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THE WINNIPEG AUTO THEFT SUPPRESSION STRATEGY

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PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING 2009

Submitted by the Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force (Winnipeg
Police Service, Manitoba Justice, Manitoba Public Insurance)

Contents:

Summary 3

Introduction 4

Scanning: Winnipeg Has Had the Highest Rates
of Vehicle Theft in North America 4

Analysis: Describing the Vehicle Theft Problem in
Winnipeg 5

Response: The Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy 8

Assessment: Did WATSS Reduce Vehicle Theft? 12

Conclusion 13

Agency and Officer Information 14

THE WINNIPEG AUTO THEFT SUPPRESSION STRATEGY

SUMMARY

The Problem:

From 2003 to 2007, Winnipeg had North America's highest rates of vehicle theft. Rates peaked at 1932/100,000 in 2004. The cost of stolen vehicles was nearly \$40 million/year, but the danger to residents was an even greater concern because of the recklessness of the auto thieves. The Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force had tried several tactics to address the problem since 2001, but despite some temporary successes rates continued to climb.

Analysis:

Crime analysis was at the core of the vehicle theft prevention strategy. Data sources included police statistics, insurance company statistics, police files, court files, interviews with police and justice officials, and interviews with young offenders. The analysis gave a detailed picture of the patterns, causes, and consequences of vehicle theft in Winnipeg. Most thefts were committed by young offenders and virtually all the vehicles were stolen for joyriding. Vehicle theft was an important part of the youth culture in some inner-city neighbourhoods. Certain makes and models, particularly older Chrysler vehicles, were extremely vulnerable.

Response:

The Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force developed the Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy (WATSS). WATSS is a comprehensive strategy that involves several partners including the Winnipeg Police Service, Manitoba Public Insurance, and Manitoba Justice (including youth probation and Crown prosecutors). The Strategy has three components: a tiered approach to at-risk youth with intensive community supervision of high-risk youth; a program requiring compulsory vehicle immobilizers for the most at-risk vehicles; and youth programming addressing the root causes of vehicle theft.

Assessment:

A first version of WATSS, which focused mainly on supervision of high-risk youth, was implemented in September, 2005. Initially the strategy was successful and vehicle thefts dropped by 16 percent in 2005. However, in the first quarter of 2006 rates rose by 26 percent. The strategy was revisited and plans developed for additional components. These included mandatory immobilizers for the most at-risk vehicles and enhancing community supervision and enforcement by adding 5 members to the police Stolen Auto Unit. Many of the specific tactics used by the strategy were also refined. Later, funding was received to implement the root causes programs. The augmented strategy has been very successful. Thefts declined by 29 percent in 2007, 42 percent in 2008, and 34 percent in the first 4 months of 2009. Rates as of April 30, 2009 were 76 percent lower than in 2004. Savings are estimated to be at least \$30 million/year.

INTRODUCTION

Winnipeg, Manitoba is Canada's 8th largest city, with a population of nearly 700,000 people. In 2007, Winnipeg had Canada's 4th highest crime rate and a motor vehicle theft rate that was 4 times the national average. Nearly 1 in every 5 Criminal Code offenses in Winnipeg in 2007 was a vehicle¹ theft.

SCANNING: WINNIPEG HAS HAD THE HIGHEST RATES OF VEHICLE THEFT IN NORTH AMERICA

From 2003 to 2007, Winnipeg had North America's highest rates of motor vehicle theft². The 2007 rate was 71 percent higher than the next highest Canadian city (Table 1).

This problem began in 1993 when the number of vehicles stolen in Winnipeg nearly tripled. Rates continued to rise until they reached 1932/100,000 in 2004 (Figure 1). The cost of these stolen vehicles was nearly \$40 million per year³, but the danger to Winnipeg residents was an even greater concern because of the recklessness of the auto thieves. In 2007, two people were killed by drivers of stolen vehicles and in one highly-publicized case, an early morning jogger was seriously injured after being deliberately run down by a youth driving a stolen car. In one 16-month period in 2007/08, 8 drivers deliberately tried to run down police officers with stolen vehicles. Vehicle thieves also frequently attempted to ram police cars. Some youth engaged in other dangerous behaviour such as jamming down vehicle accelerators and launching driverless vehicles down city streets and into parking garages.

