
GUILT, SHAME AND SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION

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Abstract: This paper builds on Clarke and Homel's (in press) expansion of the situational crime prevention model, which includes new techniques for making the potential offender feel guilty or ashamed about their contemplated crime. In place of Clarke and Homel's single category of "inducing guilt or shame," two separate categories involving the manipulation of internal controls (guilt) and social controls (including shame) are proposed. The addition of these categories expands the repertoire of available crime prevention techniques by giving fuller recognition to the subtleties and complexities of the motivations to commit crime implicit in the rational choice perspective. It is argued that the new strategies also "soften" the narrow, target-hardening image of the situational approach, and may help researchers avoid counterproductive situational crime prevention effects.

In a recent revision of Clarke's (1992) classification of situational crime prevention techniques, Clarke and Homel (in press) have proposed the inclusion of additional strategies which "incorporate the threat of feeling guilty when contemplating a morally-wrong act and the fear of shame and embarrassment arising from the disapproval expressed by significant others when offending is revealed." Clarke and Homel have argued that the 12 categories of techniques included in the existing classification relied largely (though not entirely) on manipulations of physical costs and benefits. However, they pointed out, one of the main reasons people obey laws is their moral commitment to the legal code; law violation would generate significant psychological and social discomfiture. While it has been usual in criminology to think of moral commitment in developmental and dispositional terms (i.e., the product of early socialization), whether

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or not an individual invokes a moral rule on a given occasion often depends upon immediate contextual factors. Some situations facilitate rule evasion by allowing the individual to obscure the full criminal nature of the contemplated behavior. It follows that situational strategies can also be employed to strengthen the potential psychological and social costs of offending. According to Clarke and Homel, the development of strategies around offender guilt and shame has the potential to enhance the relevance of the situational crime prevention model by more fully reflecting "the richness and complexity of the rational choice perspective on crime."

Clarke and Homel's revised classification is shown in Table 1. To the existing three columns in Clarke's original classification table (which have been relabelled "increasing *perceived* effort," "increasing *perceived* risk," and "reducing *anticipated* rewards" to emphasise the perceptual basis of the model) they have added a fourth column which they have called "inducing guilt or shame." The strategies suggested under this category are "rule setting," "strengthening moral condemnation," "controlling disinhibitors," and "facilitating compliance." Rule setting involves reducing uncertainty about the impermissibility of a given behavior. For example, customs declarations that clearly specify what can and cannot be imported leave little room for potential offenders to exploit ambiguity in their own favor. Strengthening moral condemnation involves reinforcing the moral and social prohibitions against specific offences. For example, signs in shops announcing that "shoplifting is stealing" seek to counter the self-reassuring belief that shoplifting is not a "real" crime. Controlling disinhibitors is concerned with minimizing conditions that impair the ability of individuals to critically self-evaluate their behavior. Restricting access to drugs and alcohol is the most obvious example of this strategy. Finally, facilitating compliance involves making it easier for individuals to follow rules. Thus, improving library check-out procedures denies potential book thieves the excuse that waiting in line was just too much trouble.

By highlighting the psychological and social dimensions implicit in the rational choice perspective, Clarke and Homel have opened exciting new directions for situational crime prevention. However, it is argued in this paper that the full potential of this expansion is not realised in the strategies provided in the revised classification. There are two main criticisms of the new fourth column. First, the list of suggested strategies for inducing guilt is by no means exhaustive. It will be shown that theories dealing with the moral reasoning of offenders that underpin these strategies have wider implications for crime prevention than are acknowledged

by Clarke and Hom el. Based on a reexamination of these theories, four alternative guilt-inducing strategies are proposed: "rule setting" (defined somewhat more broadly than the similarly-named category proposed by Clarke and Homel); "clarifying responsibility"; "clarifying consequences"; and "increasing victim worth."

