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Burglary of Retail Establishments

Guide No. 15 (2002)

by Ronald V. Clarke

The Problem of Burglary of Retail Establishments

Retail burglaries are a problem for many communities. A British survey found that stores lose as much to burglars as they do to shoplifters. These losses impact the viability of businesses and, consequently, of the communities around them. Although much research has been conducted on burglary in general, little of it has specifically focused on retail burglaries—break-ins at stores to steal cash or goods. However, the research that has been done points to a number of effective responses to the problem. This guide reviews what is known about retail burglaries, suggests ways to analyze them in your jurisdiction, and provides guidance as to appropriate responses.

† This guide also covers smash-andgrabs and so-called "ram raids." Smash-and-grabbers rely on the element of surprise to break display windows or showcases and escape before the alarm sounds. Ram raiders use stolen vehicles to smash their way into buildings, usually after hours. They grab what they want and make a quick escape, often in another vehicle.

The businesses covered in the guide include shops in downtown areas, in strip malls , in covered malls (or “shopping precincts,” as they are known in the United Kingdom), and in retail parks. They also include standalone superstores, neighborhood stores and rural stores, as well as restaurants, beauty parlors and off-track betting establishments. Not covered are wholesale warehouses or retail outlets in industrial parks.

Related Problems

The problem of retail burglaries needs to be distinguished from those of (1) other retail thefts and (2) other commercial burglaries. These problems, which should be addressed separately, include:

Compared with residential burglaries, commercial burglaries—especially retail burglaries—have been the subject of few studies. In part, this is due to the much larger number of residential burglaries, but it is also generally believed that commercial burglaries have less serious consequences for victims and for the community at large. However, growing recognition of the important part small businesses play in urban regeneration has heightened concern about crimes that might reduce their viability.1 In turn, this has led to more research on crimes against businesses (including retailers), particularly in the United Kingdom, Holland and Australia. As a result, we now know more about retail burglaries, though our knowledge is still patchy. The following are the best established facts:

Factors Contributing to Burglary of Retail Establishments

Understanding the factors that contribute to your problem will help you frame your own local analysis questions, determine good measures of effectiveness, recognize key intervention points, and select appropriate responses.

Not all stores face the same burglary risks. Some are in areas with low crime rates, and some are not. Some are open for longer hours, perhaps around the clock. Some sell goods that are less attractive to thieves due to their low value or bulk. Some are located where they receive constant surveillance from passing traffic or pedestrians. Research tends to confirm these factors' effects on burglary risks, though there are several reasons why we can draw few definitive conclusions:

For all these reasons, we cannot yet make firm statements about all the risk factors in retail burglaries. However, by piecing together research findings in the United States and abroad, we can be fairly sure that the risks vary with the following store factors: location, premises, size, goods sold, length of time in business, and security precautions.

Location

Studies of crimes against small U.S. businesses have found that retail burglary rates are highest in deprived inner-city neighborhoods, and lowest in small towns and rural locations. This probably reflects variations in the number of offenders living close to the stores.11

Premises

People's presence in and near stores protects them from burglary, and this factor varies with the nature of the premises. For example, several studies have suggested that stand-alone superstores located away from the downtown area are particularly at risk, because the sites are deserted at night. Supermarkets open around the clock are protected from burglary by the staff's constant presence, and mall stores seem to be at reduced risk because they tend to be protected by security guards after hours. Shops in busy downtown areas also appear to have lower burglary risks, again due to the constant surveillance passersby provide.12

† Stores with attractive goods can have higher burglary rates even if they close late (Mirlees-Black and Ross 1995).[Full Text]

Size

National victimization surveys conducted in Australia and the United Kingdom have found that smaller shops have lower burglary rates than larger ones.13 This may be due partly to location (downtown shops tend to be smaller than those in retail parks or malls), and partly to the smaller number of goods to steal.

