# Tilley Award 2005

# **Application form**

The following form must be competed in full. Failure to do so will result in disqualification from the competition.

Please send competed application forms to Tricia Perkins at patricia.perkins@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

All entries must be received by noon on the 29 April 2005. Entries received after that date will not be accepted under any circumstances. Any queries on the application process should be directed to Tricia Perkins on 0207 035 0262.

# 1. Details of application

Title of the project Operation Rockingham – Reducing Robbery in Bury

Name of force/agency/CDRP: Greater Manchester Police / Bury CDRP

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Position and rank of endorsing senior representatives(s) Deputy Chief Constable A Green

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# 2. Summary of application

### **OPERATION ROCKINGHAM**

In 2003/2004 Robbery was a Government and Force priority and as such GMP were set challenging reduction targets.

Although the Bury division had traditionally been a non -volume contributor in respect of robbery, it became clear in the later part of 2003 that Bury would not achieve its reduction target. The true picture being that at the end of November 2003 the YTD comparison showed an increase from **346 to 370** recorded robbery crimes, a **rise** of **6.9%**.

A radical review of how the division tackled the problem was required; this was carried out with the objective of:

#### 1.Stop the robberies

2.Arrest, charge and convict the individuals responsible

3.Remove the opportunity for such offences occurring in the future

4.Endeavour to reduce public fear regarding this type of crime, through the media and public reassurance.

A Divisional Robbery Champion was appointed and through the TT&CG and subsequent review work was commissioned and coordinated through the Operational Policing unit in line with the National Intelligence Model utilising SARA 2. The research took due cognisance of factors such as Victim, Offender and Location whilst also examining wider issues relating to resources, deployment strategies and funding. New 'robbery specific' control and intelligence strategies were formulated to facilitate action in relation to Prevention, Intelligence and Enforcement.

The Analytical and Intelligence functions of the OPU were realigned to provide a focused approach to tackling robbery. Problem and target profiles were developed together with a dedicated intelligence repository and daily Rockingham Briefing.

Two Operations / SARA packages were developed under the names of Goodrich and Rockingham and were used to deliver a wide range of short, medium and long-term tactics aimed at;

- High Profile Patrols (Prevention)
- Identifying locations and offenders (Intelligence)
- Targeting locations and offenders (Enforcement)
- Removing the Market Place for stolen Mobile phones together with Trading Standards.
- Preventing the reoccurrence of crimes at given locations and inhibiting the ability of offenders to commit further offences
- Multi agency tasking and intelligence gathering through the TT&CG process
- Enabling the division to deliver the above objectives through enhanced resource deployment and greater cooperation with internal and external partners

At the end of 2003 / 2004 the rise in robbery had been turned into a reduction of 5.6 % from 539 to 509 recorded crimes.

Operation Rockingham continued throughout 2004 during which time the tactics were constantly assessed and revised. The medium and long term strategies based around target hardening, including improved CCTV and lighting for hotspots delivered throught the CDRP Partnership Business Group.

As at 23<sup>rd</sup> November 2004, one year since the commencement of the operation, the YTD comparison showed a **reduction** of **49%**, from **565 to 288** recorded crimes, accompanied by a **28.1% detection rate**. As of 31<sup>st</sup> March 2005 Bury division was 175 robbery crimes below its annual target. This accounts for 55% of the 318 robbery crimes, which GMP force area was below its annual target. 3. Description of project

Describe the project following the guidance above in no more than 4000 words

# THE TILLEY AWARD 2005 - BURY DIVISION SUBMISSION

#### Introduction - Objectives of the Project

Bury consists of six towns, Bury, Ramsbottom, Tottington, Radcliffe, Whitefield and Prestwich. Formed in April 1974 as a result of Local Government re-organisation it was one of the ten original districts that formed the County of Greater Manchester.

The Borough has an area of 9,919 hectares (24,511 acres) and serves a population of 181,300 (Source ONS. 2002 Mid-Year Estimate).

