact on drug buyers than on sellers and, to some extent, buyers were a main target of this operation. Nearly half of all arrests were for misdemeanor possession; another nearly 10 percent were for loitering for the purpose of buying drugs. Conviction on these charges tends not to result in severe punishment, especially compared to the sentences meted out for drug sale: almost half of those arrested on misdemeanor charges were released quickly, with no imprisonment at all; of those who did receive jail time, the large majority (64.8 percent) received a sentence of "time served." Only 3.2 percent were given jail terms of over 90 days.²⁸ While these dispositions may seem mild, they are perhaps sufficient to deter some drug purchasers, particularly occasional users with legitimate employment and reputations that could be hurt by an arrest record. The police were hoping, in fact, that some buyers could be deterred by traffic summonses and in the first year, gave out more than 62,000 in the Pressure Point area. By harassing drug users — subjecting them not only to arrest and detention, but also parking tickets, towed cars, and the like — the police were hoping especially to discourage "out-of-towners" from buying drugs on the Lower East Side. The decreased

volume of the drug traffic and the changes in clientele suggest that some of these buyers did stop buying on the Lower East Side; in some cases, markets may have moved to them.

Drug users indigenous to the Lower East Side were more resistant than outsiders to OPP and more easily adapted to the changes in street dealing that it created. One Lower East Side drug user explained how "scoring" became more complicated and time consuming:

For the first time in a long time, I had to start worrying about where I was going to get my stuff. Before Pressure Point, it was there any time you wanted it, day or night. Suddenly, I had to make phone calls to get information; then sometimes, you'd go to the spot and no one would be there. Eventually, you'd get your drugs but it might take all day. And right away, you'd start worrying about tomorrow.

To minimize the chance of arrest, local buyers began to stay off the streets as much as possible, but still recognized that buying was riskier than before:

With Pressure Point, the police would arrest you just for being on the streets. One day I got work transporting drugs for someone; I was carrying a couple of bundles and was scared shitless being on the street. Later that day, when I was perfectly clean, I got busted for loitering just because I was walking in a "known drug area." Everyone I know got arrested during Pressure Point.

Other local users turned to the "inside operations" which are generally unavailable to outsiders:

I have a lot of connections in the area and have worked with the distributors, so when the police came on strong I avoided the street and started getting my stuff from this guy who works out of an apartment in the projects. He doesn't let you in if he doesn't know you.

Some Lower East Side users may have (raveled outside the Pressure Point area to buy their drugs, but this user's attitude may be more typical:

I'm not going to travel all over the city -- riding the trains - just to buy drugs. There's always a risk. Hell, I was arrested probably a dozen times before Pressure Point; it's all part of using drugs.

Not all drug users, then, are deterred from buying by the increased threat of arrest. OPP pushed out out-of-town buyers, but many local buyers remained; the drug trade did not disappear, but it was reduced and made less blatant.

Going along with the decrease in drug trafficking on the Lower East Side was a decrease in the often drug-related property crimes of robbery and burglary. Within two months of Pressure Point's inception, a police department news release claimed a 52.1 percent decrease in robbery and a 35 percent decrease in burglary.²⁹ Data gathered over the six month period from January to June 1984 show a slightly lower decrease, although still a substantial one. Table 1 compares the robbery and burglary rates for the Pressure Point area with other areas of the city for 1983 (pre-OPP) and 1984. Since the entire city of New York experienced a decrease in robbery and burglary during this period, not all of the decrease in the Pressure Point area can be attributed to the operation itself. However, the decrease in crime on the Lower East Side was considerably larger than for the city as a whole, and the area immediately surrounding OPP also experienced a more substantial decrease in crime than the remainder of the city.

Although these data regarding the impact of OPP on property crime are interesting, we do not know how much crime was actually deterred and how much was displaced to the other parts of the city (and even beyond) where some of the drug traffic became relocated. These other areas might have experienced some of the crime that, without OPP, would have been committed on the Lower East Side. For the Lower East Side, however, OPP meant not only less drug traffic, but less drug-related crime.