Goods Sold

Research has clearly established that shoplifters exhibit strong preferences in the goods they steal, and that stores carrying these goods are particularly at risk (see the Shoplifting guide in this series). In the United States, shoplifters favor tobacco products (particularly cigarettes), health and beauty products, recorded music and videos, and clothing (designer, in particular). The more-limited research on retail burglaries shows similar preferences,14 with some predictable variations resulting from differences in shoplifting and burglary methods. For example, burglars are more likely to target electronic goods, such as videocassette recorders and televisions, than are shoplifters, who would have difficulty taking such goods out of a store without being seen. A comparison of supermarket goods stolen by shoplifters and burglars found that both groups targeted cigarettes, liquor, and health and beauty aids, but as would be expected, the burglars stole these in much larger quantities than did the shoplifters. The burglars also robbed store ATM machines.15

Length of Time in Business

Newer businesses have higher victimization rates than older businesses.16 This might indicate that stores become more experienced in preventing crime the longer they are in business—or that store survival depends on resisting crime.

Security Precautions

Stores at greatest risk of burglary tend to take the most precautions, and while these precautions may reduce the risk of burglary, they do not entirely eliminate it. It is also the case that stores often increase their security after being burgled. These facts could help explain why some studies have found little statistical relationship between stores' level of security precautions and their rate of burglary.17 However, evaluations of recent crime prevention projects in Britain (the Safer Cities project and the Small Business and Crime Initiative) have concluded that improved security at recently burgled stores can reduce repeat burglaries and, as a result, overall burglary rates in targeted areas.18 In addition, some studies have produced evidence of the effectiveness of specific measures, such as installing burglar alarms and hiring security guards. While often falling short of proof, this evidence is reviewed below in the "Responses to the Problem of Retail Burglary" section.

UnderstandingYour Local Problem

The information provided above is only a generalized description of retail burglaries. You must combine the basic facts with a more specific understanding of your local problem if you are to develop an effective response. In most cases, your burglary problem is likely to involve a group of stores, such as those in a downtown area or in a particular mall. In other cases, your problem might be related to stores of the same general type (say, pharmacies or building supply stores). If the problem involves a single store (unless it is a very large store), you might more appropriately deal with it by offering routine crime prevention advice rather than undertaking a full-scale problem-oriented policing project. Your analysis is likely to focus on differential burglary risks among the stores in your group, and the reasons for those differences. Your analysis should address the risks of repeat victimization, as some particularly effective responses are focused on repeat victims. Bear in mind that registers of businesses may use corporate names, which may be different from "doing business as" names. The registers are also frequently outof-date, and you might need to make your own list.

† Each of these variations in retail burglaries deserves its own guide, but the information provided here should be sufficiently broad to provide assistance in all cases.

In general, you should seek to establish what kinds of offenders are involved, what kinds of stores they target, how they gain access to the stores, how they deal with security measures, and, finally, how they dispose of stolen goods. Knowledge of these factors will help you design an effective response to the problem.

Police crime reports or calls-for-service data do not generally distinguish the different kinds of nonresidential burglaries. Retail burglaries are lumped together with burglaries of educational institutions, medical centers, offices, and construction sites. Consequently, gathering information about your local problem can be labor intensive. It requires a careful review of police records and the identification of retail burglary incidents. Fortunately, the large majority of retail burglaries are reported to police, but it can still be difficult to identify repeat burglaries because locations may not be systematically recorded. For example, the store name might be included in some crime reports, and only the street address in others.

In addition, many important details about the type of business, points of entry and nature of losses may not be included. Thus, you should try to gather systematic information about these details using other data sources. Because gathering and analyzing data can be time consuming and involve technical problems, you should seek help from your local university, especially one with a criminal justice department. Data collection methods that can provide useful information include the following:

Asking the Right Questions

The following are some critical questions you should try to answer in analyzing your particular retail burglary problem. Your answers to these and other questions will help you choose the most appropriate set of responses later on.