The town enjoys relative prosperity however there are small pockets of deprivation.

There are excellent communications in the area with the M60, M62 and M66 Motorways crisscrossing the area plus the Metrolink Light Rapid Transit system with a fast and frequent service from Bury centre through Manchester city centre to Altrincham.

The Bury Division lies at the northern most point of the GMP area bordering Lancashire County Constabulary to the North and Salford and Manchester City Centre to the South. The Division has the smallest resource allocation in GMP, as a low volume contributor to crime in the Greater Manchester area the division has always struggled to attract the funding streams linked to deprivation and regeneration

Criminals from the areas of high deprivation surrounding Manchester City Centre exploit the transport links to travel to Bury and commit crime a factor that has often made identification and targeting difficult.

The Bury Division has traditionally been a non-volume contributor to the force in respect of robbery. However, it became clear in the latter part of 2003 that Bury was not making the necessary progress in order to achieve its 14 % reduction target. This was despite the division performing well in relation to targets set for other Strategic Priorities for example reducing Burglary by 23.5%

The true picture being that no reduction was being made and that if the trend continued the division would actually exceed the total number of crimes committed in the previous year. This hypothesis was proven at the end of November 2003 when the YTD comparison showed an increase from **346 to 370** recorded robbery crimes, a **rise** of **6.9%**.

It was apparent that there had been a shift change in the profile of street crime and that the previous tactical interventions used by the division were no longer working.

The decision was made through the Tactical Partnership Tasking and Coordinating process to conduct a radical review of how the division tackled the problem of street robbery. The objectives of the operation were then formulated;

#### 1.Stop the robberies

- 2.Arrest, charge and convict the individuals responsible
- 3.Remove the opportunity for such offences occurring in the future

4.Endeavour to reduce public fear regarding this type of crime, through the media and public reassurance.

The primary aim of the operation was to stop the robberies from occurring in the first instance, this would be achieved by a variety of intelligence led policing tactics in identified hotspots at critical periods.

The secondary aim was where offences had been committed to utilise improved investigative techniques and intelligence to identify the offenders, bring them to justice and then use the appropriate strands of the National Priority Offender Strategy to inhibit their ability to re-offend.

The removal of opportunities for such offences occurring in the future would be achieved through target hardening and the education of potential witnesses.

The reassurance aspect to be achieved by close liaison with the media and partners to deliver information relating to initiatives, successes and operations.

All of the above elements were collated into joint Partnership Opportunity and Intelligence Strategies.

Success would be measured against progress towards achieving the reduction and detection targets set by the force and the whole process would be monitored through the daily briefing and two weekly Tactical Partnership processes. The initial time span for the delivery of the project was set at 12 months at which time overall performance against target would be measured.

# **Definition of the Problem**

#### Why was street robbery on the increase?

The problem facing the division was to correctly assess the true dynamics of the rise in robbery and then devise sustainable tactics to not only stop it but also prevent a reoccurrence.

A historical problem for the division was that as a small non -volume contributor it had struggled to successfully bid for financial and tactical assistance from the pool of force resources. Previous operations utilised the sparse divisional resources and had been ad hoc, short term and focused around disruptive tactics.

The Ch. Insp. Ops was appointed as the Divisional Robbery Champion and review work was commissioned through the TT& CG and subsequent Strategic Review. This was coordinated through the Operational Policing Unit.

#### Scanning

In line with the National Intelligence Model, the research took due cognisance of the causation factors such as Victim, Offender and Location whilst also examining wider issues relating to resources, deployment strategies and funding. New 'robbery specific' control and intelligence strategies were formulated to facilitate action in relation to Prevention, Intelligence and Enforcement. Scanning involved taking account of information from a wide variety of sources including Patrol Officers, Community Beat Officers, Street Wardens, Local Authority and Police Data Hubs, Schools, YOT, local drugs workers and Probation Officers.

