This guide begins by describing the problem of convenience store robbery and reviewing factors that increase its risk. It then identifies a series of questions to help you analyze your local convenience store robbery problem. Finally, it reviews responses to the problem and what is known about these from evaluative research and police practice.
Convenience store robbery is but one aspect of the larger set of problems related to robbery and to commercial establishments. Although all robbery types share some common features, convenience store robbery warrants special attention because convenience stores have special characteristics. Related problems not directly addressed in this guide, each requiring separate analysis, include
Some of these related problems are covered in other guides in this series, all of which are listed at the end of this guide. For the most up-to-date listing of current and future guides, see www.popcenter.org
Convenience stores are “retail business[es] with primary emphasis placed on providing the public a convenient location to quickly purchase from a wide array of consumable products (predominantly food and gasoline) and services.”1 There are over 135,000 convenience stores operating in the United States, and the number continues to grow.† An estimated 100 million Americans visit a convenience store on any given day; each convenience store might serve hundreds, even thousands, of customers daily.2 Over 80 percent of all Americans, because of their busy schedules, prefer convenience stores to supermarkets.3
† The Middle Atlantic States (New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania) led the increase in number of stores (9.8 percent from the previous year), although all U.S. regions experienced an increase within the past year (National Association of Convenience Stores 2005).
Convenience store robberies account for approximately 6 percent of all robberies known to the police.4 Although this comprises a relatively small percentage of total robberies, the problem is persistent. Over the last 30 years, there has been little change in the proportion of convenience store robberies. Nevertheless, convenience stores in particular locations can be vulnerable to repeat victimization, especially those types of retailers that have large amounts of cash, low security, and few staff and customers likely to resist.5
The numbers of U.S. convenience store robberies rose significantly in the 1980s and then declined just as significantly in the 1990s, a reduction that could be due in part to the development of better crime prevention measures in convenience stores,6 many of which are discussed in the Responses section below.
† See Problem-Solving Tools Guide No. 4, Analyzing Repeat Victimization.
Some stores are repeatedly victimized, either by the same offender or different offenders. Reasons for repeat victimization vary. A successful robber might return to rob the same store again or might tell other robbers about the store. Alternatively, a wide range of robbers might see the store as particularly attractive or vulnerable.† Media accounts may actually play up the vulnerability of the store by reporting successful robberies7 and may glamorize the crime, giving would-be offenders the notion that those that “rob with style” don’t get caught.8
† See the Problem-Solving Tools Guide on Understanding Risky Facilities for further discussion of why some places are more vulnerable to crime than other similar places.
Interviews with convicted robbers revealed that they often selected easy targets assuming that “victims [businesses] will not install preventative measures to stop them.”9 One study of convenience store robbery victims indicates that more than one-half of the respondents reported subsequent changes in store policy or practice after a robbery.10 It was also found that a store was most vulnerable to revictimization within the first few weeks after the first robbery.11
Convenience store robberies are classified according to the offender’s method of operation:12
Another perhaps less common type is merchandise robbery,† which involves the forcible taking of goods from a store. A higher number of employee injuries are reported in merchandise robberies, as active resistance and confrontation are more prevalent in these situations.13
† One study by the Ontario Convenience Store Association found that an increase in merchandise robberies at convenience stores between 2001 and 2002 was related to higher cigarette prices, the existence of illicit markets, and the ease of disposal (Inkster Group 2004 [PDF]).
Convenience store employees suffer from high rates of workplace homicide, second only to taxicab drivers.† , 14 Customers can also suffer injury from offender assaults. Injuries can result from an employee’s active resistance or from the offender ’s misreading the employee’s nervousness or hesitation as resistance.15 When faced with an employee who chooses to actively resist and is in a face-to-face confrontation, robbers may resort to injuring the worker to avoid apprehension. Higher injury rates are consistently found to be correlated with measures employees take during the robbery.16
† See the Problem-Oriented Policing Guide, Robbery of Taxi Drivers.