Offenses

Offenders

Targets

Locations/Times

Measuring Your Effectiveness

Measurement allows you to determine to what degree your efforts have succeeded, and suggests how you might modify your responses if they are not producing the intended results. You should take measures of your problem before you implement responses, to determine how serious the problem is, and after you implement them, to determine whether they have been effective. All measures should be taken in both the target area and the surrounding area. (For more detailed guidance on measuring effectiveness, see the companion guide to this series, Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide for Police Problem-Solvers.)

The following "outcome" measures can be useful in assessing whether your responses have impacted the retail burglary problem:

In addition, the following "process" measures might provide some indication of the degree to which selected responses are being properly implemented:

Responses to the Problem of Burglary at Single-Family House Construction Sites

Your analysis of your local problem should give you a better understanding of the factors contributing to it. Once you have analyzed your local problem and established a baseline for measuring effectiveness, you should consider possible responses to address the problem.

The responses discussed below provide a foundation of ideas for addressing your problem. These responses are drawn from a variety of research studies and police reports. Several of them may apply to your particular problem. It is critical that you tailor responses to local circumstances, and that you can justify each response based on reliable analysis.

In most cases, an effective strategy will involve implementing several different responses. Law enforcement responses alone are seldom effective in reducing or solving the problem: you should give careful consideration to who else in your community shares responsibility for the problem and can help police better respond to it. Building a partnership with these various stakeholders can be essential to success. For example, if you decide to target career burglars, you may need the help of parole and probation officers or local prosecutors in securing appropriate prison sentences. If you believe that street lighting must be improved, you will need help from the city and the local utility company. Above all, you will need to persuade individual retailers to take the security measures you will surely find are needed. Local business associations might help you in securing retailers' commitment. Be aware that chain stores may need to get the head office's approval for any new security measures. Chains are likely to have their own security departments, and security staff will need to be convinced that changes in company practice are needed to meet local conditions. On the other hand, the security departments might help you formulate your response, or put you in touch with local loss prevention specialists.

Several other important considerations should guide your choice of responses:

The responses discussed below are organized under three main headings according to the groups with the main role to play in implementing them: the police, retailers and city/local government. It will be clear that research evidence about the effectiveness of most responses is patchy and sometimes inconsistent. If direct evidence of a particular response's effectiveness is lacking, the response assessment is guided by accepted crime prevention principles.

Police Responses

  1. Targeting repeat offenders. Police crackdowns can produce reductions in crime, but these reductions may not last long. Research has shown that after the police leave, it is often "business as usual" for the local offenders. However, a recently published study found that a crackdown on prolific local burglars, followed by a “consolidation” phase in which the properties most at risk were target-hardened, produced reduced residential burglary rates in one community in England. The crackdown was not the usual kind, involving heavy police presence in a particular neighborhood. Instead, it involved concentrated police attention on—including intensified investigation of—burglary suspects in one local area. Police identified, targeted and arrested 14 suspects thought to be among the most prolific local burglars, resulting in a 60 percent reduction in burglaries. There was no evidence of any displacement of burglary to other crimes or to nearby areas; indeed, car thefts dropped in the crackdown area, and burglaries dropped by 50 percent in nearby areas, suggesting that the offenders arrested were responsible for many of those crimes, as well.21 A combined crackdown and consolidation along these lines could be equally effective in reducing retail burglaries.†† For an example of how one police department reduced the number of smash and grabs by focusing attention on known offenders, click here.

    † For a recent review and discussion, see Novak et al. (1999).

    †† For a comprehensive assessment of repeat offender programs, see Spelman (1990).