Table 1: Clarke and Homel's Classification of Situational Crime Prevention Techniques

Increasing Perceived Effort	Increasing Perceived Risks	Reducing Anticipated Rewards	Inducing Guilt or Shame
Target hardening	Entry/exit screening	Target removal	Rule setting
Access control	Formal surveillance	Identifying property	Strengthening moral condemnation
Deflecting offenders	Surveillance by employees	Reducing temptation	Controlling disinhibitors
Controlling facilitators	Natural surveillance	Denying benefits	Facilitating compliance

Second, while Clarke and Homel are careful throughout their paper to talk about guilt *and* shame, their list of strategies does not clearly differentiate between these two phenomena. While guilt refers unambiguously to self-condemnation, shaming implies a mediating role for social condemnation. Indeed, Clarke and Homel recognised this problem and suggested that further work might lead to the separation of guilt and shame processes and the creation of a fifth column. This paper undertakes this task. Further, it will be argued that the threat of public condemnation is just one of a number of methods of situational behavioral control involving social influences. Four new situational crime prevention strategies based on the manipulation of social controls are described—"increasing social condemnation," "reducing social approval," "reducing imitation" and "crowd management."

EXPANDING STRATEGIES FOR INDUCING GUILT

In providing the theoretical rationale for their fourth column, Clarke and Homel have examined the literature on offender rationalisation, drawing particularly on Sykes and Matza's (1957) neutralization theory and aspects of Bandura's (1976) social learning theory dealing with "disengagement of self-detering consequences" (p. 225). However, these theories have been used by Clarke and Homel in a general way to justify the move of situational crime prevention into the psychological domain, rather than as the basis for the specific detail of the suggested crime prevention strategies. Instead, the new strategies have been developed largely through refinement of the existing classification system in order to rectify imprecision identified through practical experience and experimentation in the crime prevention field. For example, the new strategy "controlling disinhibitors" was split off from the existing strategy of "controlling facilitators." A consequence of this approach is that potentially useful avenues for inducing guilt implicit in the work of Sykes and Matza and of Bandura have been overlooked in the revised classification. The alternative approach suggested here is to derive strategies directly from the theories.

The argument advanced in both neutralization and social learning theories is that offenders are often able to avoid self-censure by cognitively redefining crime situations in a way which minimizes their personal culpability in their own eyes. Sykes and Matza suggested five specific techniques of neutralization, and Bandura (1976; 1977) listed ten techniques of cognitive disengagement. These techniques are shown in Table 2, along with examples of accompanying cognitive distortions. It can be seen that there is a great deal of similarity between the two groups of techniques. Bandura (1977) further suggested that these techniques can be grouped into four broad categories: those aimed at minimizing the legitimacy of rule proscribing the behavior; those aimed at minimizing the degree of personal responsibility for the behavior; those aimed at minimizing the negative consequences of the behavior; and those aimed at minimizing the worth or blamelessness of the victim.

Bandura (1976) argued that the ability to engage in such mental gymnastics often depends upon immediate environments and situations. He clearly recognised the crime prevention potential of his work. Referring

Table 2: Comparison of Sykes and Matza (1957) and Bandura (1976, 1977) *

General Purpose	Sykes and Matza	Bandura	Examples
Minimizing the rule	Appeal to higher loyalties Condemning the condemners	Justification in terms of higher principles Palliative comparison Euphemistic labelling	"I had to steal to help a friend" "The police are the real crooks" "At least I'm not a child-molester" "It's just tax minimization"
Minimizing personal responsibility	Denial of responsibility	Displacement of responsibility Diffusion of responsibility	"I was drunk and couldn't help myself" "I was only doing what I was told" "I was just part of a group"
Minimizing negative consequences	Denial of injury	Ignoring the consequences Minimizing the consequences Misconstruing the consequences	"The shop was insured" "I just gave her a few slaps" "She really enjoyed it"
Minimizing the victim	Denial of the victim	Dehumanizing the victim Blaming the victim	"She was just a whore" "He deserved what he got"

¹The format for this table was suggested by Ron Clarke and Ross Homel

to aggression, but raising implications for the control of anti-social behavior generally, he wrote:

Given the variety of self-disinhibiting devices, a society cannot rely solely on individuals, however noble their convictions, to protect against brutal deeds. Just as aggression is not rooted in the individual, neither does its control reside solely there. Humanness requires, in addition to benevolent personal codes, safeguards built into social systems that uphold compassionate behavior and discourage cruelty (p. 227).

