The chapters in this volume are the outcome of a conference sponsored by the Home Office at Christ’s College, Cambridge, England, in July 1985. The conference was designed to provide a forum for exploring and elaborating a decision-making approach to the explanation of crime. This perspective, the organizers believed (Clarke and Cornish, 1985), was one increasingly being adopted by a number of social scientists in disciplines with an interest in criminal behavior. At the least, these various approaches—drawn from psychology, sociology, criminology, economics, and the law—seemed to assume that much offending was broadly rational in nature (Simon, 1978). Hence the “reasoning criminal” of this volume’s title. In other respects, however, their concepts, aims, preoccupations, and terminologies were often quite different, and in consequence it was not always easy to appreciate how much common ground they shared. More tantalizingly, it was unclear to what extent the insights provided by the various disciplines could be integrated into a more comprehensive and satisfactory representation of criminal behavior. The organizers had already made one attempt to provide such a framework in the paper referred to above, and the conference provided a further opportunity to test out the possibilities for some such synthesis.

Rational Choice Approaches to Crime

The synthesis we had suggested—a rational choice perspective on criminal behavior—was intended to locate criminological findings within a framework particularly suitable for thinking about policy-relevant research. Its starting point was an assumption that offenders seek to benefit themselves by their criminal behavior; that this involves the making of decisions and of choices, however rudimentary on occasion these processes might be; and that these processes exhibit a measure of rationality, albeit constrained by limits of time and ability and the availability of relevant information. It was recognized that this
conception of crime seemed to fit some forms of offending better than others. However, even in the case of offenses that seemed to be pathologically motivated or impulsively executed, it was felt that rational components were also often present and that the identification and description of these might have lessons for crime-control policy.

Second, a crime-specific focus was adopted, not only because different crimes may meet different needs, but also because the situational context of decision making and the information being handled will vary greatly among offenses. To ignore these differences might well be to reduce significantly one’s ability to identify fruitful points for intervention (similar arguments have been applied to other forms of “deviant” behavior, such as gambling: cf. Cornish, 1978). A crime-specific focus is likely to involve rather finer distinctions than those commonly made in criminology. For example, it may not be sufficient to divide burglary simply into its residential and commercial forms. It may also be necessary to distinguish between burglaries committed in middle-class suburbs, in public housing, and in wealthy residential enclaves. Empirical studies suggest that the kinds of individuals involved in these different forms of residential burglary, their motivations, and their methods all vary considerably (cf. Clarke and Hope, 1984, for a review). Similar cases could be made for distinguishing between different forms of robbery, rape, shoplifting, and car theft, to take some obvious cases. (In lay thinking, of course, such distinctions are also often made, as between mugging and other forms of robbery, for example.) A corollary of this requirement is that the explanatory focus of the theory is on crimes, rather than on offenders. Such a focus, we believe, provides a counterweight to theoretical and policy preoccupations with the offender.

Third, it was argued that a decision-making approach to crime requires that a fundamental distinction be made between criminal involvement and criminal events. Criminal involvement refers to the processes through which individuals choose to become initially involved in particular forms of crime, to continue, and to desist. The decision processes in these different stages of involvement will be influenced in each case by a different set of factors and will need to be separately modeled. In the same way, the decision processes involved in the commission of a specific crime (i.e., the criminal event) will utilize their own special categories of information. Involvement decisions are characteristically multistage, extend over substantial periods of time, and will draw upon a large range of information, not all of which will be directly related to the crimes themselves. Event decisions, on the other hand, are frequently shorter processes, utilizing more circumscribed information largely relating to immediate circumstances and situations.

The above points can be illustrated by consideration of some flow diagrams that the editors previously developed (Clarke and Cornish, 1985) to model one specific form of crime, namely, burglary in a middle-class residential suburb. Figure 1.1, which represents the processes of
1. Introduction

![Diagram of initial involvement model](image)

**FIGURE 1.1.** Initial involvement model (example: burglary in a middle-class suburb). (From *Crime and Justice*, vol. 6, M. Tonry and N. Morris (eds.). University of Chicago Press, 1985. By permission.)
initial involvement in this form of crime, has two decision points. The first (Box 7) is the individual's recognition of his or her "readiness" to commit the specific offense in order to satisfy certain needs for money, goods, or excitement. The preceding boxes indicate the wide range of factors that bring the individual to this condition. Box 1, in particular, encompasses the various historical (and contemporaneous) background factors with which traditional criminology has been preoccupied; these have been seen to determine the values, attitudes, and personality traits that dispose the individual to crime. In a rational choice context, however, these factors are reinterpreted as influencing the decisions and judgments that lead to involvement. The second decision (Box 8) actually to commit this form of burglary is the outcome of some chance event, such as an urgent need for cash, which demands action.