  2. Targeting repeatedly burgled stores. There is a large body of evidence that focusing police and crime prevention resources on repeatedly burgled homes can produce substantial declines in burglary. Similar benefits could be obtained by concentrating preventive resources on repeatedly burgled stores.22 The research also suggests that repeat burglaries are frequently the work of highly prolific offenders, who often return soon after the original burglary. Short-term use of measures focused on recently burgled stores might result in arrests of these offenders. As well as the deployment of directed patrols, such measures include the use of hightech devices such as portable, covert closed-circuit television (CCTV) (which records pictures and sound only during periods of activity); portable silent alarms (which alert the police when activated); proximity alarms (which loudly sound when premises are approached from a particular direction); and "forensic traps" (such as chemically treated mats to pick up intruders' footprints).††

    †† Experience with these high-tech devices is limited to date, but it appears that they can pose numerous practical problems. For example, store owners/employees often forget to activate the devices when they leave at night, or forget they are activated when they return (Taylor 1999). As with conventional intruder alarms, portable burglar alarms also pose the problem of false alarms (see the False Burglar Alarms guide in this series).

  3. Disrupting markets for stolen goods. Far too little is known about how offenders dispose of stolen goods, and too little is done to disrupt markets for the goods. It is true that in many jurisdictions, pawnshops are required to report the goods they receive to the police. While this requirement's effectiveness has not been properly evaluated, the best programs seem to be those in which pawnshop records are automated, downloaded daily to the police, and automatically searched against the police records database for hits on stolen property. In any case, burglars can dispose of stolen goods in many other ways, including peddling them on the street, selling them to friends or acquaintances, selling them through newspaper ads or in bars and clubs, exchanging them for drugs, and even selling them door-to-door. Burglars also sell goods to small shops, and police in many areas have undertaken "stings" in which they set up bogus fencing operations in used-goods stores. The popularity of these stings appears to have declined. They are expensive and time-consuming, and research suggests that they can lead to an influx of crime into the area around them.23 Alternative strategies to disrupt sales of stolen goods to stores include (1) conducting surveillance of suspect stores in your area to gain evidence of thieves' entering and making sales, so as to prosecute both the thieves and the fences; (2) encouraging stores that buy used goods to display signs stating they are part of a crime prevention program to reduce sales of stolen goods; and (3) implementing local ordinances requiring stores to establish proof of ownership for used goods they buy.24
  4. Establishing business/shop watch programs. Despite their popularity, there is little evidence that neighborhood watch programs are effective deterrents to burglary. Similarly, there is little evidence that business/shop watch programs produce tangible results beyond some possible public relations benefits.25 These programs are also difficult to establish.26 Greater success might result from establishing “cocoon” business/shop watch programs in which police encourage stores close to a recently burgled store to exercise heightened surveillance for a month or two.

Retailer Actions

  1. Upgrading external security. This target-hardening option covers a variety of measures, including:
    • strengthening locks and reinforcing doors and windows;
    • installing strengthened glass, shutters or grilles in windows;
    • installing video cameras to monitor possible entry points;
    • installing security lighting at entry points; and
    • installing concrete pillars or decorative planters to prevent ram raiding.

    As mentioned, the research evidence regarding these measures' value is unclear and inconsistent. Burglars say they find these measures of little hindrance, and from a police point of view, they may provide little benefit if they merely displace burglary to other stores. Planning authorities may resist some of these measures, particularly shutters and security lighting, because they can make an area less attractive.27

    That said, there is some limited evidence from recent studies that target hardening can be effective in preventing burglary of particular premises and, if perceived to be widespread, can also protect an entire area.28 Which measures to use with which stores depends on a variety of cost, convenience and aesthetic considerations; the advice of a professional security consultant might be required.

  2. Installing burglar alarms. Most stores have burglar alarms, and research suggests these can effectively protect the premises from burglary.29 One study has found that areas with a higher number of premises with burglar alarms have lower rates of burglary.30 However, many burglar alarms have unacceptably high rates of false alarms, and more-sophisticated thieves can disable them. Different systems vary considerably in their costs for owners and for the police. For more information on these topics, see the False Burglar Alarms guide in this series.
  3. Safeguarding cash and valuable stock. This approach falls under the situational prevention category of "target removal." It includes:
    • removing high-value goods from window displays;
    • concealing goods;
    • minimizing stock with "just in time" deliveries;
    • using safes or secure cages for the most valuable items in stockrooms;
    • marking valuable goods such as computers with traceable, hard-to-remove identification numbers;
    • banking cash each day; and
    • leaving empty cash registers open at night (to prevent their being broken into).