#### Analysis

The first step was to specifically identify the problem, one of the divisions two Analysts was given sole responsibility for robbery. The aim of this was to provide ownership and build expertise.

Problem profiles were commissioned and these revealed that there had been a marked rise in robberies at the southern end of the division in the Prestwich area adjacent to the Metrolink stations.

#### The analysis revealed the following findings;

Hotspots for personal robberies were around the town centre and Prestwich, the most prevalent beats for personal robberies being F1 and D1 and areas around Metrolink stations.

- Most personal robberies occurred on a Friday or Saturday and the peak time for offences to occur was 17:00hrs to 22:00hrs.
- The majority of victims of personal robbery being male, between 12 and 20 yrs, with the highest percentage being 16 or 17 yrs old.
- Mobile phones, cash and pedal cycles are the most popular property to be targeted by offenders.
- The majority of offenders are found to be aged between 13 and 19 yrs.
- Motivational factors did not appear to be centred purely around acquisition and in some cases appeared to be more akin to territorial rivalry amongst groups of youths.
- The victim profile matched that of most victims across the whole of Greater Manchester Male, White, 12 –24 yrs either a school child or student. Victims were often followed from the Metro link Tram system and robbed nearby or would be attacked by groups of offenders near to or in local parks.

It was found that in the 12 months prior to Rockingham, 16.5% of the divisions robberies occurred within 500m of one of the 6 Metrolink stations on division and one very close to the border.

There was intelligence to suggest that offenders were travelling into the area using the Metrolink system and also using pedal cycles.

#### Intelligence / Communication Gaps

At the time of the review the division had a small Operational Support Unit, whose primary remit had been that of drugs. The officers therefore knew very little in relation as to who may be committing the robberies, this was reflected across the whole of the uniform patrol section. As a result there was little or no communication of intelligence relating to;

- Who was responsible for the robberies
- Where were they coming from
- Where they were committing them
- When or where they were likely to strike
- Who they were going to target
- Why they were doing it
- How they were disposing of the goods

The problem was compounded by a general lack of robbery specific communication between the various units on the division. It was therefore identified that a Robbery Intelligence Strategy needed to be developed.

#### Resources

An examination of previous robbery operations revealed that they were short- term and relied predominantly upon divisional resources. Funding applications and previous bids for resources had on the whole proved to be inadequate. It was clear from the outset that the division needed to;

- Improve the availability of divisionally based deployable resources
- Obtain sufficient funding to allow a response to robbery with no diminution to the core- policing product.
- Attract force support and resources to supplement divisional resources.

#### **Partnerships**

The division had previously engaged with partners in the target hardening of victims. However little or no work had been carried out in relation to locations. The analysis of the problem had revealed hotspot locations around local parks and Metrolink stations.

#### How to resolve the problem - Setting Objectives - removing barriers to success

The primary objective remained as;

#### 1.Stop the robberies

2.Arrest, charge and convict the individuals responsible

3.Remove the opportunity for such offences occurring in the future

4.Endeavour to reduce public fear regarding this type of crime, through the media and public reassurance.

In order to achieve this the division identified the need to need to;

- Ensure continual analysis of the problem
- Identify the individual characteristics of the different types of crimes being committed and evolve tactics to deal with each.
- Instigate an adequate mechanism for the collation and dissemination of intelligence
- Develop and implement improved investigative techniques
- Set aside sufficient divisional resources to respond to analysis and TT&CG actions
- Create a specialised unit to deal with Street Crime
- Utilise the full range of tactical interventions including the use of Sec 60, High Profile and Covert Operations, improved use of partnership resources
- Obtain sufficient funding to sustain a prolonged response to robbery without diminution to core policing and other strategic priorities
- Obtain the support of Force resources
- Elicit the support of partners in short medium and long term reduction strategies

# Response to the Problem

# Analysis

Matt Clarke, a divisional analyst, was given sole responsibility for robbery, analysis was conducted on a daily basis and his information was used to target resources at hotspot areas.