Convenience store robberies are not only costly to the workers victimized but also to the store itself. Costs include loss of customers who may be deterred from shopping at a store that has been robbed, leading to a loss of income from reduced customer sales. Stores can also experience an increase in workers’ compensation costs and insurance premiums due to the robbery. Unfortunately, for those independently owned stores, losses may be unrecoverable, due to the inability of many small operations to afford insurance coverage.17 Stores that do not have insurance coverage may be forced to increase prices or potentially close. Other less direct costs include the various criminal justice activities of state and local governments, including police investigations, prosecutions, and incarceration and supervision of offenders.18
The average cost to employers of a single episode of workplace violence can amount to $250,000 in lost work time and legal expenses.19 Workplace victimizations reportedly contribute to a loss of 3.5 days per employee per crime. Victimization can further limit the ability of these stores to attract and maintain employees for the night shifts, particularly in stores that operate 24 hours a day20 and those with a high volume of cash transactions, a characteristic of such stores. The combination of operational expenses and security challenges can be financially burdensome.21
Victim employees can also suffer psychological harm.22 “Secondary victimization ” can occur when employers, managers, employees, or those responding to the robbery fail to acknowledge the victim’s trauma.23 This may result from not believing the victim’s description of the attack, discounting the incident, and blaming or criticizing the victim. Psychological problems resulting from victimization may not only affect the employee’s subsequent workplace performance, but also can affect the store’s daily operations.†
† Most victims’ organizations agree that immediate intervention and support after a victim endures a robbery is beneficial to the victim’s recovery, yet statistics show that of the 86,000 robbery victims (irrespective of location of victimization) in 1991, only 4 percent of the reported robbery victims were treated by mental health care providers (National Center for Victims of Crime 1997).
Understanding the factors that contribute to convenience store robbery will help you frame your own local analysis questions, determine good effectiveness measures, recognize key intervention points, and select appropriate responses.
Research has identified many factors that influence a robbery’s likelihood or outcome. In some cases, the findings are inconsistent or contradictory. This may be because it can be difficult to interpret studies based on small numbers of stores or difficult to determine if certain store features influenced the robberies, or were changed in response to the robberies.24 The factors generally found to contribute to the incidence of convenience store robberies follow.
Operation hours
Operation hours are by far the strongest factor contributing to convenience story robbery, particularly for stores open 24 hours a day.25 Late evening to early morning hours carry a greater risk of being targeted, perhaps because fewer people are about—other customers, police, or passersby—who might intervene.
Interior store layout
Several characteristics of a store’s interior layout can influence its vulnerability to a robbery. Common among these is visibility, from two perspectives. First, employees should be able to see their surroundings, and second, people outside the store, including police on patrol, should be able to see into the store.26 Robbers are deterred by brightly lit stores in which employees and the store’s cash registers are clearly visible from the street.27 The height and placement of store displays and shelving also determine whether there are unobstructed views inside the store.
Exterior store environment
Visibility is also a factor outside the store. Poorly lit gasoline islands and parking lots increase the chances of a robber’s selecting a particular store,28 since employees cannot see what is occurring outside the store. There is also a relationship between parking lot size and store vulnerability in that a large parking area in front of the store reduces the ability of passersby to provide informal surveillance of the store’s interior and exterior.29 The availability of viable escape routes is also a consideration in determining whether or not a store is a prime robbery target. For instance, poorly designed fencing or landscaping can facilitate a robber’s quick flight from the store, thereby making the store a more attractive target.