Figure 1.2, which is much simpler, depicts the further sequence of decision making that leads to the burglar selecting a particular house. The range of variables influencing this decision sequence is much narrower and reflects the influence of situational factors related to opportunity, effort, and proximal risks. In most cases this decision sequence takes place quite quickly. Figure 1.3 sketches the classes of

Increasing frequency of burglary (due to success) till personal optimum selected

1st burglary → 2nd → 3rd → 4th → 5th → Nth

INCREASED PROFESSIONALISM
Pride in improved skills and knowledge; successively reduces risk and increases haul through planning and careful selection of targets; acquires fencing contacts; develops skills in dealing with police and courts.

CHANGES IN LIFE STYLE AND VALUES
Recognition of financial dependence on burglary; chooses work to facilitate burglary; enjoys 'life in fast lane'; devalues legitimate work; justifies criminality.

CHANGES IN PEER GROUP
Becomes friendly with other 'criminals' and receiver; labeled as criminal; loses contact with 'straight friends'; quarrels with relations.
variables, relating to changes in the individual’s degree of professionalism, peer group, life-style, and values, that influence the constantly reevaluated decision to continue with this form of burglary.

Figure 1.4 illustrates, with hypothetical data, similar reevaluations that may lead to desistance. In this case, two classes of variables are seen to have a cumulative effect: life-events (such as marriage), and those more directly related to the criminal events themselves.

These, then, are the main features of the framework that was developed out of our review of recent work in a variety of disciplines that have an interest in crime. It differs from most existing formal theories of criminal behavior, however, in a number of respects. It is true that, like many other criminological theories, the rational choice perspective is intended to provide a framework for understanding all forms of crime. Unlike other approaches, however, which attempt to impose a conceptual unity upon divergent criminal behaviors (by subsuming them under more general concepts such as delinquency, deviance, rule breaking, short-run hedonism, criminality, etc.), our rational choice formulation sees these differences as crucial to the tasks of explanation and control. Unlike existing theories, which tend to concentrate on factors disposing individuals to criminal behavior (the initial involvement model), the rational choice approach, in addition, emphasizes subsequent decisions in the offender’s career. Again, whereas most existing theories tend to accord little influence to situational variables, the rational choice approach explicitly recognizes their importance in relation to the criminal event and, furthermore, incorporates similar influences on decisions relating to involvement in crime. In consequence, this perspective also recognizes, as do economic and behaviorist theories, the importance of incentives—that is, of rewards and punishments—and hence the role of learning in the criminal career. Finally, the leitmotif encapsulated in the notion of a “reasoning” offender implies the essentially nonpathological and commonplace nature of much criminal activity.

Empirical Studies of Criminal Decision Making

Part 1 of this volume consists of a number of empirical studies of shoplifting (Carroll and Weaver), robbery (Cusson and Pinsonneault, Feeney, Walsh), commercial burglary (Walsh), and opioid use (Bennett). Considered merely as additions to the crime-specific literature, these studies contribute greatly to our knowledge about particular offenses. This may be illustrated by a few of the more unexpected findings: that many robberies are impulsive and unplanned (Feeney, Walsh), that some robbers avoid burglary for fear of encountering the householder (Feeney),
and that, prior to their first experience of drug use, many opioid users had already apparently decided that they wanted to become part of the "drug scene" (Bennett). Additionally, although not necessarily designed with the above formulation of the rational choice approach in mind, these studies also exemplify the kind of detailed empirical work needed to test, refine, and elaborate our models.