    While these techniques are good security practice, nothing is known from research about their effectiveness in preventing retail burglaries. However, cash reduction is a well-proven method of preventing commercial robberies, and removal of coin-fed fuel meters in British homes has been shown to prevent residential burglaries.31

  4. Locking escape routes. It is good security practice to make it as difficult to get out of a store after hours as it is to get in. (Fire exits must not be locked during normal business hours or when the store is otherwise occupied). When leaving at night, store managers should cut off the power supply to loading-bay doors, and make sure other doors and windows cannot be opened from the inside.
  5. Screening and training shop staff. It is good security practice (where law permits) to screen prospective employees for criminal records. It is also good practice to train staff in security measures, to clarify their responsibilities (particularly for key security), and to encourage their involvement—for example, by keeping watch for suspicious behavior and unfamiliar vehicles.
  6. Employing security guards after hours. Burglars say that security guards pose the greatest threat to their activities.32 Guards are widely employed in large malls and retail parks, which helps to account for the relatively low burglary rates of stores in these locations. An alternative adopted by some large stores is to employ a night crew that handles cleanup, restocking and display dressing. The store is protected from burglars while this necessary work gets done.
  7. Using crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED). CPTED entails changing landscaping and design to (1) discourage access to all but intended users, (2) allow intruders to be spotted, and (3) establish the boundaries between private and public property. While research provides little guide as to CPTED's effectiveness in reducing retail burglaries, the general principles of this approach are widely accepted.33 If stores in your area are contemplating either major remodeling or construction of new premises, they should consider incorporating CPTED strategies to reduce their future burglary risks. A CPTED survey can be done for an entire area, not just for individual businesses. If a block of businesses or a business district cooperates in paying for a CPTED specialist to undertake a survey and recommend improvements, the cost will be minimal. Information about CPTED can be obtained from the National Crime Prevention Council (www.ncpc.org/) and the International CPTED Association (www.cpted.net).

    For an example of how one police department used CPTED to reduce burglary along a commercial corridor, click here.

City Planning Measures

  1. Improving street surveillance through lighting and CCTV. Commercial burglars prefer targets that receive little surveillance,34 and they could be expected to avoid well-lit streets† and those with CCTV surveillance. Consistent with this, a study in Britain found large reductions in shop burglaries following the introduction of CCTV surveillance in three downtown areas,35 and a study in Portland, Ore., found that improving the lighting on a commercial strip produced a significant drop in retail burglaries.36 As with all security measures, lighting has to be carefully designed to provide maximum benefits without unnecessary cost.††

    † State or county crime prevention associations may provide grants to fund lighting improvements.

    †† For a discussion, see Poyner and Fawcett (1995), and Painter and Tilley (1999).

  2. Promoting "living over the shop." In an effort to restore downtown areas' vitality and provide after-hours surveillance of retail properties, the British government is sponsoring a program to encourage people to live in vacant space above shops. The program, which has been adopted by many towns and cities, has the additional benefit of increasing the supply of low-cost housing.37 A recent evaluation, based on interviews with a variety of interested parties, found that most people supported the program and believed it helped to reduce crime in downtown areas.
  3. Promoting business improvement districts (BIDs). Many U.S. cities have designated BIDs formed by coalitions of local businesspeople. The objective is to promote investment in declining business areas. Similar initiatives in Britain fall under the title of "town center management." An important objective of most BIDs† is to reduce crime and the fear of crime. To this end, initiatives may include improvements in street lighting, installation of public CCTV systems, regular cleaning of graffiti and repair of vandalism, dedicated patrols by police and security guards, and formation of a force of "city guards" to provide a street presence and assist visitors or tourists. Evaluations of BIDs are currently being undertaken in the United States.38

    † Though not, apparently, of most TCM schemes (Beck and Willis 1995).