Most Winnipeg residents had either been directly victimized by auto theft or knew someone who had been victimized, and personal accounts and media reports made it clear that the public felt vehicle theft was a major problem in the community (see Figure 2).

In 2001, the province had established the Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force made up of representatives from Manitoba Justice, Manitoba Public Insurance (MPI), Winnipeg Police Service (WPS), Royal Canadian Mounted Police, prosecutions, and the University of Manitoba. Their initial efforts involved: using bait cars; fingerprinting all recovered stolen vehicles; restricting licensing for drivers convicted of vehicle theft; encouraging the police and other justice system personnel to treat vehicle theft more seriously; school programs; enrolment of vehicle theft offenders under the age of 12 in special programming⁴; and taking court action to recover damages from offenders.

These early efforts met with some success and rates fell 12 percent in 2002. However, rates soon resumed their upward climb as these measures were not sufficient to deal with Winnipeg's highly-motivated vehicle thieves. In 2004, the rate of vehicle theft reached 1932/100,000. During the last quarter of 2004 the problem seemed to be spiralling out of control (Table 2) and in November of that year reached an annualized rate of over 3,000/100,000. At this point, the Task Force developed a plan for presentation to the board of Manitoba Public Insurance (MPI)⁵ and to the provincial Minister of Justice. These efforts led to the Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy (WATSS).

ANALYSIS: DESCRIBING THE VEHICLE THEFT PROBLEM IN WINNIPEG

Why did auto theft rates rise so dramatically in Winnipeg and why did they remain high for so long? The answer is that auto theft became an important part of youth culture in parts of the city. Virtually all the vehicles stolen in Winnipeg are used for joyriding or as temporary transportation and are eventually recovered. A small number of high-end stolen vehicles are sold and there have been a few small-scale chop shops, but the primary motivation for stealing cars is excitement, not money. For almost a decade, the favourite targets were Chrysler products manufactured in the early 1990s which were particularly easy to steal. Interviews with young offenders found that they stole cars for excitement and to show off for their peers and that they were very committed to continuing to steal cars.

Offense Patterns

Because most vehicle thefts are reported, we know a great deal about the targets of this crime and about its geographic patterns. Vehicles are stolen from all parts of Winnipeg, though theft rates are higher in the core area. While there were some fluctuations, there were no important monthly or day of week patterns. About 95 percent of all stolen cars are recovered, so they not being sold or chopped. Only about 10 percent of thefts resulted in arrests.

Certain types of vehicles were targeted. Table 3 shows that from 2003 – 2005, older Chrysler products were favourite targets. These vehicles were very easy to steal and had high theft risk rates. The ease with which these vehicles could be stolen by children as young as 10 years of age illustrates the role that target vulnerability played in the rise of the auto theft culture and was an issue that had to be addressed if we were to significantly reduce auto theft rates.

Offender Patterns

While we had good documentation of the offense patterns, we also needed to learn more about the offenders. Why were some young people so attracted to auto theft that Winnipeg had the highest rates of this crime in North America⁶? MPI funded a study in which 43 incarcerated young auto thieves were interviewed⁷. The main findings were:

- Most lived in single-parent families. Over half had run away from home at least once. Respondents reported a high rate of criminal involvement among immediate family members.
- Respondents were not successful in school. They were 2-3 years below expected grade levels, and had high rates of truancy, suspension and expulsion.
- Average age of first involvement was 12 and the average age when they began

stealing cars themselves was 13.