It was identified that a common theme in the robberies committed in the Prestwich area was the youth on youth element and that the crimes did not appear to be driven purely by acquisition. The proximity of the Metro link to the commission of crime was also identified, indicating that offenders may be traveling to the division from elsewhere. Although only 16.5% of the crimes committed were within 500m of Metro Link Stations it was recognised that a core group of offenders were responsible for a significant amount of the offences. These offenders were using the Metro link to enter the division, therefore intervention at the Metro link stations was seen as a good primary tactic to capture intelligence and prevent crime.

A review of descriptions revealed reliance upon the wearing of balaclavas and ski masks to prevent identification. Another common theme was the wearing of bandanas as possible sign of gang affiliation.

# Intelligence

PC Gareth Johnson, a Field Intelligence officer, was given sole responsibility for managing intelligence in relation to operation Rockingham. This included;

- A dedicated SRN (System Reference Number), which was created on the force intelligence system to act as a repository for all Rockingham Intelligence. This allowed robbery intelligence to be reviewed as a whole prior to assessment and rating.
- A dedicated Rockingham daily briefing site updated with the previous days intelligence and crime data.
- The briefing was also circulated to adjacent divisions giving full details of all intelligence relating to travelling offenders and the operational tactics being utilised at any given time this has since been included on the divisional intranet site and can be viewed force wide.

- A Robbery Intelligence booklet was produced and updated weekly for use by the officers on the dedicated robbery car.
- A prison release database was developed, this facilitated the monitoring of offenders under bail conditions and tagging orders and set timescales for future interventions against targets upon release.
- A 'Cold Case' review of previous undetected robberies was conducted with the aim of finding solvability factors using contemporary intelligence. This provided an early break through when newly obtained photographs from Sec 60 Stop Searches were compared with old CCTV footage from previous robberies revealing the identity of offenders who were previously unknown to the police.

The overall aim was to improve the quality of intelligence submissions and communication links within the division and with its neighbours. In the first eight days of the Rockingham Srn being established 94 pages of Robbery specific intelligence were submitted. This quickly began to fill the yawning knowledge gap identified at the problem definition stage, and was used to inform the resources deployed to tackle the problem.

#### Resources

The division immediately made enhanced bids for the provision of force resources such as the Force Hawk Team. Detailed, evidenced bids were submitted for Hawk funding. The amounts of funding requested were significantly higher than the division had previously requested. The increased funding allowed the division to plan a prolonged structured campaign against robbery whilst maintaining its commitment to core policing and other strategic priorities, including the fight against burglary.

A divisional robbery unit consisting of 1 Sgt and 7 Constables was formed, to whom all robbery investigations were passed. Actions were monitored and coordinated through the daily tasking meeting and weekly TT&CG. A Civilian Investigative Assistant was also recruited to the team. The aim of developing the team was to improve the quality of investigation and develop a sound knowledge base

A dedicated Robbery Car was deployed between 0700 and 2300. This allowed an immediate response to all robberies therefore maximising the opportunity to potentially apprehend the offenders and gather other evidence. The Robbery car was also deployed to monitor cash in transit movements across the division. The Bury division maintained a year round commitment to Operation Liaison/Hawkeye under the local name of Operation Snickers.

Prestwich Township Officers played an important role in the day to day delivery of Rockingham Tactics. This ensured an element of continuity and exploited their local knowledge.

The identification and monitoring of those involved in street robbery had been identified as a problem. The Township team led by Sgt Ian Campbell were provided with digital cameras that were used in unison with the Video Van. The officers engaged in a rigorous campaign utilising Sec 60 to unmask and identify the gangs of youths. Once identified their pictures were circulated via the Rockingham database and 'Thumb –Nail cards' were given to all officers deployed on the operation. These officers were also used to disrupt the activity of offenders using pedal cycles, enforcing lighting regulations etc.