Location
There may be a relationship between the location and surrounding environment of a convenience store and its risk of becoming a robbery target. For instance, one study found that stores located in shopping complexes or strip malls had fewer robberies than those not in more concentrated commercial settings.30 A study of robberies at service stations and pharmacies produced similar findings.31 According to another study, stores in neighborhoods with older buildings and structures, close to graffiti and subsidized housing, and not located in a shopping center showed an increased risk of robbery.32
Convenience store type
Convenience stores can be distinguished from other retail establishments by the hours they operate, store size, and products sold. Most are open every day until late in the evening, with some open 24 hours a day. Some are corporate franchises, others are independently owned. Single-store businesses that are owned and operated as a one-store business or franchise dominate the market.33
There are generally six convenience store formats. Each is categorized by the size of the store and the products it sells, as shown in Table 1 below.34
| Table 1: Convenience Store Types | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Type | Size | Typical Products | Parking |
Kiosk |
< 800 sq. ft. | Gasoline and “fast-moving” items (tobacco, beverages, snacks, and confectioneries) |
Usually only at the pumps |
Mini |
800 to 1200 sq. ft. |
Limited grocery selection (predominantly prepared sandwiches) |
At the pumps and some with striped parking |
Limited selection |
1,500 to 2,200 sq. ft. |
Broader product mix and added prepared foods (hot dogs, nachos, popcorn) |
Striped parking (with extended hours) |
Traditional |
2,400 to 2,500 sq. ft. |
Expanded product mix (including dairy, bakery, snack foods, and beverages) |
Six to 12 parking spaces and pedestrian access |
Expanded |
2,800 to 3,600 sq. ft. |
Traditional product mix |
10 to 20 marked parking spaces |
Hyper |
4,000 to 5,000 sq. ft. |
Can include a bakery, restaurant area, or a pharmacy |
Multiple parking spaces (usually larger than the expanded store) |
Risk of robbery based on a variety of administrative and environmental factors has been proposed. For instance, stores with gas pumps, sometimes referred to as convenience gas stations, are less likely to be robbed than stores without pumps.35 Another study has found that independent stores less than two years old were at higher risk for robbery than older stores that are company owned and operated.36
Ownership
The security and crime prevention measures convenience store owners employ vary considerably with the type and structure of ownership. 7-Eleven, Inc. has its own security department, policies, and employee crime-prevention training program.37 A “mom and pop” owned establishment would likely have very few resources and less access to current techniques.
Staff number
Several studies have evaluated the presence of two or more clerks to reduce the risk of robbery. The findings have been inconsistent, and are highly debated.38 The 1986 Gainesville, Fla., studies concluded that the number of clerks on duty was a strong predictor of robbery potential.39 However, a review of convenience store robberies by the National Association of Convenience Stores in 1997 did not support this conclusion.40
Cash-control procedures
The handling and storage of cash has a significant influence on the targeting of stores for robbery. The Athena Research Corp. studies of armed robbers in 1985 and 1995 have shown that “80 percent of potential robbers can be deterred if a convenience store limits the amount of money kept in its cash register.”41 There are a number of cash-control units available to retailers that have both a drop safe and money dispenser, with various access methods. Again, both the ability to purchase such units and the implementation of strict cash protocol depend on the ownership type and structure.
A strict cash control protocol can significantly reduce the chances a store will be targeted by potential robbers.
Incident response policies
Employers’ policies, particularly about firearms in the workplace,† and various administrative and environmental measures† have an impact on workplace violence and homicide rates.42 Furthermore, the combination of inexperienced employees and inadequate training procedures can contribute to higher victimization rates.43 One multistate study found that clerks’ behavior might be the most significant factor in determining the extent of injuries during a robbery.44 For instance, injury can be caused by two different offender assaults: the blitz attack, which catches the victim by surprise and is unprovoked by the victim or another, and the response to perceived resistance, which can result from either misreading the employee’s nervousness as resistance, or wanting to get in and out of the store as quickly as possible.45 Employees can, in turn, employ certain behavior to keep themselves safe. This includes following the offender’s instructions, staying calm and quiet, avoiding eye contact, not making any sudden movements, remaining inside the workplace, not attacking the offender, while making mental notes to provide to the police regarding the offender’s physical description.46
† One study found that there was approximately a “sevenfold increase in the risk of a worker being killed in workplaces that allowed guns,” implying that workplaces that respond to a prior experience with crime by allowing firearms may actually be creating a greater risk for workplace homicide by allowing weapons on the premises (Loomis, Marshall, and Ta 2005).