Table 1

ROBBERIES AND BURGLARIES IN OPP AREA AND OTHER AREAS OF NEW YORK CITY*

ROBBERY			
	Jan..June '83	Jan.-June '84	% Change
OPP Area	67	37	^-4.8
3 OPP Precincts (minus OPP area)	800	629	-21.4
Borough of Manhattan South (minus OPP area)	5,301	5,089	-4.0
New York City"	42,022	39,771	-5.4
BURGLARY			
	Jan.-June '83	Jaiu-June '84	% Change
OPP Area	519	319	-38.5
3 OPP Precincts (minus OPP area)	1,214	1,031	-15.1
Borough of Manhattan South (minus OPP area)	7,243	7,376	+ 1.8
New York City**	72,372	64,962	-10.2

* Data supplied by New York City Police Department

** Figures not available for Jan.-June period. Figures for entire year were divided in half to obtain 6-month estimate.

IMPACT OF OPP ON THE COMMUNITY³⁰

A 1986 *New York Times* article focusing on the Lower East Side reported that "thanks to Operation Pressure Point, art galleries are replacing shooting galleries."³¹ Even a police operation of the magnitude and intensity of OPP could not, single-handedly, produce such a transformation, but the *Times* is correct in its reporting of the change itself. In some sections of the Lower East Side, property val-

ues began to climb, new shops and restaurants (and art galleries) opened up, and entire blocks of apartment buildings became renovated and occupied. OPP did not create these changes, but it did facilitate the process of gentrification that began on the Lower East Side in the early 1980s, largely in response to the increased demand for residential property in Manhattan.³² Not all neighborhoods in the Lower East Side have been part of this gentrification process; in particular, the sections bordering Chinatown and those along the East River have changed very little and are still occupied, primarily, by poor and working-class minorities, many of them living in city-owned housing projects. Just as gentrification of the Lower East Side was not uniform across all neighborhoods, neither was the impact of OPP; it was most successful in ridding drug traffic from neighborhoods already in the process of change before OPP began and least successful in the areas which have remained largely untouched by gentrification.

In the first few weeks of OPP, the police successfully "liberated" the most drug-infested streets and parks all over the Lower East Side; the drug traffic did not disappear, but the volume decreased quickly and substantially. Many drug sellers, perhaps hoping that OPP would be nothing more than a temporary interruption, stayed off the streets, waiting for law enforcement to return to "normal" so they could resume operations. It was only with the realization that OPP would continue indefinitely that drug sellers began to reemerge, developing the new marketing strategies that would decrease their risk of arrest. What they also quickly discovered was that some neighborhoods (specifically, those in the process of change and improvement) presented more risk than others. Consequently, as the drug trade began to reassert itself, it became increasingly more concentrated in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods of the Lower East Side.

Poor, run-down neighborhoods hold some advantages for street-level drug dealers. For one thing, there is often a transient population on the streets and in the local parks, making it difficult for the police to identify persons involved in the drug trade. Buyers and sellers often live in the neighborhood themselves and are similar to other residents in terms of class, race, ethnicity, and general appearance, again making them indistinguishable to the police. And

as the methods of selling became less blatant, the police became increasingly less effective in these neighborhoods. OPP officers, patrolling on foot and by car, constantly monitored the street population, conducting searches and sometimes making arrests, but seldom witnessed a drug sale in progress. Their presence undoubtedly had some deterrent effect, keeping some buyers out of the area and preventing sellers from returning to pre-OPP ways of doing business.

It is hard to imagine what the OPP team could have done to have more impact in these neighborhoods. Undercover and surveillance operations might have been more effective but a 1985 departmental policy aimed at preventing corruption prohibited officers on the regular patrol force (the large majority of Pressure Point officers) from working out of uniform.³⁴ This meant that all drug-related undercover operations had to be handled by the Narcotics Division, a unit which has limited resources in light of the volume of drug crime in the city as a whole. The Narcotics Division did assist the regular OPP force on the Lower East Side,³⁵ and if expanded, could have provided more assistance, but this would have made OPP much more costly. Most of the patrol officers assigned to Pressure Point were fairly inexperienced (many straight out of the police academy), allowing a massive police presence at relatively low cost. In fact, OPP might not have been created at all were it not for expansion of the New York City force beginning in 1984, and the increased number of recruits available for their first street assignment. Operation Pressure Point continued to rely on this steady supply of new officers to fill the ranks and it would have required substantial reorganization and expansion of departmental resources to substitute a highly trained and experienced undercover force for the OPP patrol force.