The removal of anonymity together with other intelligence led to the identification of the various groups of youths involved in street robbery. These included 'The Young Rude Boy Soldiers' and 'The Little Hill Gang'. Several members of both groups were then identified as being responsible for retrospective crimes and their subsequent arrests coincided with a dramatic down turn in the levels of street robbery.

#### **Partnerships**

Upon conducting analysis of the problem it was clear that there was much scope for coordinated partnership action in the areas of victim, offender and location.

Although at the inception of Rockingham the GMAC model was not in operation, the decision was made to involve the local authority more closely in the ST&CG and TT&CG processes.

Having identified the local robbery problem as being driven on the whole by youth culture, it was agreed that both the Victim and Offender elements of any prevention strategy should focus upon this group.

### Partnership – Helping potential Victims

Together with several local high schools, Operation Sayen was launched. This involved the marking of mobile telephones and target hardening advice to reduce the likelihood of becoming the victim of robbery.

It was identified that a secondary, and historically traditional Christmas hotspot, for robbery was Bury Town Centre. The Bus / Tram interchange being within walking distance of four local high schools and two collages and therefore providing a pool of potential victims. Joint Local Authority and Police truancy sweep operations were launched having the dual purpose of removing victims and providing a high visibility response.

#### Partnership – Dealing with offenders

The OPU Manager and SCPOC engaged in the process of meeting with the local YOT manager and individual caseworkers every two weeks. During the meeting intelligence was shared and individual strategies were formed for street crime offenders. Progress was monitored and any actions amended dependent upon which intervention strand the offender fell within i.e. Prevent and Deter, Catch and Convict, or resettle and rehabilitate.

It was recognised that there was a large gap in the ability to restrict the ability of young people from continuing to engage in offending behaviour. Partnership work towards achieving this aim had not taken due cognisance of the opportunities afforded by ASBO legislation. In fact only one ASBO was in existence in the Bury CDRP area.

The decision was made to appoint an ASBO coordinator who would work under the Local Authority Liaison Officer. Owing to the lack of previous action in this area and the current spate of offending behaviour that the partnership was suffering from, time was of the essence. The offending behaviour of those involved in street robbery needed to be tackled quickly. It was therefore decided that the most expedient method of imposing the ASBO's on street crime offenders was to apply for ASBO's on conviction. Initially the YOT were somewhat sceptical of this approach, however a close working relationship was developed where the benefits of an objective case-by-case regime of obtaining ASBO's on conviction against street crime offenders was commenced. To date 17 ASBO's on conviction have been obtained. The partnership has since engaged in the more traditional case build approach to obtaining ASBO's.

#### Partnership – Markets for stolen goods

Statistics published by the National Mobile Phone Crime Unit revealed that nearly 50% of all street crime involves the theft of a mobile phone, and 30% is exclusively a mobile phone. The NMPCRU also stated that a significant number of robbery reports might be false. In order to tackle both of these problems the Bury Division mounted two initiatives.

#### **Operation Willoughby**

Operation Willoughby was launched in April 2004 to look at all aspects of crime prevention related to mobile phones and other portable electrical items which form a large part of the acquisitive element of robbery crime.

Officers from Bury visited identified second hand outlets and market stalls in a joint operation with the Bury Market Management and Local Authority Trading Standards. Although no evidence of handling or illegal reprogramming was discovered the operation did serve to remind traders of the police interest in such matters.

The division was fully supportive of the MEND database initiative launched by the Home Office. In order to make maximum use of this facility and encourage young people to register their mobile phones and other portable items the Division produced a scheme where young persons who registered their equipment were given a 'glow in the dark' wristband sporting the 'Keep it safe – Keep it hidden' message.

#### **False Reporting**

Again in April 2004 the division began to formally investigate the possibility of false reporting within the standard practice for all robbery reports. This included the serving of notices on 'victims', and a structured approach to each report.