Table 2 suggests four broad situational crime prevention strategies for inducing guilt in potential offenders, corresponding to the four categories of guilt-minimization. The first is "rule setting." The strategy is based on the principle that offenders may seek to deny the essential wrongness of their actions, and may even claim the moral high ground, by contrasting their behavior with the more heinous behavior of others, focusing on the corruption of those in power, redefining their actions using more palatable language, or claiming to be serving a higher moral principle. The general crime prevention strategy involves reinforcing the illegitimacy of the targeted behavior. This strategy subsumes Clarke and Homel's "rule setting," but also overlaps their strategy of "strengthening moral condemnation." Whereas Clarke and Homel viewed "rule setting" largely in terms of clarifying the legal status of a behavior (e.g., harassment codes, customs declarations), here it includes reiteration of the fundamental moral imperative (e.g., "shoplifting is stealing" signs). However, the strategy does not include the public shaming techniques which Clarke and Homel suggest for "strengthening moral condemnation" (e.g., the "bloody idiot" campaign which attempts to utilize peer pressure to modify drinking-and-driving behavior), being concerned only with personal evaluations of wrongness. This distinction between self-condemnation and public condemnation is taken up again later in this paper.

The second strategy is "clarifying responsibility" for the behavior. This strategy is based on the principle that offenders may avoid self-blame for their actions by citing external causal agents, blaming others, employing disinhibitors, claiming a lack of behavioral alternatives, or using groups, organisations or superiors to obscure their personal contribution to anti-social acts. The general crime prevention strategy involves constructing situations that minimize disinhibition and reinforce personal agency. This category subsumes Clarke and Homel's "controlling disinhibitors"

(e.g., server intervention) and "facilitating compliance" (e.g., improved library checkout) categories since both of these strategies seek to prevent offenders from blaming circumstances for their behavior. However, the scope is wider than this. For example, Bandura (1977) argued that the division of labor within organisations facilitates corruption by allowing individuals to hide behind a collective responsibility (as distinct from helping them avoid detection). Restructuring arrangements so that individuals perform discrete tasks forces them to take personal responsibility for their actions. Similarly, Zimbardo (1973) found that uniforms encourage a sense of collective identity in their wearers and weaken feelings of personal accountability. Zimbardo was originally interested in reducing the abuse of prisoners by prison officers, and argued that more informal modes of dress and the wearing of identifying name tags may help break down the sense of licence which anonymity and symbols of authority confer. Extending the principle, other applications may include controlling the wearing of gang "uniforms" in schools and other problem venues.

The third strategy is "clarifying consequences" of the proposed behavior. This strategy is based on the principle that offenders may seek to deny causing harm by portraying the outcome of their actions as being less serious than it really is, perhaps even denying that there is a victim. The general crime prevention strategy involves exposing offenders' attempts to gloss over the negative consequences of their behaviors. Health warnings on cigarette packets are an example of the use of this technique in the field of preventive medicine. This strategy is similar to Clarke and Homel's "strengthening moral condemnation," but differs in its emphasis on the outcome of the behavior rather than the ethical principle involved. Thus, rather than displaying signs equating shoplifting with stealing, the signs employing this strategy would emphasize the costs of shoplifting to the community. Using this principle, copyright messages on compact disks, computer software, videos and so forth emphasize the detrimental effects of piracy to the entertainment industry, and quarantine signs at airports and borders attempt to raise the consciousness (and conscience) of travellers about the possible devastation to local agriculture caused by importing undeclared foodstuffs and animal products. Also in this category are road-side signs warning about the effects of speeding and drinking and driving, and those indicating accident "black-spots."