†† Although some researchers believe that limiting cash on hand to less than $100 could reduce robbery risk and injury rates, other research has found that limiting cash and escape routes can force a robber to take greater risks, thereby potentially increasing employee injury rates. Other suggestions include installing a visible drop safe to allow for natural surveillance throughout the store (Faulkner, Landsittel, and Hendricks 2001).
Like robbers in general, most convenience store robbers are male (95 percent) with about two-thirds of them under the age of 25.47 They are often impulsive and opportunistic, and do limited planning before attempting the actual robbery. Most are seeking quick cash, often to buy drugs. A high proportion report that they were under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs while committing the robbery.48
Serial robbers, particularly those that victimize the same location on more than one occasion, appear to be more professional, even determined, in their approach. They are significantly more likely to carry a gun, to have been in prison before, to wear a disguise, and to choose a specific time for the robbery. They are also more likely to be violent, and cause a higher rate of employee injury.49 Their robberies display distinct geographical patterns over time.50
Since it has been found that certain stores are more vulnerable to repeat victimization, we can conclude that robbers are selecting those stores because of the opportunities they offer for successful completion of a robbery.51 Offenders prefer areas in or near their neighborhoods, thus increasing the risk for those stores in areas where many offenders live.52 However, many factors may affect offender decisions. For example, since offenders commonly use guns in convenience store robberies, some offenders looking for quick cash may think that a weapon overcomes any other obstacles to carrying out the crime. Novice offenders might be less likely to differentiate between low-risk and high-risk targets.53 Robbers commonly consider escape routes an important factor in selecting a target. 54
To limit the risk of apprehension, robbery offenders generally operate at night, when concealment is more likely. Convenience store robberies have been found to be consistent with this time pattern. One study of robberies in 30 Leon County, Fla., convenience stores over a four-year period found significant correlations not only to time but also to day of the week, and month. Fifty percent occurred between 10 p.m. and 12 a.m., generally times when business traffic is minimal. Three days (Friday, Saturday, and Sunday) accounted for 60 percent of the robberies. More than 50 percent occurred between November and February, consistent with findings that property crimes occur more frequently during winter months.55
The information provided above is only a generalized description of convenience store robbery. You must combine the basic facts with a more specific understanding of your local problem. Analyzing the local problem carefully will help you design a more effective response strategy.
Your analysis should examine the different risks evident in the stores, and be particularly focused on repeat victimization. Gathering information is labor-intensive and detailed. The more standardized your department’s information-gathering process, the more opportunity you have to understand your robbery problem and reach conclusions.
In addition to criminal justice agencies, the following groups have an interest in the convenience- store robbery problem and should be considered for the contribution they might make to gathering information about the problem and responding to it:
The following are some critical questions you should ask in analyzing your particular problem of convenience store robbery, even if the answers are not always readily available. Your answers to these and other questions will help you choose the most appropriate set of responses later on.
Since environmental details are particularly relevant to this type of crime, it is important to listen carefully to victims’ description of the robbery. You can collect pertinent information by asking victims incisive questions about the setting and circumstances of the crime.
It is also crucial to interview as many apprehended offenders as possible. to find out how they make their decisions. See Problem-Solving Tools Guide No. 3, Using Offender Interviews to Inform Police Problem-Solving, for further guidance on gathering information from offenders.
† For more information on crime mapping tools, see www.iaca.net/software.asp.
Measurement allows you to determine to what degree your efforts have succeeded, and suggests how you might modify your responses if they are not producing the intended results. You should take measures of your problem before you implement responses, to determine how serious the problem is, and after you implement them, to determine whether they have been effective. All measures should be taken in both the target area and the surrounding area. For more detailed guidance on measuring effectiveness, see the Problem-Solving Tools Guide, Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide for Police Problem-Solvers.