In our discussion of the rational choice perspective we identified three main components: the image of a reasoning offender, a crime-specific focus, and the development of separate decision models for the involvement processes and the criminal event. The empirical studies both give
some support to the above analysis and permit further refinements. In regard to the nature of offender decision making, the present studies suggest that, although offenders act in a broadly rational fashion, normative economic models such as the expected utility (EU) paradigm fail to capture the cognitive activities involved. (This point is referred to again below.) Furthermore, there is evidence from Carroll and Weaver’s study that information-processing strategies change with growing expertise. As far as the second element is concerned, the importance of a crime-specific approach has already been noted above in relation to the insights provided about particular crimes. The necessity of such a focus is reinforced by Walsh’s comparisons between commercial burglars and robbers: Although similar proportions in each group claimed to plan their offenses, there was some evidence of differences in the form and content of the reasoning involved. Within categories of crime, too, it seems that further differentiation may have some value: Feeney, for example, found that commercial robberies were more often planned than those committed against individuals. Blazicek’s recent (1985) study of target selection by commercial robbers tends to support this finding, and his results also indicate that a further breakdown of commercial robbery into more specific categories might be useful. More generally, information from his respondents suggests that, when selecting their commercial targets, such robbers apparently attach more importance to the overall scenario—numbers of people inside the establishment, its size and location—than to the personal characteristics of the human victims involved. Since studies like Lejeune’s (1977) on mugging have shown victim characteristics to play a more central role in relation to target selection, it would be interesting to know more about the relative importance of scene and victim characteristics for other offenses.

The empirical studies support in general terms the separate modeling of event and involvement processes. (This issue, too, relates to the nature of criminal decision-making processes and will be discussed in more detail later.) However, they also suggest the need for some qualifications: For example, Cusson and Pinsonneault’s analysis, with its emphasis on the possibility of “backsliding,” suggests that desistance from a particular type of crime may not always be the smooth process of disengagement that our model might suggest. Their concepts of “shock” and of “delayed deterrence” leading to desistance further stress the discontinuities involved. (In passing it should be noted that the concept of desistance, and indeed of involvement, assumes repeated offenses. Although this assumption undoubtedly holds for many crimes, there is a limited class, including domestic murder, for which it will not.)

Lastly, the authors of these chapters (in particular, Carroll and Weaver, Walsh) raise some of the methodological problems commonly encountered when carrying out such empirical research. Many of these considerations will be especially relevant to studies of event decisions,
but others will be found to apply equally to questions of involvement, continuance, and desistance. The problems can be divided into two broad categories: those of contacting and enlisting the cooperation of “real” criminals, and those of providing a research context and, where relevant, a decision task likely to elicit valid information about criminal decision making. Unfortunately, these two groups of requirements often tend to conflict. To guarantee the representativeness of one’s sample, it might seem sensible to contact those convicted of such offenses, large clusters of whom are, in any case, conveniently located in prisons. Although these populations do not (as is often claimed) necessarily contain an overrepresentation of unsuccessful offenders—the criminal records of convicted burglars and robbers are likely to be only the tips of their personal offending icebergs—the data may well contain other systematic distortions: for example, the presence of large numbers of older, more serious, and more persistent offenders may exaggerate the role of experience and planning in decision making.

Although problems in gaining the cooperation of incarcerated offenders may be encountered (Walsh), the difficulties are considerably magnified where the decision is made to use those currently at liberty. The confidentiality of agency files, the covert nature of criminal activity, and the difficulty of penetrating criminal networks all make the task of identifying and contacting criminals (cf. Klockars, 1974; Carroll and Weaver) and ex-criminals (Cusson and Pinsonneault) a hard one; even when respondents are found, the problems remain of verifying their credentials and estimating their representativeness.

Such problems interact with those of trying to ensure that information about criminal decision making is elicited in ways that guarantee authenticity and verisimilitude. Bennett has elsewhere (Bennett and Wright, 1984) graphically cataloged the practical difficulties of undertaking process-tracing research with burglars. Moreover, the well-documented ethical and legal problems of carrying out participant observation studies with criminals (cf. Weppner, 1977)—to say nothing of the personal dangers sometimes involved—will usually place similar constraints on process tracing, limiting the method at best to the study of induced behavioral intentions rather than the commission of criminal acts. This will mean that, although questions of procedural rationality can be addressed by such studies, the effectiveness of the identified decision processes in achieving their outcomes cannot be directly explored. Even this research might be viewed as ethically dubious where serious personal crimes are being studied, especially those regarded as having pathological components, if those using the procedure were to be suspected of condoning, colluding in, or encouraging the consideration of such offenses.