The fourth strategy is "increasing victim worth." This strategy is based on the principle that people find it easier to victimize those who can be stereotyped as sub-human or unworthy, those who can be portrayed as

deserving of the fate which has befallen them, or even those who are simply outsiders or anonymous. The general crime prevention strategy involves creating environments and devising situations that minimize depersonalization and strengthen the emotional attachment between potential offenders and victims. This strategy is a rich source of crime prevention techniques largely ignored in Clarke and Homel's revised classification. Victim-offender conciliation programs, while not strictly crime prevention (since they occur after the fact), utilize the principle that it is more difficult to offend against people who have been invested with personal qualities (Launay, 1987). Investigating victim-offender relationships at the crime scene, Indermaur (1994, and in this volume) found that the offering of resistance during a robbery often had the effect of arousing "righteous indignation" in the offender. Indermaur suggests that victims need to adopt non-confrontational techniques in order to avoid providing "justification" for the offender to resort to violence. Appearance, dress and mannerisms may also facilitate the process of depersonalization and increase chances of victimisation. For example, Zimbardo (1973) showed that the wearing of uniforms and badges of outgroup membership by victims encouraged their stereotyping by aggressors. Dehumanisation may be further facilitated by the physical environments in which potential victims are located. The finding that victimisation rates are high in large housing estates and run-down ghettos (Newman, 1973; Pease, 1992) may be partly explained by the ease with which inhabitants of these environments are rendered anonymous and devoid of personal qualities.

The principle of reducing the opportunities for offenders to derogate their intended targets may be extended to include property or organisations as victims. Urban renewal and other environmental beautification programs may be successful crime prevention strategies not just because they increase the commitment of residents to guardianship (Fowler and Mangione, 1986; Lavrakas and Kushmuk, 1986; LeBeau, 1987), but also because they make it cognitively more difficult for offenders to justify vandalism and other crimes by removing the excuse that the area is rundown in any case. In a similar vein, prisoners are less likely to damage prison property when fittings are of good quality and a sense of territoriality over living areas is encouraged (Atlas and Dunham, 1990). Employee share schemes, incentive schemes and general attention to reducing job dissatisfaction may increase in employees a sense of attachment to a company and inhibit their ability to portray the company in ways

that justify acting fraudulently against it (Johnson, 1987; O'Block et al., 1991).

SHAME AND OTHER SOCIAL INFLUENCES

Shame is a complex concept in that it implies a degree of self-reproach (Grasmick and Bursik, 1990) that is often brought about by social condemnation (Braithwaite, 1989). However, there are sound theoretical reasons for disentangling the internal and social components of shame. A number of sociological and psychological perspectives support this distinction. Recent theorising in the deterrence literature has centered on expanding the notion of expected utility of criminal behavior beyond conventional consideration of state-imposed sanctions (Grasmick and Bursik, 1990; Williams and Hawkins, 1986). Specifically, these developments have emphasised the roles of both internalized norms and attachment to significant others as sources of potential punishment that need to be incorporated into the general deterrence model. Learning or behavioral theories have made similar distinctions. Traditionally, learning theorists have held that human behavior is regulated by its physical determinants (tangible rewards and punishments). However, social learning theory (Bandura, 1976, 1977) broadened the notion of the regulating consequences of behavior to include social determinants (praise and condemnation of others) and self-generated determinants (self-judgements of performance assessed against personal standards of behavior). Neutralizations or cognitive disengagements, then, are conceptualised as the selective activation of self-generated determinants.