In contrast to its failure to clear the drug traffic out of the poorest areas of the Lower East Side, OPP substantially reduced (and perhaps even eliminated) the street drug trade in the more gentrified neighborhoods. There, the initial liberation of the streets and parks was not followed by the gradual reemergence of drug buyers and sellers. This does not seem to be because the police paid more attention to these areas; they deny any bias in coverage and my own observations during the second year of OPP bear out that police patrols remained heaviest in the poor areas where the drug traffic had become concentrated.

The success of OPP in neighborhoods that were becoming gentrified can probably best be explained in the same way as its failure in poorer neighborhoods: by the make-up of the community itself. Once cleared off the streets in the first few weeks of Pressure Point, drug buyers and sellers quickly became "outsiders," their presence readily apparent to OPP personnel and to residents, many of whom were eager to report them to the police. The resident population in these neighborhoods had been changing gradually over a period of years — becoming increasingly middle class and white ~ a change that was not as apparent when the drug dealers and other "undesirables" occupied the streets and parks. By clearing out these groups, OPP allowed the resident population to "claim" the public areas, both formally (through organizing neighborhood events) and informally (through their increased willingness to be on the streets).³⁶ Research by Stephanie Greenberg et al. (1985) suggests that residents themselves can reduce crime and other undesirable behavior through informal social control of their neighborhoods, especially by increasing their use of public space. Such informal control is most likely to occur in communities with general agreement concerning social norms, an agreement which perhaps began to emerge in these gentrifying neighborhoods as the police cleared the "street population" away for the first time since the area had begun to change. A new group of people, themselves once intruders into a run-down sparsely populated neighborhood, began to establish new standards of acceptable conduct and assist the police in enforcing them. Operation Pressure Point thus facilitated a change that had already begun and, by making these neighborhoods even more desirable than before, increased the chance that further gentrification would occur, making it even more unlikely that the drug traffic would return.

CONCLUSION

Operation Pressure Point accomplished a great deal: a drastic improvement in some neighborhoods, a more modest improvement in others, but an overall reduction in drug trafficking and drug-related crime on the Lower East Side. Operation Pressure Point was also a tremendous tactical success for the New York City Police Department. In spite of very little advance planning,³⁷ the whole opera-

tion was carried out with very few procedural problems; both the Transit Police and Housing Authority Police were extremely cooperative;³⁸ coverage by the local media was nothing but favorable;³⁹ and the response of people in the community was, for the most part, very positive. Community reaction was naturally most favorable in neighborhoods where the impact was greatest, but even in areas with remaining drug traffic, residents appreciated the reduction in volume and the less obtrusive methods of dealing being used. As a neighborhood improvement strategy, then, OPP was a success, even if a limited one, and it shows that the police can develop innovative strategies to fight some of the pervasive "criminal situations" that plague specific urban neighborhoods.

It does not necessarily follow, however, that all drug-infested communities can benefit equally from an operation like Pressure Point. Police officials around the country, understandably anxious for solutions to the problems of drug trafficking and drug-related violence, should be cautious in copying this model. Mark Kleiman (1986) reports that a similar operation in Harlem had very little impact on the open drug market there. In a neighborhood in Queens, the drug trade reportedly returned in full force within days of the dismantling of a nine-month police offensive against crack dealers.⁴⁰ Operation Pressure Point worked better on the Lower East Side than similar operations elsewhere probably because much of the Lower East Side was in the early stages of gentrification, on its way to becoming a middle- and upper-middle-class community. In other middle-class neighborhoods, even citizen-patrol groups have recently had some success in reducing drug trafficking simply by acting as an active counter-presence on the street.⁴¹ We should probably expect that neither citizen groups nor the police will have as much impact in the poverty-ridden areas where most of the nation's street-level drug trafficking is concentrated.

