You may have read newspaper reports about successful street closures in particular neighborhoods, or heard about them from police officers involved. Crime may indeed have been reduced, but you should always be wary of anecdotal evidence of this kind. People like to think their projects were successful, and newspapers like to publish “feel-good” stories about communities pulling together to defeat crime. While you can learn much from these accounts—for example, how to overcome the difficulties associated with street closures—research studies generally provide more reliable evidence on effectiveness.
Unfortunately, only a relatively small number of projects involving street closures have been evaluated (f or example, no published evaluations exist of substantial street-closure schemes in Dallas; Houston; Chicago; Bridgeport, Conn.; and Oakland, Calif.)9 and the studies that have been published tend to focus on successful projects, simply because studies of unsuccessful projects are less likely to be published. Furthermore, not all research studies on street closures are well designed. Properly designed studies compare the neighborhood’s crime rates before streets were closed with crime rates after they were closed. They should also compare the neighborhood’s crime rates with those of nearby “control” areas where streets were not closed. This helps to rule out alternative explanations for drops in crime, such as seasonal changes, intensified police enforcement, or reduced gang activity. The studies sometimes collect other data that help in evaluating street closings, including information regarding the number of service calls, the volume of traffic, the residents’ perceptions of security, and the costs of installing gates or barriers. In some cases, evaluations also examine whether crimes prevented by the closures have been displaced to nearby locations.
This section summarizes the information available from 11 studies that evaluated street or alley closings. There is considerable variety among the projects reviewed. Several were undertaken in deprived inner-city neighborhoods, plagued by a variety of crimes. Three other projects were citywide efforts, one undertaken in an affluent Florida city. Three overseas projects focused on street prostitution. Only one (British) project specifically focused on closing alleys, though in other projects, both alleys and streets were closed. City governments and residents’ associations implemented most of the projects, though often with considerable police involvement.
Despite the variety of areas and crimes covered, for some crimes and for some settings, there are no directly relevant studies to draw upon. This means the studies may not tell you whether closing streets or alleys will work in your particular situation. This is not unusual, because there are important gaps in knowledge about effectiveness for nearly every aspect of policing, from patrol through criminal investigation. In fact, research almost never tells you exactly what to do in a given situation—it can only help you select responses that have a better chance of working for you. It is down to you to judge the fit between the available research and your own situation.
Table 1 summarizes the main features of the studies, including the type of area covered, the crimes targeted, and the results achieved (the Appendix provides fuller descriptions of the studies). Few of the studies are recent. Only one project—that undertaken in Charlotte, N.C.— was specifically designed as a police-led problem-oriented project, though police were active partners in the other projects. In the past 10 years, projects submitted for the Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing have frequently included closures, but deal only with problems in shopping plazas and other commercial facilities,10 and problems relating to festivals and other events.11
Even though few of the studies in Table 1 are problem-oriented projects, you can still learn from them—particularly about the effectiveness of the closures. To help you decide how much weight to place on each study, Table 1 includes ratings of the research designs’ quality: weak, adequate, or strong.† You will see that several of the studies are rated as weak, and you should be aware that even those rated as adequate or strong have their limitations. Few of them can separate the effects of street or alley closings from those of other measures taken at the same time, and few examine the effects on crime or disorder for more than a year. This means that little is known about street closure’s long-term effects.
† Judged by the strictest criteria, none of the studies would be considered strong because none of them included randomly selected streets to be closed. However, this would very rarely be possible, and the studies must be judged against more realistic criteria. In these assessments, an informal (probably generous) judgment was made, taking account of the number of streets closed, the crime measures used, the level of crime before intervention, the time period studied, whether control areas were studied, whether displacement/diffusion was measured, and whether costs were calculated. No criticism of the researchers is implied by these ratings, since they were generally doing the best they could, given the practical constraints and the time and funds available.