The following outcome measures can be useful in assessing whether your responses have impacted the convenience store robbery problem:
In addition, the following process measures might provide some indication of the degree to which selected responses are being properly implemented:
Analysis of your local problem should give you a better understanding of the factors contributing to it. Once you have analyzed your local problem and established a baseline for measuring effectiveness, you should then consider possible responses to address the problem.
The following response strategies provide a foundation of ideas for addressing your particular problem. These strategies are drawn from a variety of research studies and police reports. Several of these strategies may apply to your community’s problem. It is critical that you tailor responses to local circumstances, and that you can justify each response based on reliable analysis. In most cases, an effective strategy will involve implementing several different responses. Law enforcement responses alone are seldom effective in reducing or solving the problem. Do not limit yourself to considering what police can do: give careful consideration to who else in your community shares responsibility for the problem and can help police better respond to it. The responsibility of responding, in some cases, may need to be shifted toward those who have the capacity to implement more effective responses. (For more detailed information on shifting and sharing responsibility, see Response Guide No. 3, Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for Public Safety Problems).
Understanding the operations, community context, and interpersonal dynamics of these businesses allows you to more effectively implement the specific responses below. For example, a sole owner who has used a weapon to scare a would-be robber may require a different approach and response than the store that employs 18-year-olds with little experience for late-night shifts.
† See Problem-Solving Tools Guide No. 5, Partnering With Businesses to Address Public Safety Problems and such Problem-Specific Guides as Shoplifting and Robbery of ATMs for further information on police-private security collaboration.
†† See the Problem-Solving Tools guide on Using Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design in Problem-Solving for further information.
† This is the so-called “80/20” rule: that crime tends to be heavily concentrated in a relatively small percentage of places, against a relatively small percentage of victims, and by a relatively small percentage of offenders. See Crime Analysis for Problem-Solvers (Clarke and Eck 2005).
†† A given store’s vulnerability can unfortunately result from media accounts of a successful robbery, absent any publicity of increased security measures. Incarcerated robbers believe that a victimized business will not install preventive measures (Gill and Pease 1998).
The following responses are rooted in situational crime prevention.62,† These responses are voluntary in some jurisdictions and mandated by law in others. Legislation requiring the implementation of security measures may affect the likelihood of convenience store robberies.††
† For further information on situational crime prevention techniques, see www.popcenter.org/25techniques.htm.
†† In April 1998, OSHA issued its Recommendations for Workplace Violence Prevention Programs in Late-Night Retail Establishments, marking the first time it explicitly sanctioned specific retail crime prevention measures. Additional information on OSHA recommendations [PDF].
7-Eleven, Inc. implemented many of these measures, maintaining that their implementation contributed to a 70 percent reduction in robberies over 20 years.63 Local governments should ensure that their licensing and permitting regulations and procedures do not discourage sensible crime prevention measures.†
† In a study of convenience stores in Austin, Texas, it was found that the process of installing brighter or additional lighting in store lots could be burdensome. It involves hiring an electrical technician, preparing estimates, and obtaining a permit (LaVigne 1994 [PDF]).
An unobstructed view of the entrance and interior of the store provides natural surveillance that increases the risk of apprehension for the offender.
† The Starbucks chain implemented a security model that includes moving the store safe to the street-front sales area, taking advantage of natural surveillance from the glass windows (D’Addario 2001).
† A state industry association has appealed the regulations, maintaining that they may be too expensive for businesses (Neary 2004).
† Offender interviews have found that their decisions on choosing a target are strongly influenced by the proximity of the store to major and minor roads, and the proximity to a police station, among others (Wellford, MacDonald, and Weiss 1997 [PDF]).
† Some convenience stores offer free coffee or food to police officers to encourage them to stop in more often, but many police departments prohibit officers from accepting such offers.