There is also, at this point, no reason to believe that operations like Pressure Point can substantially reduce the overall volume of drugs being sold or consumed. In all likelihood, OPP simply displaced much of the drug trade from the Lower East Side to other parts of the city and beyond.⁴² This displacement is of value to residents of the Lower East Side who, for a long time, were bearing a disproportionate share of the burden of a drug problem that extends far beyond the boundaries of their neighborhood; they had reason to favor a more equitable distribution of that problem, even if it meant

pushing it into other communities. But street-level drug enforcement of OPP's magnitude does not offer a solution to the drug problem itself. It is hard to imagine the resources that would be necessary at the local level to put sufficient pressure on an entire city to prevent displacement and produce a substantial reduction in drug consumption. Anytime the costs of buying drugs are raised, some users will reduce or eliminate their use (Moore, 1973; Reuter & Kleiman, 1986), but by 1988 even New York's Police Commissioner Benjamin Ward was warning that the strategy of neighborhood saturation had been "perhaps oversold" and was "not likely to overcome the drug problem in the long run or on a citywide basis."⁴³ The rave reviews that followed the success of OPP perhaps raised expectations for what can be done to reduce street-level drug trafficking, and police departments may find themselves pressured to expand these types of programs. In the current era of high demand for drugs, they may also find themselves unable to duplicate on a broader scale what OPP was able to accomplish on New York's Lower East Side.

NOTES

- 1 See, for example, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973), National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (1969), National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968), and President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (1967a, 1967b).
- 2 Drug transactions, at every level, have the potential for violence as buyers and sellers disagree over the price, quality, and quantity of drugs changing hands (McBride, 1981; McCoy et al., 1978). The properly crimes of robbery and burglary are also associated with drugs because drug users — especially addicted ones — may turn to crime to support their habits. Researchers disagree over the magnitude of this drug-crime connection (Ball et al., 1981; Inciardi, 1979; Inciardi and Chambers, 1972; Goldman, 1978a; Moore, 1977), but it is well accepted that drug users are responsible for a substantial amount of property crime.
- 3 In January 1984, the *Los Angeles Times* ran a front-page story of "the most open heroin market in the nation," with a picture of customers lining up to buy drugs on New York's Lower East Side. See, *Los Angeles Times*, January 8, 1984, p. 1.
- 4 According to Paul Goldstein et al. (1984), illegal drugs are increasingly being marketed under "brand names" applied by the seller as a way of creating user loyalty. Goldstein lists hundreds of names which have recently turned up on packets of heroin and cocaine in New York City

— names like "evening delight," "dragon lady," "temptation," "magic blue," "prophecy," "black death," etc.

5 In fact, a New York City police officer told me of driving through the Lower East Side with his family and how his wife and children urged him to stop so they could participate in what they assumed was one of the many ethnic festivals which occur on the streets of New York during the summer.

6 There are three regular precincts on the Lower East Side: the 5th, the 7th and the 9th. The Pressure Point area included sections from all three of these precincts but did not fully encompass all of the streets from any of them.

7 These statistics are based on data provided by the New York City Police Department.

8 In 1974, the police reported approximately 525,000 index crimes; in 1980, 720,000, and in 1984, 600,000. Throughout this period there were several increases and decreases, but at no point did the amount of reported crime decline to 1974 levels. (Data obtained from New York City Police Department.)

9 Drug arrests were given a low priority in other cities as well. According to Herbert Jacob (1984), narcotic arrests peaked in the early 1970s; after this time, serious crimes made up a growing proportion of all arrests.

10 According to Kleiman (1986), drugs bought on the streets of the Lower East Side made it as far as Lynn, Massachusetts where they were then sold in open street operations not unlike those in New York.

11 See *New York Eagle*, December 2, 1983 (p. 7).

12 "Is This Any Place for Children?" by Murray Weisssetal, *New York Daily News*, July 31, 1983, p. 1.

13 See *New York Tribune*, April 30, 1984 (p. 1) for such comments by some Lower East Side residents. This is also the position taken by Jagna Sharff (1985). She claims that the drug traffic, which initially served to "push out" much of the older, immigrant population, was, by 1984 "the last obstacle to gentrification" and invasion by the "yuppies." Her position is that drug dealing was tolerated by the police when the neighborhood was in decline (pre-gentrification) but became the object of police attention once property values began to increase. Beecher et al. (1981) and Farmer (1984) point out that official responses to crime are almost always "political," in that they respond to some interests over others and are particularly influenced by business interests in the community.