Summary of Responses

The table below summarizes the responses to retail burglaries, the mechanism by which they are intended to work, the conditions under which they ought to work best, and some factors you should consider before implementing a particular response. It is critical that you tailor responses to local circumstances, and that you can justify each response based on reliable analysis. In most cases, an effective strategy will involve implementing several different responses. Law enforcement responses alone are seldom effective in reducing or solving the problem.

Police Responses
# Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations
1 Targeting repeat offenders Incapacitates those offenders responsible for a large portion of burglaries …police can reliably identify habitual criminals; there is a high proportion of repeat burglaries; courts are willing to award custodial sentences; and crackdowns are consolidated through environmental Requires the cooperation of prosecutors, courts, probation and parole departments, and city planning departments
2 Targeting repeatedly burgled stores Concentrates prevention where it is most needed; facilitates the arrest of prolific offenders …a small proportion of stores experience a large proportion of burglaries, and measures can be put in place quickly Requires cooperation among police divisions (local officers, crime prevention officers, detectives), business owners and city officials
3 Disrupting markets for stolen goods Reduces the incentive for theft by making it difficult for offenders to sell stolen goods …stolen-goods markets are not widespread Can be difficult to obtain information about how and where offenders sell or exchange stolen goods; stings are expensive and of doubtful effectiveness; courts often take a lenient view on receiving stolen property charges
4 Establishing business/shop watch programs Increases offenders' risk of police intervention and/or subsequent identification …concern about retail burglaries is widely shared among stores Can be difficult to enlist store owners' participation; a more effective alternative is to establish temporary "cocoon" watch programs around recently burgled premises
Retailer Actions
# Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations
5 Upgrading external security Stops or slows down offenders …existing security is low, and natural surveillance is poor Target-hardening solutions need to be carefully tailored to individual stores, often requiring the advice of professional security consultants
6 Installing burglar alarms Increases offenders' risk of getting caught …a high proportion of stores are fitted with alarms, and alarms are connected to CCTV systems that allow private security companies to verify that a burglary is taking place before calling the police Burglars can disable alarms; there are high rates of false alarms, but improved systems are coming on the market
7 Safeguarding cash and valuable stock Reduces the rewards of burglary …burglars' principal target is cash or stock readily convertible to cash Little research is available on this strategy's effectiveness
8 Locking escape routes Slows offenders down and increases their risk of getting caught; limits the amount of stock offenders can remove …stores are located in areas with good natural surveillance, and stolen goods are bulky/heavy A commonsense approach, but one on which little relevant evaluative research has been done; depends on well-trained and disciplined staff
9 Screening and training shop staff Reduces the risk of "inside jobs"; increases staff's responsibility for store security …stores are located in high- crime areas, and staff turnover is high Laws must permit screening of potential employees; employees must have incentives to share in the security function
10 Employing security guards after hours Increases offenders' risk of getting caught …stores are closely clustered together, and guards are constantly or frequently present Burglars report being most deterred by security guards; a low-cost alternative for larger stores is to employ a night crew to handle cleanup, restocking and display dressing
11 Using crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED Makes burglary more difficult; increases offenders' risk of getting caught …retailers are planning major remodeling or the construction of new buildings Incorporating CPTED principles need not be costly and can bring long term benefits; CPTED surveys can be undertaken for an entire business district, as well as for individual premises
City Planning Measures
# Response How It Works Works Best If... Considerations
12 Improving street surveillance through lighting and CCTV Improving street surveillance through lighting and CCTV …stores are located in downtown areas or business districts U.S. civil liberty groups often oppose the installation of public CCTV systems; lights and CCTV equipment are sometimes vandalized in high crime areas
13 Promoting "living over the shop" Increases natural surveillance of stores at night and on weekends …stores are located in downtown areas or business districts This initiative is usually part of a wider revitalization program; accommodations sometimes do not provide good surveillance of the stores below; this approach appeals most to singles and young people who are often away from home and therefore provide less surveillance
14 Promoting business improvement districts (BIDs) Increases natural surveillance in the area …BIDs have dedicated patrols by security staff BIDs depend on widespread support from the business community; BIDs' crime prevention value has not yet been demonstrated

Endnotes

[1] Gill (1994); Shapland (1995); Felson and Clarke (1997).