† 7-Eleven’s training is offered to all employees in a two-day session incorporating presentations, a handbook, and role-playing exercises. Issues covered include robbery deterrence, violence avoidance, loitering, physical assault, gang activity, and general emergency procedures (Lins and Erickson 1998).
† As mentioned previously, some offenders are not dissuaded by the prospect of small amounts of cash. With the popularity of crack cocaine, a cheap drug of choice, offenders are willing to take risks for even small sums (Bellamy 1996).
In addition, the use of cash-control units (also known as drop safes) can allow secure management of the cash on hand. The units have a safe for clerks to deposit cash periodically, with access controlled by keys and/or personal identification numbers (PINS). The unit opens or dispenses cash on a delay, which is likely to deter an anxious robber.74 It is possible that the lack of availability of cash might result in robbers’ shifting their focus to the taking of merchandise, but if robbers are looking for quick cash such displacement would be unlikely.
The presence of video monitors has been found to have some deterrent affect by increasing the robber’s risk of identification.
† For a further assessment of the effectiveness of CCTV, see Response Guide No.4, Video Surveillance of Public Places.
†† s Reports from the Hillsborough County, Fla., Sheriff’s Office indicated an almost 90 percent clearance rate for stores equipped with hidden 35 mm cameras (Bellamy 1996).
† A police department in Edmonton, Alberta, developed a Robbery Awareness Education Kit to introduce training to retailers (Alberta Minister’s Committee to Promote Health and Safety 2000 [PDF]).
†† The San Bernardino, Calif., police offer a four-hour training class to businesses on crime prevention. In addition to distributing tools like the height strip, the class also identifies other information retailers should collect during a crime (Berry 2004).
† Scored categories include such items as visibility into the store, adequate entrance lighting, prominent “No Loitering” signs, and low shelf height.
Enforcing prohibitions against loitering outside convenience stores reduces opportunities for potential robbers to watch the routines of store clerks and customers.
† ‘People are present’ factors include perceived police presence in the area and the proximity (of the store location) to a police station. These ranked as moderately important by the offenders, while window locations, time, lighting, and cashier locations ranked at the bottom of the scale (Petrosino and Brensilber 2003).
7-Eleven, Inc. has established a particular program for its stores called the Police Community Network Centers (PCNCs). They work with local police departments to install either a workstation inside the stores or an office or trailer adjacent to it. It is clearly identified, and includes a dedicated telephone, workspace and storage, and display areas for crime prevention literature.85,†
† 7-Eleven, Inc. reports that it has received “rave reviews from police organizations and city governments that have participated in the program.” There are currently more than 200 PCNCs in 100 cities in 18 states (7-Eleven, Inc. n.d.).
The table below summarizes the responses to convenience store robbery, the mechanism by which they are intended to work, the conditions under which they should work best, and some factors you should consider before implementing a particular response. It is critical that you tailor responses to local circumstances, and that you can justify each response based on reliable analysis. In most cases, an effective strategy will involve implementing several different responses. Law enforcement responses alone are seldom effective in reducing or solving the problem.