- Respondents were involved in a range of offenses in addition to vehicle theft.
- Most did little planning and seemed willing to steal cars any place and any time. They used the vehicles for joyriding and for short-term transportation and usually just abandoned the vehicles.
- Respondents enjoyed the thrill-seeking dimensions of vehicle theft, which helps to explain why they often stole several vehicles in a day. Their thefts appeared to be a way of gaining status.
- Peers were important. Many respondents reported gang associations. Virtually all had friends who stole cars and most reported peer pressure to steal cars. This supports the conclusion that there is an extensive adolescent car theft culture in some parts of Winnipeg.
- Respondents had high rates of drug and alcohol use and were involved in a thrill-seeking lifestyle that included vehicle theft.
- Some targets were clearly more attractive than others. There was a strong preference for stealing older Chrysler vehicles.
- Most respondents were not concerned about the consequences and any fear they had was not sufficient to overcome the thrill of stealing cars or the peer pressure.

In addition to this formal study, police officers also spent many hours interviewing apprehended youth in order to gain a more detailed understanding of the vehicle theft problem.

Review of Effective Programs

We conducted a detailed review of the evidence on vehicle theft prevention⁸. This review indicated that electronic vehicle immobilizers were effective and also suggested that some youth programs had potential. We also learned that Regina, Saskatchewan, which had a problem similar to Winnipeg's, had implemented a promising reduction strategy. Task Force members visited Regina to learn about their program of intensive supervision of young offenders who were in the community under conditional release.

Analysis Summary

Our problem analysis told us a great deal about Winnipeg's vehicle theft problem:

- Rates were extremely high. The proportion of attempted thefts was much higher than in other cities (Table 1).
- About 95 percent of stolen autos were recovered, most within 24 hours and most were

inexpensive older vehicles. This indicated that the problem was joyriding, not theft for profit.

- Clearance rates were around 10 percent, indicating that conventional investigative and enforcement tactics were not effective. Analysis of court statistics showed that sentences for vehicle theft were typically very light, again suggesting that conventional youth justice measures would not alleviate the problem.
- The 10 Most At-Risk Vehicle list included extremely vulnerable vehicles, particularly Chrysler minivans built in the early 1990s.
- Some neighbourhoods had higher rates, but the pattern of thefts was essentially city-wide. However, the WPS successfully used vehicle recovery patterns on a number of occasions. For example, in 2007 they used recovery data to arrest an adult who targeted 1998 Windstars and who estimated that he had stolen 100 Windstar vans⁹.
- Auto theft was part of the youth culture in some Winnipeg neighbourhoods. This conclusion was based on interviews with young offenders, and was reinforced by interviews with police, probation officers, and prosecutors.
- A scan indicated that intensive community supervision of high-risk offenders¹⁰, some types of electronic immobilizers, and some youth programs had been successful in reducing vehicle theft in other jurisdictions.

RESPONSE: THE WINNIPEG AUTO THEFT SUPPRESSION STRATEGY

A Tiered Approach to Countering Auto Theft

The Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy (WATSS) has three components. The first provides different levels of programming and intervention for youth at different levels of risk for vehicle theft involvement. Probation staff reviewed files on all young offenders involved in vehicle theft and classified them into Levels 2, 3, and 4. Level 1 youth were not identified individually but programming was delivered in neighbourhoods with high levels of involvement in vehicle theft. The actions to be taken at each level included:

Level 1: Youth-at-Risk

- Public education, prevention and intervention
- Parents, care-givers and teachers involved
- Supporting programs include schools, police school resource officers, and youth service agencies

Level 2: Early Involved

- Prevention and diversion
- Turnabout program for youth under 12 years
- Alternative measures as appropriate

Level 3: Repeaters

- Enhanced case management and supervision by youth corrections
- Youth and family involvement
- Increased offender programming directed at auto theft

Level 4: Very High-Risk to Re-offend

- Daily in-person contact with probation officer, seven days a week
- Other contact every three hours
- Absolute curfew enforced
- Intensive programming with families and schools
- Zero tolerance for non-compliance
- Crown to advocate for custody (pre-trial/sentence)