[2] Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995).[Full Text ]

[3] Cromwell, Olson and Avary (1991); Butler (1994); Jacques (1994); Wright and Decker (1994); Wiersma (1996).[Full text ][Full Text ]

[4] Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995); Butler (1994).[Full Text ][Full text ]

[5] Skogan (1990); Tilley (1993); Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995); Farrell, Chenery and Pease (1998).[Full Text ] [Full Version ] [Briefing Notes ]

[6] Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995).[Full Text ]

[7] Taylor (1999).

[8] Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995).[Full Text ]

[9] Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995).[Full Text ]

[10] Redshaw and Mawby (1996); Burrows (1997); Brown (2001).

[11] Reiss (1969); Skogan (1990).

[12] Butler (1994); Walker (1994); Redshaw and Mawby (1996).[Full text ]

[13] Walker (1994); Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995); Perrone (2000).[Full Text ][Full Text ]

[14] Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995); Shapland (1995).[Full Text ]

[15] Food Marketing Institute (1997).

[16] Hakim and Shachmurove (1996); Perrone (2000).[Full Text ]

[17] Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995); Shapland (1995).[Full Text ]

[18] Tilley (1993); Tilley and Hopkins (1998). [Full Version ] [Briefing Notes ] [Full Version ] [Briefing Notes ]

[19] Cromwell, Olson and Avary (1991); Butler (1994); Jacques (1994); Wright and Decker (1994); Wiersma (1996).[Full text ][Full Text ]

[20] Tilley and Hopkins (1998). [Full Version ] [Briefing Notes ]

[21] Farrell, Chenery and Pease (1998).

[22] Tilley (1993); Tilley and Hopkins (1998); Bowers and Hirschfield (1998); Taylor (1999). [Full Version ] [Briefing Notes ] [Full Version ] [Briefing Notes ]

[23] Langworthy and LeBeau (1992).

[24] Clarke (1999); Sutton, Schneider and Hetherington (2001).[Full Version ] [Briefing Notes ] [Full Version ] [Briefing Notes ]

[25] Beck and Willis (1995).

[26] Tilley and Hopkins (1998). [Full Version ] [Briefing Notes ]

[27] Jacques (1994); Beck and Willis (1995).[Full Text ]

[28] Tilley (1993); Tilley and Hopkins (1998). [Full Version ] [Briefing Notes ] [Full Version ] [Briefing Notes ]

[29] Hakim and Blackstone (1997).

[30] Burglary of Retail Establishments

[31] Hakim and Blackstone (1997).

[32] Clarke (1997).

[33] Butler (1994).[Full text ]

[34] Crowe (1991); Poyner and Fawcett (1995).

[35] Butler (1994); Wiersma (1996).[Full text ]

[36] Brown (1997).

[37] Griswold (1984).

[38] Beck and Willis (1995).

[39] Greene and Stokes (1998).

References

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Related POP Projects

Important!

The quality and focus of these submissions vary considerably. With the exception of those submissions selected as winners or finalists, these documents are unedited and are reproduced in the condition in which they were submitted. They may nevertheless contain useful information or may report innovative projects.

Allapatah Produce Market Power Play (Resubmission) [Goldstein Award Finalist], Miami Police Department, 2002

Business Against Crime, West Midlands Police (UK), 2002

North Tryon Street Corridor Commercial Burglaries, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, 2000

Smash and Grab Task Force, Metro-Dade Police Department (Metro-Dade, FL, US), 1995

Stemmons Corridor Service Delivery Project, Dallas Police Department, 1999

Top Ten Percent, Tucson Police Department, 2006