| General Considerations for an Effective Response Strategy | ||||
| # | Response | How It Works | Works Best If… | Considerations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Understanding the ownership, management structure, and operations of local convenience stores | Tailors the responses to the stores ’ particular needs and resources | …the management structure is clearly defined and information is available to police | Independent stores, not tied to rigid commercial guidelines, may not have the financial backing to implement security changes; industry associations may oppose recommendations |
| 2 | Collaborating with private security | Enhances likelihood that effective responses will be implemented | …police and private security recognize their respective legitimate interests | Well suited for municipalities with large number of retailers |
| 3 | Targeting repeat victims | Focuses attention on highest-risk locations, increasing likelihood of improving protection of those stores | …analysis of repeat victimization is timely and accurate | Media reports may contribute to repeat victimization by spotlighting a store’s vulnerability |
| 4 | Reevaluating responses consistently | Refines understanding of past responses and improves future responses | …decisionmakers are constantly researching new strategies and are willing to reconsider past responses | Stakeholders will advocate a variety of changes based on their respective interests |
| Specific Responses to Reduce Convenience Store Robbery | ||||
| Retailer Responses | ||||
| # | Response | How It Works | Works Best If… | Considerations |
| 5 | Maximizing natural surveillance | Increases robbers’ risk of detection by optimizing visibility of key areas | …views into and within the store are unobstructed by signs, displays, etc. | Placement of safes and cash register can enhance ability for observation |
| 6 | Having multiple employees on duty during high-risk periods | Deters potential offenders because they would have more difficulty controlling more than one victim | …local robbery patterns clearly identify high-risk periods | Increases costs to stores; likely to require legislation due to industry opposition; effectiveness debated |
| 7 | Controlling access | Limits offenders’ opportunity to escape quickly, which may deter offenders altogether | …number of entrances/exits are limited, and exterior environment provides some obstacles to a quick escape | Difficult for stores to balance easy access for customers with obstructed access for potential robbers |
| 8 | Establishing territoriality | Controlling certain store characteristics empowers the employees over would-be robbers by providing a logistical advantage | …stores are not located near major roads or high- crime areas; stores are near a police station | Not all territorial elements are readily altered |
| 9 | Promoting legitimate activity | Increases risk of detection by encouraging steady activity among patrons and others | …stores operate gas pumps that attract traffic at all hours | Free coffee or other promotions can invite late-night traffic; refusing to sell illicit products can reduce presence of potential offenders |
| 10 | Training employees | A well-trained staff reduces the vulnerability of a business by emphasizing methods of robbery deterrence and violence avoidance | …it is required for all employees, with refresher training as needed | Costly in time and possibly dollars; attracting workers to convenience stores for any length of time is challenging in itself |
| 11 | Maintaining store appearance | Deters potential offenders by suggesting that employees are vigilant against robbery | …employees spend time away from registers to maintain appearance, thereby hindering a quick robbery | Convenience store robbers may not make this rational inference |
| 12 | Using cash-control procedures | Limiting cash available to clerks can dissuade offenders as well as minimize losses | …cash policy is clearly posted | Some offenders either don’t trust the posted signs or don’t care if the take is limited |
| 13 | Installing cameras and alarms | Surveillance and security equipment that are in plain sight to customers may provide deterrence and increase risk of detection | …cameras actually record activity, and employees have fixed and remote activator devices to sound alarms | Costly; quality of images is key for best value; may aid identification process if eyewitnesses are panicked |
| Police Responses | ||||
| # | Response | How It Works | Works Best If… | Considerations |
| 14 | Providing robbery prevention and awareness training | Improves stores’ capacity to prevent and respond appropriately to robberies | …training is based on reliable knowledge and made available to stores that otherwise have limited access to training |
Compliance ensures effectiveness; small- operation staff may not have time to attend; gives police familiarity with business and ownership |
| 15 | Inspecting convenience stores for compliance with robbery prevention measures | Increases likelihood that known effective measures will be implemented | …there are meaningful consequences for failure to implement effective measures | Standards might be either mandated by law or voluntarily agreed to by the convenience store industry |
| 16 | Enforcing prohibitions on loitering outside convenience stores | Minimizes opportunities for potential offenders to plan a robbery | …stores cooperate with police in enforcement and prosecution | Valid laws must be in place |
| Responses With Limited Effectiveness | ||||
| # | Response | How It Works | Works Best If… | Considerations |
| 17 | Conducting robbery stakeouts | Increases likelihood of apprehension of offenders in the act | …police have specific reliable information about a robbery attempt and safety of store employees can be assured | Resource-intensive due to unpredictability of robbery attempts; armed confrontations are risky to police officers and employees |
| 18 | Increasing police patrols | Periodic observation by police will either deter a robbery situation or result in apprehending an offender | …police can target repeat victims or vulnerable days/times | Quick nature of convenience store robberies makes the chance of apprehension unlikely |
| 19 | Maintaining a consistent police presence | Deters potential offenders from attempting a robbery | …presence is reliable and well-known to potential offenders | Difficult for police to ensure reliable presence, given competing responsibilities |
| 20 | Establishing satellite facilities | Deters potential offenders through enhanced likelihood of police presence | …location/ workspace is clearly identified as police space | Depends on resource availability; requires cooperation with store management |
[1] National Association of Convenience Stores (2006).