However, in vitro techniques, such as process tracing using video recordings (cf. Bennett and Wright, 1984) or retrospective interviewing
using still photographs to stimulate discussion and simulate important aspects of the decision problem, may fail to capture essential elements of the real-life task or decision-making processes, even if the method enables the salient information being used to be correctly identified. At worst there is the danger that a largely fictional gloss of rationality, born out of the demands of the researcher and the needs of the offender, could be imposed post hoc on previous offending or arise more adventitiously through faulty memory and ignorance of or inability to articulate the real mechanisms involved. On the other hand, some offenders—even if their offense has been adjudicated, and certainly before—may, out of professional habit or personal needs, remain anxious to conceal any exercise of foresight and planning (Walsh). Indeed, most of the methodological problems traditionally to be met with in ethnographic research, whether by interview or observation, apply in some measure to the studies reported here. These difficulties relate inter alia to the motivations of respondents in supplying information; to the reactive effects of unanticipated interactions between experimenter (or interviewer) and subject (or respondent); to the intrusiveness of any technical instrumentation and other props; to the wealth of material generated; and to problems of analysis (a problem for process-tracing research; cf. Payne et al., 1978).

The list, of course, is endless, but such are the inevitable intellectual challenges and frustrations of undertaking research into real-life criminal decision making. It is hoped that the present chapters, taken singly or as a group, give some indication of the corresponding rewards.

Theoretical Issues

Part 2 of this volume collects chapters addressing some general theoretical issues. One of these concerns the place of a rational choice perspective in theoretical criminology. This topic is discussed in chapters by Hirschi and by Felson, both of whom believe that rational choice approaches complement rather than supplant existing theory. Hirschi sees rational choice theory as being concerned mainly with explaining crimes (or "events"), in contrast to his "control theory," which is primarily a theory of criminality (or "involvement"). Felson attempts to provide a synthesis among routine activities, social control, and rational choice perspectives. In his view, rational choice theory deals mainly with the content of decisions; routine activity approaches, in contrast, are seen to deal with the ecological contexts that supply the range of options from which choices are made.

We, too, see no essential conflict among these various theoretical positions, which, as Hirschi points out, share basic assumptions about the nature of human beings. On the other hand, we believe that rational choice models deal not just with crimes but also with criminality, and not
merely with the form and content of decision making itself but also with the historical and contemporaneous background to decisions. In other words, we see a rational choice perspective as providing a framework within which to incorporate and locate existing theories. This does not reflect an imperialistic ambition on our part to encroach upon the territory of other theories; indeed, it seems to us that a plurality of criminological theories is desirable. However, there is also a need for some integration of theory, and our perspective represents one such attempt. We also believe that theories are primarily of heuristic rather than intrinsic value, and the standard by which we should like to see the rational choice approach judged is the degree to which it enhances thinking about crime-control policies.

A second general issue, which is directly addressed in chapters by Lattimore and Witte (economists), by Tuck and Riley, and by Johnson and Payne (all psychologists), concerns the nature of the criminal decision-making process. This issue is also raised in some of the empirical chapters. Taken together, these chapters suggest that normative economic and decision theory models and related perspectives, such as the theory of reasoned action (TORA), may fail to capture the nature of the actual decision-making processes involved. In brief, such models often appear to require from decision makers more complex and sophisticated information-handling skills than they generally seem either willing or able to employ. Because the descriptive value of a model is vital to its usefulness in developing an understanding of criminal decision making detailed enough to provide pointers for policymaking, this conclusion is an important one. It should, however, be accompanied by some qualifications. In particular, it may be premature given the present concentration on event decisions and the limited range of crimes (mainly predatory) so far studied. The more protracted time scales of involvement decisions may allow greater scope for information processing along the lines that EU models seem to require; in a similar way, the latter may yet prove to provide appropriate descriptions of decision making (even in relation to event decisions) where offenses requiring a greater degree of deliberation and planning, such as some forms of corporate crime, are concerned.