To date several false reports have been dealt with by a variety of means; Fixed penalty notices, Caution/Reprimand and Court proceedings. One offender received a 12 month Community Rehabilitation order having been found guilty of wasting police time.

# Partnership - Locations

Analysis had revealed that several hotspot locations for robbery had the following characteristics,

- Near to the borders with adjacent divisions
- On or near to transport links such as the Metrolink
- In or around large parks, E.g. Heaton and Saint Mary's Park

It was clear from the outset that the division had neither the resources nor capability to tackle the robbery problem on its own and a partnership approach would be required.

#### Internal Resources

Through the Rockingham briefing our operations were circulated to the North Manchester Division and the support of the Metrolink section, OTG and Hawk Team was elicited to conduct operations on the Metrolink. The operations aimed at targeting the identified travelling criminals and spanned the border between the Bury and North Manchester Division

#### Partnership Resources CCTV

The local authority has an extensive CCTV system and so a joint review of all cameras near to robbery hotspots was conducted. This revealed that some cameras needed repositioning and undergrowth or trees obscured others.

The issues were discussed at the Tactical Partnership Business Group and the Local Authority Arborist was tasked to remove limbs from trees that were obscuring cameras.

Often where offences had been caught on camera officers had experienced difficulties or delays in obtaining tapes from the local authority control room. As a result a joint CCTV protocol was developed. Officers were also placed within the control room as a deployment tactic of Rockingham.

The local authority has also assisted in the supply of rapid deployment mobile cameras placed at robbery / theft from the person hotspots. The authority is currently investing £10,000 in the purchasing a covert multi camera mobile CCTV Cabin which can be placed at robbery hotspots and transmit images back to the CCTV control.

#### **Additional Patrols**

Details of robbery hotspots were forwarded to the local authority parks and security patrols and as a result they included these areas in their patrol patterns therefore increasing the visibility of capable guardians.

# **Target Hardening**

When physical walk throughs by officers were made of the Saint Mary's Park hotspot it became obvious that potential victims were using the park as a short cut. As a short- term strategy it was decided that the local authority would lock the park gates each night, the result was a dramatic decrease in the number of crimes committed in the park.

As a long-term strategy a joint review of the park has been carried out with the aim of designing out crime and ensuring that legitimate users can enjoy the boroughs parks at any time of day.

This has resulted in BMBC Project No BP05 'Financial and Social Benefits of Improved Street Lighting through Crime Reduction in Partnership' and £127,400 in funding being identified to improve lighting and other facilities around Saint Mary's Park and other hotspots.


**Evaluation of the Project** 

#### Did the project achieve what it set out to do?

Operation Rockingham has been subjected to continual assessment by several methods

- Daily review Daily TTCG
- Weekly Review OPU and Robbery Champion
- Two weekly review CDRP Partnership Business Group TCG
- Periodic Review Problem profiling and SARA 2 System
- Quarterly Review including Results Analysis

The review and evaluation methods outlined above informed the optimal appraisal processes in relation to the tactics employed under Operation Rockingham, thus ensuring that the operation evolved appropriately to deal with any changes in the dynamics of the robbery problem.



The current evaluation of the project indicates it has been successful in achieving a significant reduction in Robbery and has achieved the original aims set in November 2003;

#### Stop the robberies 49% Reduction in robbery Year end figures 04/05 49.5%

Arrest and charge the individuals responsible 28.1% of robberies detected Year end figures 04/05 23.3%

# Remove the opportunity for such offences occurring in the future and Endeavour to reduce public fear regarding this type of crime.

- Long-term Crime and Disorder Partnership measures have been implemented, these have included;
- Target Hardening of vulnerable locations such as improved lighting in and around parks and Metrolink Stations.
- Educational programmes and property marking schemes
- Improved CCTV
- High visibility patrolling by Police, PCSO's and Community Wardens and Traffic Wardens

- Targeted leafleting and poster campaigns around Bury's 'World Famous Market'
- There has been a reduction in recorded incidents of youth nuisance in the Prestwich area that should contribute towards Community Reassurance.