Level 3 and Level 4 offenders were typically in the community under conditions of release such as curfews. WATSS provided intensive supervision to ensure that these conditions were kept. Youth were contacted in person every day by probation officers or police and contacted by phone every three hours. Youth who violated their conditions of release were apprehended so they did not have the opportunity to reoffend. Initially, there were about 200 level 3 and 4 offenders, so additional staff were required. MPI provided funding to hire 14 specialized youth corrections staff to form a new Auto Theft Unit within youth probation. Their role is to ensure that all release conditions are met and to work with the highest-risk youth and their families to help reduce their criminal involvement. WATSS emphasizes moving youth away from vehicle theft by improving their life circumstances and by providing them with other opportunities. This program is similar to Regina's but substantially changed because of local circumstances, including the fact that Winnipeg is a much larger city. Senior probation staff spent 6 months working with the other partners to adapt the program and to match risk factors with level-specific interventions.

Electronic Immobilizers

The second component of the program involved installing electronic immobilizers in high-risk vehicles. Electronic immobilizers disable a vehicle's starter, ignition, and fuel systems unless the car is started using a coded transponder. Research in several countries, including Australia, showed that immobilizers were effective in reducing auto theft. MPI provided free immobilizers to owners of the most at-risk vehicles. This program resulted in 63,000 vehicles having immobilizers installed. As noted below, this coverage was not sufficient to avoid target displacement and immobilizers were later made compulsory for some vehicles.

Dealing with Root Causes

The third component of the Strategy involved addressing the root causes of auto theft by working with young people and their families in order to try to reduce the number of young people who find auto theft an appealing form of recreation. Much of this work is

done by youth probation staff. In addition, we have recently receiving funding from Canada's National Crime Prevention Centre to provide additional support programs for high-risk offenders and their families. This program is run with community partners including the Winnipeg School Division, Big Brothers and Big Sisters of Winnipeg, and New Directions for Children, Youth, Adults and Families. This component is designed to move current offenders away from stealing vehicles and to end the flow of new recruits to this dangerous and costly pastime. This program was funded relatively recently and was not part of the initial version of WATSS.

Objective

The objective of the Strategy was to reduce vehicle theft by 20 percent over a 2-year period. This was a relatively modest target, but since our previous successes had been only temporary, we felt it was a realistic goal.

Re-Analysis: Responding to Another Increase in Vehicle Theft Rates

WATSS was initially successful. Vehicle theft rates declined by just 8 percent between January and August, 2005, but by 27 percent from the beginning of WATSS in September to December, 2005. However, they increased again by 26 percent in the first quarter of 2006, so it was apparent that more changes were required. A supervisor in the WPS Stolen Auto Unit looked at the relationship between the number of the top 50 offenders who were in the community each day and the number of cars stolen on that day (See Figure 3). This clearly shows that the more of this group who were on the street each day, the more cars that were stolen. Other crime analysis data supported this conclusion. For example, the police knew that certain young offenders preferred particular models of vehicles and when they were in custody or under effective supervision in the community, thefts of these particular types of vehicles dropped significantly. This finding highlighted the need for improving the offender-oriented approach used in the intensive supervision program.

The Auto Theft Task Force reports directly to the Minister of Justice, so we were able to arrange a briefing at which the police supervisor was able to present his findings personally to the Minister. The Task Force proposed that more police be hired in order to improve community supervision, and as a result the Department of Justice funded 5 more positions for the WPS Stolen Auto Unit. This allowed them to provide round the clock shift coverage. The police also shifted more of their efforts to dealing with high-risk offenders.

Another weakness of the initial version of WATSS was that the voluntary immobilizer program did not have sufficient penetration of the vehicle fleet to have a significant impact on thefts. If would-be thieves could not start the first Dodge Caravan they encountered because it had an immobilizer, they could easily go down the block and find a similar vehicle without one. Thus, MPI worked with the Manitoba government to have them bring out a new regulation in September, 2007 making it compulsory for the most at-risk vehicles to have immobilizers before they could be registered or reregistered¹¹.