However, the rapid information processing often demanded by the search and evaluation procedures involved in the assessment of criminal opportunities, and in the planning and commission of offenses, must favor explanations that emphasize the role of noncompensatory strategies (cf. Johnson and Payne). The end result of these strategies would be to lighten the load upon the human cognitive system. It seems likely, therefore, that the burden is reduced in other ways, too. Part of the expertise involved in criminal decision making may well consist in the ability to manage fears, moral scruples, and guilt by dealing with these issues at the time of first considering (or reconsidering) involvement, and
thereafter treating them as temporarily settled (in Cook’s [1980] terms, as "standing decisions"). There is some evidence from Bennett’s study (and from his previous research on burglars’ perceptions: cf. Bennett and Wright, 1984) and from Feeney’s and from Carroll and Weaver’s research that this may occur.

The third general issue examined in part 2 (in the chapter by Kemph) concerns the role of specialization in criminal behavior. Our crime-specific focus may appear to rely on the notion that offenders tend to specialize. This, of course, runs counter to most of the empirical evidence (Wolfgang et al., 1972), although 78% of Feeney’s sample of robbers claimed to be specialists. In fact, such an assumption is not necessary to our models, the foci of which are on crimes rather than on offenders, and which therefore treat of offenders, whether generalists or specialists, only in relation to that particular form of crime. In a sense, therefore, the question of whether offenders are generalists or specialists is a tangential one and would only become salient were the models to be used to explain a particular offender’s career, in which case the links between various crime-specific involvement models would need to be described. There is, in addition, the purely practical point that it may be inefficient to develop separate involvement (though not event) models for specific crimes that tend to be committed by largely the same kind of offenders. Nevertheless, given the difficulty of making the distinction between crime-based and offender-based models, there is no doubt that the value of the approach would be more readily appreciated the greater the degree of specialization that could be demonstrated. Seen in this light, Kemph’s findings, using data from the second Philadelphia cohort, of a moderate degree of specialization are encouraging, and sufficient to keep the issue open.

The final group of issues raised by the chapters in part 2 of this volume concerns the implications for policy of a rational choice approach. The view, for example, that offenders will act rationally to adapt their behavior to changes in penal sanctions is put forward by Cook in his telling exploration of some of the possible unforeseen consequences of incapacitation. Elsewhere (Cornish and Clarke, forthcoming) we have argued, in relation to situational crime prevention, that an understanding of factors affecting target choice is the key to the management of the displacement problem. Displacement refers to the possibility that, in response to reduced opportunities to commit a particular crime, offenders will adapt by choosing other targets, offending at a different time or place, changing their methods, or committing other forms of crime (Reppetto, 1976). Rational choice perspectives provide a fruitful way of conceptualizing the displacement phenomenon and of assessing the degree to which it might undermine crime-control measures. More generally, a focus on offender decision making seems to offer a more useful framework within which to discuss deterrence than do most existing criminological theories, which seem geared toward rehabilitation.
and social prevention. The distinction between involvement and event models, for example, provides a convenient basis for locating decisions about, respectively, the distal and proximal risks of offending.

In the wider context of criminal justice policy, Norrie’s paper raises important questions about the extent to which a rational choice approach, with its apparent emphasis upon individual choice and responsibility, supports a "just deserts" philosophy. The distinction he develops between "situated" rationality, under which people are seen as making genuine choices, albeit from a restricted range of possibilities dictated by their position in the socioeconomic structure, and the "abstracted" notion of rationality implicit in the criminal law, provides a strong support for our own reluctance to see the rational choice perspective as necessarily supporting juridical individualism. Thus, the mere ability to be a reasoning criminal cannot of itself provide a basis for ascribing criminal responsibility to actions, and the rational choice perspective is therefore neutral with respect to the free will-determinism debate.

Conclusions

The view that formed the starting point for this volume—that it can be useful to see offenders as reasoning decision makers—is borne out by its contents. The empirical studies of part 1 provide further evidence that, with regard to the offenses studied, criminals exercise some degree of planning and foresight and adapt their behavior to take account of proximal and distal contingencies. It also seems that the rational choice models we have provided serve to locate the findings of individual studies within a policy-relevant explanatory framework. The approach seems, for example, particularly useful for thinking about situational crime prevention and deterrence.