Perhaps the distinction between guilt and shame is most clearly made in moral development theory (Kohlberg, 1976). This approach has fitted physical, social and personal controls on behavior into a developmental hierarchy of moral reasoning. In the pre-conventional stage of development, moral decisions are made in relation to the avoidance of physical punishment. In the conventional stage, the concern is primarily with appearing "nice" in the eyes of others. The post-conventional stage involves decisions of conscience. According to Kohlberg, behavior controlled by social reactions involves a lower order of reasoning than behavior controlled by self-evaluation (and behavior controlled by physical means is lower still). An explicit tenet of the hierarchical approach, then, is that one

can be sensitive to the opinions of others without feeling any personal sense of having done wrong.

The clearest example of the confound between guilt and shame in Clarke and Homel's revised classification is in their strategy of "increasing moral condemnation." As already noted, the techniques they suggest for this strategy involve both increasing self-condemnation ("shoplifting is stealing" signs) and subjecting the potential offender to public criticism (the "bloody idiot" drunk-driving campaign). Other techniques suggested in this category are ambiguous. The use of roadside speedometers is a technique to induce guilt when only the driver is made aware of the result; it is a method of shaming when other drivers are also made aware of the result.

In place of Clarke and Homel's "increasing moral condemnation," the strategy "increasing social condemnation" is suggested to more precisely capture the public criticism and embarrassment components of shaming. A number of specific techniques for increasing anticipated social condemnation have already been mentioned. There are undoubtedly others. While it addresses the lower end of the "crime" scale (and is possibly even apocryphal), the use of urine-sensitive swimming-pool dyes exemplifies the concept of utilizing the threat of public exposure to modify behavior. The prospect of suffering humiliation is also the basis of signs in shops depicting the social stigma associated with being caught shoplifting. An alternative approach is to persuade those affected by crime to be more vociferous in their condemnation of offenders. Brantingham (1986) reports a study showing that when school repair costs were taken from that school's film budget, peer pressure on offenders resulted in a significant reduction in vandalism. Elements of social embarrassment can also be found in existing strategies. Merchandise tags ("entry/exit screening") that set off clamorous alarms draw public attention as well as alerting security staff to a theft. Similarly, the success of "natural surveillance" and "surveillance by employees" may partly depend upon the fact that illegal behavior will be viewed and condemned by others.

Situational social influence, however, is not restricted to fear of condemnation. In some cases illegal behavior can be socially rewarded. This occurs particularly within delinquent subcultures (Bandura, 1976). Thus, an additional strategy under the category of social controls is "reducing social approval" for illegal acts. The most obvious way to operationalize this strategy is through controlling the opportunities for offenders to reinforce one another. Crime and violence within schools may be reduced

by altering patterns of contact and interaction among members of delinquent cliques (Hawkins and Lishner, 1987). Parents employ a similar principle of structuring social reinforcements when they screen their children's associates (Le Blanc, 1995). Limiting the extent to which other members of the subculture become aware of a delinquent act may also reduce opportunities for social reinforcement. Clarke and Homel's suggested technique of rapid cleaning of graffiti, which they give as an example of "denying benefits," may be more appropriately listed under this strategy, since many of the benefits for the graffitist are reaped in increased subcultural status (Sloan-Howitt and Kelling, 1992). The decision by television stations (in Australia at least) not to broadcast "streaking" and other field invasions by spectators at sporting events also aims to contain the reinforcing publicity that such behavior attracts.

Social condemnation and approval are consequent determinants of behavior, that is, they are situational crime prevention strategies inasmuch as they can be manipulated to alter the anticipated social outcomes for criminal acts, Bandura (1977) has made the point that behavior is also under the control of antecedent determinants that act as situational instigators for action. One such social cue to engage in behavior is the observation of someone else performing that behavior, particularly when the actor is of high status or is respected by the observer. For example, a pedestrian (especially one who is well dressed) crossing the street against a red light will readily induce others to follow (Lefkowitz et al., 1955). This suggests that an important addition to existing situational crime prevention strategies is "reducing imitation." The general strategy involves exposing potential offenders to prosocial models or reducing the opportunity for potential offenders to imitate others performing antisocial acts. Supervisors, then, can reduce employee fraud or other forms of corruption by setting high and conspicuous standards of probity for subordinates (O'Block et al., 1991). Conveniently, models need not appear in-person. The principle that people will imitate models underpins public education campaigns (litter reduction, seat-belt wearing, etc.) that enlist the endorsement of celebrities, and also provides the rationale for restricting or censoring media portrayals of pornography and violence (Lab, 1992). (Although, arguably, both of these measures only qualify as situational crime prevention if they are carried out near the site of potential crimes). In many cases it is the observed result of illegal behavior which provides the model rather than observation of the act itself. Cleaning of graffiti not only denies the offender social rewards, but also removes the inducement