The list included all vehicles with odds up to 1 in 100 to be stolen in a year.

This mandatory program was phased in over 12 months. However, crime analysts noted that as favourite targets were protected, offenders began to target other vehicles, particularly those equipped with the General Motors Passlock II immobilizer (Table 4). While these immobilizers do offer some security, several of our experienced offenders had learned how to defeat them and passed this knowledge on to their peers. Consequently, when installations of the first list were completed in September, 2008, a second list of most at-risk vehicles was established. Immobilizer installations in these vehicles will be completed September, 2009. Thus far there is no evidence of serious displacement to other types of vehicles. Because the remaining vehicles include a diverse range of makes and models (typically low-volume models), it is unlikely that offenders will develop enough expertise in stealing them to significantly affect theft rates. Also, technical experts believe that some actually have effective immobilizers but have not gone through the formal approval process.

Coordination

This comprehensive strategy requires a high level of coordination. This coordination begins with the Auto Theft Task Force that oversees all elements of the Strategy. It is comprised of senior representatives from the Winnipeg Police Service, Manitoba Justice, and Manitoba Public Insurance. Below the Task Force are Working Groups for each of the 4 levels of youth. The most important is the Level 4 group which meets weekly and which is made up of representatives from the WPS, youth corrections, prosecutions, and MPI. The role of Working Groups is to develop policies and procedures and to ensure that the system works as seamlessly as possible. For example, one early problem was that for legal and administrative reasons it was difficult to ensure that early-involved offenders were placed into vehicle theft prevention programs. The police, Crown, and corrections all changed their procedures and established a central referral point to speed up case processing and to get these youth into programs as quickly as possible. Front-line staff from the different agencies work together on a daily basis as a team and have eliminated many of the normal organizational boundaries. This effective coordination means that offenders are often arrested within hours of being breached for violating release conditions¹². This results in non-compliant high risk offenders being taken off the streets as quickly as possible. This teamwork has been one of the keys to the success of the Strategy.

The Crown prosecutor's office also works closely with the other Strategy participants. Two prosecutors are assigned to vehicle theft and take great effort to carefully prepare cases and to inform judges about the seriousness of vehicle theft and the continued involvement of chronic offenders.

There was also a high degree of coordination within the Winnipeg Police Service. The department's Executive augmented the Stolen Auto Unit by starting the Platoon Representative program. Each platoon in the five uniform divisions has one or two designated reps who receive specialized training and work with the Stolen Auto Unit on vehicle theft within their districts. This program has been a key element in the Strategy

as the reps work on the Strategy, and also provide their platoons with information about current offenders, hotspots, and other current intelligence. They also receive intelligence from their platoon members to provide to the Stolen Auto Unit.

Implementation Issues

Many potentially successful crime reduction initiatives have failed because of implementation problems. WATSS used several measures to ensure the Strategy was implemented as planned.

Leadership

Strong leadership was in place at all levels. Frequent meetings and open discussion ensured that everyone knew about the Strategy and worked together to implement it. Turnover of personnel was kept to a minimum to ensure continuity.

Accountability

Because of their role as a major funder, MPI developed a business plan that specified practices such as the number of contacts made with individuals under supervision and also mandated 3 external evaluations during the first 2 years of the Strategy. The Task Force and working group structures facilitate accountability. Most issues were raised and resolved at the Task Force or at the working group level.

Communications

Internal communication was a priority. Changes in the program were quickly disseminated and the Task Force and working groups enabled constant input from the people working at the street level. Bottom-up and top-down communication led to many important changes in the program.