### **Dispersal of benefit**

Operation Rockingham has also had a dispersal of benefit in the Prestwich area. Incidents of Youths causing annoyance were showing a rising trend in the months leading up to Rockingham.

The offenders for the juvenile nuisance incidents were a similar age group to the robbery offenders that were being targeted. As a result of the increased Police and Partnership activity in the area the juvenile nuisance incidents began to fall and have shown a downward trend during the course of Operation Rockingham.

# Cost Benefit Analysis

The cost of Operation Rockingham has largely been funded through bids under Operation Hawk **Total cost £115 000** The operation has successfully reduced the number of robberies, the cost of the operation therefore should be viewed in the wider context of the overall savings to the community.

		Robberies Nov 03 - Nov 04		Best Cost to society (£) (Brand & Price 2001) Appendix	Saving to society (£)
Personal	482	239	243	4700	1142100
Commercial	83	49	34	5000	170000
Total	565	288	277		1312100

The overall saving to society is £1 312 100

#### **Problems Encountered**

#### Partnership

Having identified unlit paths through local parks as a potential hotspot, it was agreed to lock the gates at night to ensure unsuspecting victims did not use them as a short cut. It was not anticipated that the two separate local authority departments responsible for community safety and parks would attempt to cross charge each other for providing this service. The ensuing dispute led to the gates being left open for a short period and a robbery occurring. The matter was resolved through intervention by the TPBG.

A review of the CCTV around robbery hotspots revealed that trees obscured many cameras; the solution seemed simple; just trim back the offending limbs. This exposed the lack of police knowledge in relation to the art of the arborist and the logistics and legalities involved. Once again the TPBG provided the forum to discuss the issue and led to crime hotspots being prioritised for attention.

#### Funding

As the success of Rockingham has been so dramatic and the numbers of robberies have decreased it has become difficult to secure the levels of funding that were available at the start.

# Conclusion

In November 2003 the Bury Division faced the spectre of failure in meeting its targets for robbery and an upward trend in the incidence of Street Robbery.

The problem facing the division was to correctly assess the true dynamics of the rise in robbery and then devise sustainable tactics to not only stop it but also prevent a reoccurrence.

A historical problem for the division was that as a small non -volume contributor it had struggled to successfully bid for financial and tactical assistance from the pool of force resources. Previous operations utilised the sparse divisional resources and had been ad hoc, short term and focused around disruptive tactics and failed to exploit the opportunity for assistance from other stakeholders in the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership.

A systematic problem solving oriented approach was adopted. This in essence involved working from a clean slate with no preconceptions and using NIM principles to formulate a solution. The solution involved identifying and overcoming all of the barriers to success. The barriers included how to attract funding, force resources, help from other partners as well as actually dealing with the offenders.

As a result Operation Rockingham was developed. The view of those involved is that it worked because it was systematic, simple and continuously evolved as the dynamics of the robbery problem changed.

Analysis shows that the operation has been a success and achieved significant reductions in crime whilst achieving its other aims and objectives,

Problems were encountered, which involved eliciting the full support of some local authority departments. However the development of the Tactical Partnership Business Group under the GMAC Model provided and ideal vehicle for resolving those issues through discussion.

The project has been successful in dealing with travelling offenders through enhanced intelligence sharing and joint operations. Attempts to deal with cross border 'Car Jackers' through level two operations have not been successful in getting of the ground and this is an area where the division will continue to strive for improvement.

Most recently the principles of investigation and intelligence gathering developed through Rockingham have been used to identify a series of crimes across GMP. Two such operations have been mounted **Operation Tignes and Operation Olympic**, both involved the investigation of offences of commercial and personal robbery across several GMP divisions resulting in suspects being arrested in connection with 17 robbery offences.