14 In meetings with the community, the police receive more complaints of "street conditions" — loud music, rowdy youth, derelicts, street vendors, prostitutes, and the like — than they do of serious crime. Citizens want and expect the police to take care of these problems and

Commissioner Ward decided to give them a much higher priority than did his predecessors. He was particularly influenced by the work of Wilson and Kelling (1982) suggesting that renewed attention to street conditions in deteriorating neighborhoods may also have an impact on serious crime.

15 There are some problems in directly comparing dispositions from federal court with those of state court because the charges themselves are not identical and the time periods for which data are available are not the same. But even a rough comparison of outcomes suggests much tougher treatment in the federal system. In federal court, almost 80 percent of convicted felons were sentenced to imprisonment, with fewer than 10 percent of those serving less than one year. In state court, 66 percent of those convicted on felony charges went to jail, and almost half of them were given a year or less. At the indictment stage, the disparities are even greater between the two systems. In the federal system 126 felony indictments resulted from 161 felony arrests— In state court, fewer than one-fifth (131 out of 716) of felony arrests resulted in a felony indictment. Federal statistics are from the United States Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York. For state data, see note 26.

16 From the police perspective, the advantage of DATs is that they can be processed more quickly, letting officers return to the streets rather than spend hours processing the arrest, transporting prisoners to detention, and waiting for arraignments to be completed.

17 When a person issued a DAT fails to show up for the court appearance, the court will issue an arrest warrant, but the warrants division of the police department has been understaffed and unable to "track down" all defaulted DATs. Often the police will catch defaulted DATs when the person is arrested again; this time, they will not qualify for DAT and will remain locked up until appearing in court to face the accumulated charges.

18 These are very similar to the police tactics which Symanski (1981) reports are widely used against prostitution. Because the police would be able to make only a few arrests each night, they can more effectively control prostitution through "harassment" than "arrest."

19 The constitutionality of such tactics remains questionable, and there have been some complaints by Lower East Side residents who felt they were unjustly harassed by the police. However, a study sponsored by the police department a few months after OPP began, found general public acceptance of the police tactics being used.

20 After one year, Pressure Point forces were reduced slightly from approximately 240 to 200 officers. At times, the force was reduced further as officers regularly assigned to OPP were temporarily assigned to other tasks (parades, sporting events, concerts, etc.). Skolnick and Bayley (1986) warn that for innovative strategies to be effective, the integrity of the deployment must be maintained and the tendency to "pull" officers for other assignments must be avoided.

- 21 The nighttime hours between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m. became especially popular because OPP forces were at their lowest. Because much of the population was asleep at this time, citizen complaints were uncommon and sales could occur without much threat of arrest.
- 22 Drug users reported that some sellers responded to OPP by refusing to sell "single bags" (\$10 or \$20 worth) and requiring buyers to buy in bundles of ten. Drug buyers would have to pool their money, send one person to make the buy, and then distribute the packets among themselves. This change increased the risk to buyers (because it required them to congregate on the street and make these arrangements) but decreased the risk to sellers by allowing them to distribute the same amount of drugs in a shorter period of time.
- 23 This conclusion was unanimous among everyone interviewed, including police officers, business people, community residents, drug users, and taxi drivers familiar with the community.
- 24 Data gathered by the New York State Substance Abuse Services shows no increase in the Methadone Maintenance population during this period. This may be because most methadone clinics have a waiting list for entrance into the program, but there was also no change in the number of people on the waiting lists.
- 25 One Lower East Side police officer who lived in Harlem reported a noticeable increase in the volume of drug trade there and claimed to have seen some well-known "street people" from the Lower East Side in Harlem for the first time after OPP began.
- 26 These data come from Criminal Justice Agency (CJA) Follow-up Report on Criminal Court Outcomes. The agency only analyzed court outcomes for those arrested during the first month of Pressure Point; there is, at this point, no way of knowing if the courts became more or less lenient as time went by. These data also fail to include the court outcomes of defendants who had their cases heard in federal court.
- 27 Of the remaining 47 convicted felons receiving jail time, 14 received a sentence of 1-3 years, 26 got 2-4 years and 7 were given longer sentences; the most severe sentence was 6-15 years, given to one person.
- 28 See Follow-up report on Criminal Court and Supreme Court Outcomes, Tables 3 and 4. These tables include data from all arrestees who pled guilty in the criminal court.
- 29 City of New York, Police Department News Release No. 17, March 20, 1984.
- 30 Not included in this section is an examination of how OPP affected the drug users who are also a part of the community. Some of the users I spoke to were pleased with the results of OPP because they, too, felt the situation had gotten out of hand and were especially glad to see fewer out-of-town buyers on the street. Paul Goldstein (1985) reports that buying drugs became more dangerous after OPP when many