Public Support

There was potential resistance to the compulsory immobilizer program. The city's major newspaper editorialized that the program was "An Abuse of Power¹³" and a popular tabloid columnist wrote several stories describing how after-market immobilizers could ruin vehicles and result in major disruptions to owners. The Task Force responded quickly to these attempts to shape public opinion. More importantly, MPI implemented a rigorous quality control program to ensure that installers and installation facilities were certified, carefully trained, and monitored by an independent standards organization. They also established an Immobilizer Quality Control Group that people could call to ensure an immediate response to any problems with immobilizers. As a result, the failure rate of immobilizers was extremely low and the issue quickly disappeared as a public concern.

ASSESSMENT: DID WATSS REDUCE VEHICLE THEFT?

Several times Winnipeg had significant reductions in vehicle theft that were not sustained. However, the reductions over the past 2 ½ years have been very substantial and in 2009 Winnipeg's vehicle theft rates will almost certainly no longer be the highest in Canada. Figure 4 shows that theft rates dropped by 29 percent in 2007, by 42 percent in 2008, and by 34 percent thus far in 2009. This represents a decline of 76 percent from 2004 to April 30, 2009. Attempted thefts rose until 2008, but are now down 66 percent between 2004 and April 30, 2009. These reductions are far greater than for any other Canadian city or other Manitoba communities. The increasing number of electronic immobilizers should help to sustain these reductions.

MPI has calculated the financial benefits of WATSS. The total investment (mostly for the immobilizer program) was about \$52 million. Savings to date have been calculated at \$59 million and MPI forecasts ongoing savings of at least \$30 million per year based on a theft rate close to the current level¹⁴.

Displacement or Diffusion of Benefits?

There were concerns that if WATSS was successful in reducing vehicle theft there would be an increase in carjackings and in crimes such as break and enter and robbery. However, there have been virtually no carjackings in Winnipeg and rates of break and enter, robbery, and theft from auto have declined over the past 2 years. Figures 5 and 6 show the relationships between vehicle thefts and theft **from** vehicles and break and enter. The evidence suggests a diffusion of benefits rather than displacement to other offenses. This is likely because the intensive supervision has helped the youth stay out of trouble and because the work of probation staff has helped some to change their behaviour.

The Effectiveness of Electronic Immobilizers

The immobilizer program has been very successful. As of May, 2009 about 85 percent of the most at-risk vehicles had immobilizers installed¹⁵. None of these immobilizers has been defeated. A small number of immobilized vehicles have been stolen, but these have resulted from people leaving their keys in the vehicle or from the theft of keys. Installations of most at-risk vehicles will be complete by September, 2009. At that time, at least 75 percent of Winnipeg's vehicles will have effective immobilizers.

External Evaluation

There has been an external evaluation of the intensive supervision component of the Strategy. The evaluation reiterates the material presented above and concludes that "The target to reduce auto theft in the Winnipeg area has been successfully met. For the period 2004 to 2007 there has been a 38 percent reduction in auto theft. Comparing 2004 to 2008 the decline is even more dramatic -64%¹⁶".

CONCLUSION

The Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy highlights the value of taking a disciplined, problem-oriented approach to crime reduction. Reducing vehicle theft in Winnipeg was a very difficult process and our efforts suffered numerous setbacks. However, continued iterations of the SARA process enabled us to ultimately achieve very significant reductions in vehicle theft.

AGENCY AND OFFICER INFORMATION

This problem solving initiative was coordinated by the Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force.
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END NOTES

¹ The terms 'vehicle theft' and 'auto theft' will be used interchangeably. However, the focus of the prevention initiative was on theft of autos, SUVs and light trucks and not on other types motor vehicles.

² In 2007 the rate of theft in Winnipeg was 1714/100,000 compared with 1048/100,000 in Modesto, CA which had the highest rate in the United States.

³ The actual figures are \$28,596,266 for theft and \$10,164,701 for attempted theft. Canadian and U.S crime statistics include both thefts and attempts in the category of vehicle theft.

⁴ Under Canadian law, youth under 12 cannot be charged with criminal offenses.

⁵ Manitoba is one of 3 Canadian provinces that has a government-run vehicle insurance system. Every vehicle owner in Manitoba must insure his or her vehicle with Manitoba Public Insurance.