Table 1 : Evaluated Projects Using Street and Alley Closures
|City||Type of Area||Year(s)||Targeted Offenses||No. of Streets Closed||Other Actions||How Effective?||Research Design*||Studies|
|1||Hartford , Conn.||Declining inner-city neighborhood (Asylum Hill)||1973||Burglary, mugging, purse-snatching||Four||Residents’ associations established; neighborhood policing scheme||Closures reduced crime, but effect only temporary. Fear of crime reduced.||Adequate||Fowler, McCalla, and Mangione (1979)[Full text ]; Fowler and Mangione (1982) [Full text ]|
|2||Dayton , Ohio||Transitional neighborhood (Five Oaks)||1992||Drug houses, gunshots, prostitution, gangs, burglary, speeding||35 streets, 26 alleys||Supportive residents’ association; high level of media attention||Crime reduced by 25 percent within one year; violent crime reduced by 40 percent. No evidence of displacement. Concern about crime decreased. Traffic declined by 36 percent.||Strong||Dayton Office of Management and Budget (1994); Donnelly and Kimble (1997)|
|3||Los Angeles||Crime-ridden, inner-city neighborhood ( Newtown)||1990||Gangs, drug dealing, assault, homicide, drive-by shootings||14||Increased police patrols; community policing||Serious crimes immediately reduced, including homicides and drive-by shootings. Crimes increased when streets reopened.||Strong||Vernon and Lasley (1992); [Full text ] Lasley (1998) [Full text ]|
|4||Hartford , Conn.||Public- housing project||About 1997||Drug dealing, assault, drive-by shootings||One||None||Violent crime reduced, with no displacement. Drug dealing unaffected.||Weak||Zavoski et al. (1999)|
|5||Charlotte , N.C.||Inner-city, drug-dealing neighborhood ( Belmont)||2000||Drug dealing, violence||Two||None||Substantial reduction in violence in the area immediately affected by the closures. Violence was not displaced, but drug activity may have been.||Adequate||Markoe (2000 )|
|6||Finsbury Park, London||Run-down, inner-city neighborhood with long- established street prostitution||1985||Street prostitution and cruising johns||Seven||Police crackdown on prostitutes, pimps, and johns; hotels and landlords prosecuted||Large reduction in street prostitution and cruising. Lower rates of auto theft, assault, and burglary. Resident satisfaction increased. Surprisingly little displacement.||Strong||Matthews (1997)|
|7||Streatham, London||Middle-class, residential area with a recent problem of street prostitution||1989||Street prostitution and cruising johns||Several streets closed and “no entry” signs||Police crackdown on prostitutes and cruising johns; police antiburglary initiative||Large reduction in street prostitution, cruising, burglary, and other crimes. Increased resident satisfaction. Prostitutes displaced from residential area.||Strong||Matthews (1993) [Full text ]|
|8||Vancouver , British Columbia||Downtown prostitution strolls||1981||Street prostitution and cruising johns||“Series”of diverters installed||Series of other initiatives taken at different times in the same areas||The “hardened,” drug-addicted prostitutes adapted by displacing to nearby areas. The barriers also reportedly helped prostitutes to solicit cruising johns, who were forced to slow down.||Weak||Lowman (1992)|
|9||St. Louis||Racially integrated, 60-block city neighborhood||1984||UCR offenses||Multiple||Target- hardening; lighted porches; neighborhoodwatch; community crime newspaper||Lower rates of increases in burglary up to five years after closures. Limited impact on fear.||Adequate||Wagner (1997)|
|10||Liverpool , England||Residential neighborhoods with row houses and rear alleys||2000 to 2003||Burglary||3,168 alley gates installed||Research design focused only on alley gates||Burglary reduced by 37 percent within one year. Little displacement, but diffusion of benefits. Gates were highly cost- effective.||Strong||Bowers, Johnson and Hirschfield (in press)|
|11||Miami Shores , Fla.||Affluent suburban city||1988 to 1991||Robbery, burglary, larceny, aggravated assault, auto theft||67 in first phase; eight in second phase||None||Burglary, larceny, and auto theft reduced. Lower rates of increases in robbery and assault, compared with nearby jurisdictions.||Weak||Atlas and LeBlanc (1994)|
The incomplete coverage of the research, the limitations of the methodology, and some inconsistencies in the results have been discussed above. Even so, one can draw some broad conclusions about the street and alley closures, summarized as follows:
† Though residents and police believed the 1993 street-closure scheme in the Hispanic East Side of Bridgeport, Conn., had been effective in reducing drug dealing and other crimes, the city council ordered that the barriers be removed in 1998, in response to residents’ complaints. Many had become tired of the inconvenience caused by the 40 street closures, and they also believed that the ugly concrete barriers stigmatized the neighborhood and scared off businesses (Halbfinger 1998).
In conclusion, research has shown that street and alley closures can reduce crime in a variety of different settings. However, research is absent or sparse for some crimes and settings. In addition, the studies do not separate the benefits of closures from those of other measures taken at the same time. Follow-up is typically short, and little is known about the long-term benefits of street and alley closures. Finally, the studies provide little information about whether the savings in crime outweigh the costs of the closures.
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