selling operations moved indoors. Other users report a decrease in the quality of drugs and an increase in price.

- 31 "The Fortunes of the Lower East Side are Rising," by William Greer, *New Yoik Times*, August 4, 1986, p. 6E.
- 32 According to Robert Ponte (1985), a shortage of both office and residential space in Manhattan has led to an increase in property values all over the city and the rapid development of areas that, just a few years ago, were abandoned to the poor. For example, on Avenues A and B, in the heart of OPP, new co-op units offering "moderately priced housing" in the \$200,000 to \$300,000 range are being developed. See "Lower East Side Buildings Rehabilitated," by Diane Shaman, *New York Times*, April 1, 1988, p. A18.
- 33 This seemed to be a particular problem in the Public Housing Project where even citizens who dislike the drug trade are often personally connected to those involved; they want the drug trade gone, but without their friends and relatives being arrested. Some residents also expressed fear of retaliation and were reluctant to give even anonymous tips to the police. In some communities, money from the drug trade circulates within the community itself, again making residents reluctant to assist the police.
- 34 OPP forces did conduct some surveillance operations in unmarked cars, but in uniform, leaving them quite visible to anyone looking for them.
- 35 The Police Department will not release information about undercover operations, so it is impossible to compare the number of undercover operations in the early and later stages of OPP. However, OPP patrol supervisors claimed that, over time, they began to receive much less backup from the undercover units.
- 36 Several researchers have shown this link between resident use of the streets and crime. When crime (or fear of crime) increases in a neighborhood, residents tend to stay off the streets as much as possible, weakening informal social controls, and perhaps causing an even greater increase in crime (Wilson, 1985; Conklin, 1975; DuBow et al., 1979). Jane Jacobs (1961) strongly suggests policies that encourage resident use of public areas as a strategy for fighting crime.
- 37 OPP was not based on a carefully developed "master plan." It was put into motion within a month of Commissioner Ward's appointment, after gathering together several people with knowledge of the Lower East Side's drug problem. Many operational decisions got made on an "as need" basis.
- 38 These three policing organizations in New York have not always cooperated with each other and have sometimes competed with each other for arrests. The success of OPP may facilitate additional joint efforts in the future.

³⁹ The only exception I could uncover was an interview with Dr. Robert Newman who admonished the police department for not providing advance warning (and seeking input from) the local drug treatment establishment before beginning the operation (CBS News, March 11, 1984).

- ⁴⁰ See "Crack Dealers Returning to Streets Narcotics Teams had Swept Clean," by David E. Pitt, *New York Times*, December 5, 1988, p. 1.
- ⁴¹ See, for example, "East Side Drug Patrol's Tactic: Stare," by Selwyn Raab, *New York Times*, September 5, 1989, p. B3.
- ⁴² Cornish and Clarke (1987) show that displacement is not the inevitable result of police pressure, in part because not all criminals are sufficiently mobile or sufficiently skilled to alter their criminal activity. At this point, however, there appears to be no shortage of new personnel willing to become involved in street-level drug trafficking whenever police pressure deters any number of current dealers.
- ⁴³ "Ward Calls Drug Units Panacea," by David E. Pitt, *New York Times*, November 30, 1988, p. B1.

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