⁶ At a different level, the question might also have been worded as "Why was auto theft so attractive to young people that some would go out in -30 C weather to spend the day stealing 5 cars?"

⁷ Anderson, Jeff and Rick Linden. 2002. "Pilot Study of Juvenile Auto Theft Offenders." Unpublished paper, University of Manitoba.

⁸ Linden, Rick and Ren Chaturvedi. 2006. "The Need for Comprehensive Crime Prevention Planning: The Case of Motor Vehicle Theft." *Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice*, 47(April): 251-270.

⁹ In the 3 weeks prior to this arrest there were 35 Windstar vans stolen, compared with 0 in the 3 weeks following the arrest.

¹⁰ At a more general level, this was consistent with the finding that offender-oriented strategies were likely to be successful (see National Research Council, Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices. 2004. *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence*. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.

¹¹ This was an expansion of a 2006 regulation that required vehicles that had been stolen and vehicles imported to the province to have immobilizers installed. In addition to provincial regulations, lobbying by the Manitoba government and by anti-auto theft groups had also led to federal legislation requiring all cars sold in Canada after September, 2007 to have effective immobilizers.

¹² Arrests made by the Stolen Auto Unit increased from 180 in 2005 to 424 in 2008.

¹³ Winnipeg Free Press, June 29, 2007.

¹⁴ The spending was calculated to the end of FY 2008/09. The average cost per theft is \$3920 and for attempted theft \$1651. The projected savings are based on a reduction from 2006 theft levels to current levels of about 2200 thefts and 2200 attempted thefts per year. MPI's actuary has forecast annual savings increasing to \$37.4 million in 2011.

¹⁵ In order to obtain an insurance company discount, an immobilizer has to be tested and meet a standard and be installed according to a protocol involving both technical and security measures. Not all immobilizers (i.e. GM's Passlock II and many aftermarket brands) meet this standard.

¹⁶ PJ Cople Consulting Services. "Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy: Year Two Final Evaluation." P. 7. Calgary, Alberta.

APPENDICES


Table 1

Police-reported motor vehicle thefts, by census metropolitan area, 2007

CENSUS METROPOLITAN AREA	TOTAL MOTOR VEHICLE THEFTS			COMPLETED MOTOR VEHICLE THEFTS	
	number	rate	percent change in rate 1997 to 2007	percent of total	rate
Winnipeg	12,548	1,714.1	25.1	50.2	870.5
Abbotsford	1,693	1,001.3	-3.3	85.0	841.0
Edmonton	9,120	832.1	57.1	87.4	726.8
Regina	1,495	734.8	-50.0	76.7	563.3
Calgary	7,318	638.6	-15.4	95.6	607.6
Vancouver	14,411	630.3	-43.8	87.4	478.8
Saskatoon	1,541	615.7	-1.7	85.3	526.9
Montreal	22,403	600.6	-38.6	84.4	507.1
London	2,331	489.0	-31.4	80.5	371.1
Toronto	15,392	279.3	-39.9	96.1	274.1
Ottawa	2,353	264.4	-65.2	88.2	232.7
Canada	146,142	443.2	-25.2	85.6	364.5

Source: Dauvergne, Mia. 2009. "Motor Vehicle Theft in Canada, 2007". *Juristat*, Vol. 28, No. 10 Ottawa; Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics.

Figure 1
Winnipeg Auto Theft Rates 1991 - 2008



Source: 1995 – 2007 Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada
1991 – 1994, 2008 – 2009 Winnipeg Police Service



Figure 2: Media Coverage of Vehicle Theft

Table 2: Monthly Vehicle Thefts 2001 – 2009 (not including attempts)