for others to imitate his or her feats. A similar explanation can be applied to the finding that rapid repair of vandalism inhibits further vandalism (Challinger, 1992). Attempts can also be made to neutralize or discredit antisocial models. Kallis and Varnier (1985) recommended that the most effective anti-shoplifting signs are "Make a choice on your own—don't shoplift." which are designed to help potential offenders withstand the effects of peer influence.

The final suggested strategy involving social controls is "crowd management." That individuals behave differently when in the presence of others than when alone is social psychology's *raison d'etre*. Like models, crowds can act as situational instigators of behavior. Specifically, crowds are associated with two broad psychological processes relevant to criminal behavior. First, belonging to a crowd can cause members to deindividuate—to submerge their identities within the group—resulting in their decreased ability to self-monitor their behavior and permitting them to engage in acts that they would ordinarily not perform (Prentice-Dunn and Rogers, 1989; Zimbardo, 1969). Deindividuation is commonly associated with mob violence (Colman, 1991). Second, being crowded—subjected to high density conditions—can cause individuals to suffer increased stress, anxiety and frustration, which can trigger hostility and aggression (Paulus and Nagar, 1989). For example, crowding has been shown to be related to levels of urban crime (Gove et al., 1979), disciplinary infractions in prisons (Cox et al., 1984) and nightclub disturbances (Macintyre and Homel, in press; Ramsay, 1986).

Deindividuation is a form of psychological disinhibition and as such has already been dealt with under the strategy of "clarifying responsibility." "Crowd management," then, is concerned here largely with the problem of crowding. At its simplest level, reducing crowding involves either reducing the number of people in a given environment, or increasing the available space for those people. The most obvious way for establishments to reduce crowding is to set lower limits to patron numbers. This type of strategy is well established in the crime prevention literature. The concept of entry controls to reduce congestion is a feature of crime prevention through environmental design (Newman, 1973), and is also covered to some extent in the "deflecting offenders" category in Clarke and Homel's classification. However, crowd management is broader than this. The experience of crowding involves a perceptual dimension, and so the crowding effects can be moderated by a number of social and architectural features in the environment (Paulus and Nagar, 1989). For example.

positive mood states and efficient room design can reduce the effects of social density, while windows and high ceilings can increase the sense of spaciousness. Thus, disorder has been found to be lower in nightclubs that create a relaxing ambience (Ramsay, 1986). Similarly, Macintyre and Homel (in press) found that nightclub violence was reduced by floor plans that regulated traffic flow and minimized unnecessary jostling. Given this expanded view of crowd management, creation of a separate category seems warranted.

Table 3: Proposed Fourth and Fifth Columns of Situational Techniques

Increasing Social Controls	Inducing Guilt
<p><i>Increasing social condemnation:</i> "bloody idiot" campaign enlisting support of victims public roadside speedometer</p>	<p><i>Rule setting:</i> harassment codes customs declarations "shoplifting is stealing" signs</p>
<p><i>Reducing social approval:</i> dispersing school gangs screening children's associates non-televising of "streaking"</p>	<p><i>Clarifying responsibility:</i> server intervention assigning discrete tasks limiting uniform use</p>
<p><i>Reducing imitation:</i> rapid repair of vandalism discrediting models supervisors as exemplars</p>	<p><i>Clarifying consequences:</i> copyright messages quarantine warning signs accident "black-spot" warnings</p>
<p><i>Crowd management:</i> limiting patron density creating pleasant club ambience regulating patron flow</p>	<p><i>Increasing victim worth:</i> victim cooperation strategies avoiding outgroup insignnia environmental beautification</p>

The two separate columns suggested to replace Clarke and Homel's single category of "inducing guilt and shame" column are shown in Table 3.