[2] Calvin (n.d.).
[3] Hunter (1999).
[4] U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (2002). [Full text]
[5] Catalano, Hill, and Long (2001).
[6] Hunter (1999).
[7] Gill and Pease (1998).
[8] Matthews (2002).
[9] Gill and Pease (1998).
[10] Petrosino and Brensilber (1997).
[11] Gill and Pease (1998).
[12] Faulkner, Landsittel, and Hendricks (2001).
[13] Faulkner, Landsittel, and Hendricks (2001).
[14] Welford, MacDonald, and Weiss (1997). [Full text]
[15] Petrosino and Brensilber (1997).
[16] Faulkner, Landsittel, and Hendricks (2001).
[17] Petrosino and Brensilber (1997).
[18] Bellamy (1996).
[19] National Center for Victims of Crime (2000).
[20] Conti (2005).
[21] Lins and Erickson (1998).
[22] National Center for Victims of Crime (1997).
[23] National Center for Victims of Crime (2000).
[24] Eck (1998). [Full text]
[25] Taylor (2002).
[26] U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (1998). [Full text]
[27] Lins and Erickson (1998).
[28] Lins and Erickson (1998).
[29] D’Allessio and Stolzenberg (1990).
[30] Hunter (1999).
[31] Taylor (2002).
[32] Hendricks et al. (1999).
[33] National Association of Convenience Stores (2005).
[34] National Association of Convenience Stores (2006).
[35] Hunter (1990).
[36] Hendricks et al. (1999).
[37] Lins and Erickson (1998).
[38] Eck (1998). [Full text]
[39] Hunter and Jeffery (1997).
[40] Hunter (1999).
[41] Lins and Erickson (1998).
[42] Faulkner, Landsittel, and Hendricks (2001).
[43] Runyan et. al. (2005).
[44] Wellford, MacDonald, and Weiss (1997). [Full text]
[45] Petrosino and Brensilber (1997).
[46] WorkCover New South Wales (2002).[Full text]
[47] Correctional Service of Canada (1995). [Full text]
[48] Petrosino and Brensilber (2003). [Abstract only]
[49] Gill and Pease (1998).
[50] Catalano, Hill, and Long (2001).
[51] Bellamy (1996).
[52] Gabor (1989).
[53] Hunter (1999).
[54] Lins and Erickson (1998).
[55] D’Allessio and Stolzenberg (1990).
[56] Catalano, Hill, and Long (2001).
[57] Casteel et al. (2003).
[58] Casteel and Peek-Asa (2000); Mayhew (2000).
[59] Eck (1998). [Full text]
[60] Matthews (1996). [Full text]
[61] Hunter (1999).
[62] Bellamy (1996).
[63] Lins and Erickson (1998).
[64] LaVigne (1994). [Full text]
[65] Hunter (1999).
[66] Bellamy (1996).
[67] Lins and Erickson (1998).
[68] Hunter (1999)
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Important!
The quality and focus of these submissions vary considerably. With the exception of those submissions selected as winners or finalists, these documents are unedited and are reproduced in the condition in which they were submitted. They may nevertheless contain useful information or may report innovative projects.
Operation Business Education Against Robbery (BEAR), San Diego Police Department, 1998
Raleigh's Robbery Suppression Initiative, Raleigh Police Department, 2009
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