Auto Theft Task Force (ATTF) Winnipeg Auto Theft Statistics 2001 to 2009												
Data source: Manitoba Public Insurance (registered vehicles with claims filed)												
	Pre-Auto Theft Strategy				Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy					Daily	Daily	Daily
	2001	2002	2003	2004	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Average	Average	Average
					2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2004	2008	2009
January	618	466	430	451	552	626	608	360	185	14.5	11.6	6.0
February	471	473	447	516	500	627	450	274	151	17.8	9.4	4.9
March	496	420	614	642	603	834	548	237	153	20.7	7.6	4.9
April	567	494	563	698	547	630	381	282	202	23.3	9.4	6.7
May	584	485	471	728	624	657	474	340		23.5	11.0	
June	519	461	523	672	542	667	442	267		22.4	8.9	
July	576	625	593	788	685	661	563	255		25.4	8.2	
August	672	605	513	703	708	642	381	279		22.7	9.0	
September	494	560	557	733	714	538	409	229		24.4	7.6	
October	716	611	759	939	695	710	466	253		30.3	8.2	
November	697	481	485	1132	618	590	413	222		37.7	7.4	
December	649	512	656	765	572	540	340	177		24.7	5.7	
Monthly Avg:	588	516	551	731	613	644	456	265	173			
Yearly Total:	7059	6193	6611	8767	7360	7722	5475	3175	691	24.0	8.7	5.6
Daily Avg:	19.3	17.0	18.1	24.0	20.2	21.2	15.0	8.7	5.8			
Yearly % Chg:		-12.3%	6.7%	32.6%	-16.0%	4.9%	-29.1%	-42.2%	-33.6%	2009 vs 2004: -76.0%		
Color Codes:												
	(Stolen vehicles per month)											
	Stolen Vehicles per day											
	30.8 Final 3 months of 2004											
	5.4 First 3 months of 2009											
	-82.4% % Reduction											

Table 3: Top 10 Most At-Risk Vehicles, 2003 – 2005

MODEL	RISK OF THEFT/Yr.
Plymouth Voyager (1990 – 1994)	1 in 7
Chrysler Intrepid (1990 – 1994)	1 in 7
Jeep Grand Cherokee (1990- 1994)	1 in 7
Dodge Caravan (1990 – 1994)	1 in 8
Dodge Spirit (1990 – 1994)	1 in 9
Plymouth Acclaim (1990 – 1994)	1 in 9
Chrysler Intrepid (1995 – 1999)	1 in 10
Dodge Stratus (1995 – 1999)	1 in 11
Plymouth Sundance (1995 – 1999)	1 in 11
Chrysler Dynasty (1990 – 1994)	1 in 11


Source: Manitoba Public Insurance

Table 4: Top 10 Most At-Risk Vehicles, 2007

Cadillac Escalade (2000-2004)	1 in 6
GMC Yukon (2005-2007)	1 in 8
GMC Yukon (2000-2004)	1 in 14
Ford Windstar (1995-1999)	1 in 16
Nissan Quest (1990-1994)	1 in 18
Chevrolet Trailblazer (2000-2004)	1 in 18
Chevrolet G20 (1990-1994)	1 in 21
Chevrolet Suburban (2000-2004)	1 in 21
Chevrolet Silverado (2005-2007)	1 in 22
Ford F350	1 in 25

Source: Manitoba Public Insurance

Figure 3: Relationship Between Number of Top 50 Offenders in the Community and Stolen Vehicle Rates








Figure 4: Winnipeg Daily Stolen Vehicle Average. 2002 – 2009 (does not include attempts)

Source: Manitoba Public Insurance



* Data source: Winnipeg Police Service Niche RMS – UCR Occurrence Data
(Niche Records Management System (RMS) launched in mid-April 2004)

Figure 5: Relationship Between Vehicle Thefts and Theft From Vehicles, 2004 - 2009



* Data source: Winnipeg Police Service Niche RMS – UCR Occurrence Data
(Niche Records Management System (RMS) launched in mid-April 2004)

Break & Enters include residential, detached garages, sheds, etc.
Does not include commercial business Break and Enters.¹⁷

Figure 6 Relationship Between Vehicle Theft and Break and Enters, 2004 - 2009