The studies in part I were carried out by workers from a variety of academic backgrounds. The value of a rational choice perspective as an impetus to interdisciplinary cooperation is also supported by the theoretical work in part 2 and bears out Simon's (1978) judgment about how much common ground is already shared. Whereas the empirical work serves to flesh out the rational choice framework, the second set of chapters identifies some of the theoretical issues that need to be tackled if this perspective is to be taken further. For example, it is important that a rapprochement be reached with other theoretical perspectives, that a fuller understanding of the cognitive processes involved in criminal decisions be achieved, and that the implications of a rational choice approach for crime control and the wider criminal justice policies be more fully debated.

The present volume goes some way toward dealing with these issues.
Nevertheless, much work remains to be done. In addition, a number of other issues require urgent attention. Perhaps the most pressing of these concerns the need to extend the reach of rational choice approaches to a wider variety of crimes. Considering the clear applicability of a rational choice perspective to corporate crimes, it is to be hoped that the approach will act as a further stimulus to research in this neglected area. It is particularly important, however, to ascertain the extent to which such an analysis can be applied to violent offenses. The few relevant studies that exist in this area (Lejeune’s 1977 study of mugging, Athens’s 1980 study of rape and homicide, and Dobash and Dobash’s 1984 study of spouse abuse) suggest that many such offenses do indeed exhibit a substantial degree of rationality. Feeney’s findings indicate that the use of weapons and of force, or threatened force in robbery, may be rationally calculated to gain swift control over an uncertain situation. It may be that our reluctance to construe aggressive or violent behavior as instrumental rather than expressive (or normal rather than pathological) sometimes has more to do with our own fears than with the facts of the matter. One must also be wary of definitions of rationality that rely too much on evidence of planning. From Walsh’s and Feeney’s data on personal robbery, it seems likely that “pattern planning” would be sufficient for offenses that rely largely for their success on surprise, intimidation, and a general ability to seize the initiative and think on one’s feet.

Although a number of chapters in the present volume have been concerned with the nature of decision-making processes, in terms of both their form and their content, a question that has barely been addressed (except in the clinical research of Yochelson and Samenow, 1976) is whether characteristically criminal thinking patterns exist. To handle guilt and shame, for example, do criminals employ unique thinking patterns, or do they make much greater use of commonplace cognitive devices such as excuses, justifications, and defense mechanisms like repression or denial, or is it that their thinking processes are similar to those of nonoffenders but the informational content differs? On the evidence of Carroll and Weaver’s chapter in this volume, and of Johnson and Payne’s discussion of noncompensatory strategies, it certainly seems that, in relation to decisions about the criminal event, the more experienced offender behaves in much the same way as any expert decision maker.

All methods for studying cognitive processes are liable to error. The primary data collection technique employed by the empirical studies in this volume was the interview, a technique whose strengths and limitations are too well known to require further rehearsal here. A range of other methods to study criminal decision making exists (such as participant and nonparticipant observation, the life history approach, and process tracing), and criminal decision making can be studied using a range of tasks in a variety of settings from the natural to the contrived.
Each of these approaches has its own special application: Process tracing, for example, is more suited to the study of events than of involvement, whereas the life history method may be especially useful where the sequential decisions of the criminal career are to be explored. Neither should more indirect methods of studying criminal decision making be forgotten: Interviews with victims and with police experienced in handling particular types of crime, surveys of previously victimized targets (cf. Winchester and Jackson, 1982)—all these can provide useful evidence against which to validate data obtained directly from offenders.

For the future, apart perhaps from more carefully defining the offenses under investigation, there is a need to move from the pilot study to more methodologically rigorous research. This will involve increased attention to the representativeness of the samples and the reactivity of whatever method is employed. Given that the field is still new, however, the need to encourage continuing methodological innovation and triangulation of research techniques cannot be overemphasized. In particular, it is to be hoped that the historical reluctance of some deviancy sociologists (particularly in Britain) to explore the implications of their ethnographic research for crime-control policies will not prevent a fuller appreciation of the insights that this work can provide.

Lastly, it remains to draw attention to two somewhat disquieting questions concerning this new image of a reasoning criminal. One, mentioned in Hirschi’s paper, refers to the possibility that criminologists may now be tending to see the offender as more thoughtful and intellectually sophisticated than he or she really is—an image with which, perhaps, the middle-class academic feels more at ease. A second and related question concerns the likely long-term consequences of thus “depathologizing” crime. If most criminal behavior is portrayed as rational, normal, and commonplace, what will be the effect upon everyday thinking and moralizing about crime?

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