CONCLUSIONS: "HARD" AND "SOFT" SITUATIONAL PREVENTION

According to Clarke (1992), situational crime prevention "relies... not upon improving society or its institutions, but simply upon reducing opportunities for crime" (p. 3). Criticisms of the situational model have typically dwelt on the target-hardening aspects of opportunity reduction. Such measures have been portrayed as narrow and simplistic responses to crime that take insufficient account of offender motivations (Trasler, 1986). Moreover, concerns have been raised about the social implications of the unfettered application of target-hardening principles (Bottoms, 1990; Grabosky, 1994. and in this volume; Weiss, 1987). Taken to its logical conclusion, so the argument goes, situational crime prevention engenders public fear and distrust, and encourages the development of a siege mentality. Not only is this vision of society unappealing, a reliance on target-hardening can produce effects opposite to those sought. Walls, guards, conspicuous security devices and the like divide rather than build communities by separating and isolating their members. At some point, then, situational crime prevention runs the danger of becoming counter-productive, creating the very social conditions which foster criminal behavior.

These attacks on the situational model have not gone unchallenged (Clarke, 1992). Even so, the developments proposed in Clarke and Homel (in press), and expanded upon in this paper, help to "soften" the hard-edged, "locks-and-bolts" image of situational crime prevention by forcing a wider interpretation of opportunity reduction. The explicit recognition of the role of psychological and social "opportunities" to commit crime suggests a range of new, often less obtrusive ways of countering criminal behavior at the situational level. These "soft" strategies rely on providing immediate moral and social support to the prospective offender, and may be readily contrasted with the more usual "hard" constraining techniques of situational prevention.

Presented with alternative "hard" and "soft" situational prevention strategies, researchers and practitioners may need to make careful decisions about the appropriate approach for a given crime problem. For some offenders, "soft" approaches may be quite ineffective. Kohlberg's work on moral development suggests that pre-conventional moral reasoners are essentially motivated by external rewards and punishments, and will be

largely unmoved by social pressure or appeals to their conscience. Thus, while attempts by victims to elicit pity might deter some rapists, other rapists will be deaf to such pleas and may even be further aroused by them (Cohen et al., 1971). On the other hand, techniques designed to induce guilt and social embarrassment may prove particularly useful for crimes involving relatively uncommitted offenders, such as those involved in minor acts of juvenile delinquency, and white-collar crimes, where the offender can be assumed to have a considerable stake in conformity.

More interestingly, in some cases "hard" and "soft" approaches might suggest contradictory solutions. Opposing philosophies of prison design offer a good example this. Using conventional target-hardening techniques, prison officers can be protected from possible assaults from inmates by the installation of bars and bullet-proof glass, and by the use of technology such as automatic doors that minimize the need for personal contact between the two groups (Atlas and Dunham, 1990). Yet these strategies also serve to facilitate the process of depersonalization, which may make officers cognitively more acceptable targets for assault should the opportunity arise. The alternative strategy is to reduce the physical barriers separating inmates and staff, and encourage greater interpersonal contact between the two groups. Ultimately, officers may well be safer in an environment in which they are known and treated as individuals by the inmates (and *vice versa*). The extent to which this principle can be applied more generally is problematic. For example, providing security screens for taxi drivers appears to have been relatively successful and to have produced few apparent side effects (Chaiken et al., 1992). Nevertheless, the expanded situational model provides a starting point for analysing the unintended psychological and social impact of target-hardening measures, and may help researchers strike the balance between appropriate opportunity reduction and a "fortress society."



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